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Abstract
Asset recovery (AR) refers to the process through which criminals are 
deprived o f  the proceeds o f crime. Despite strong support for AR in the policy arena, 
virtually no work to date has confirmed that it reduces (or should theoretically reduce) 
crime. This thesis seeks to fill this gap in understanding.
The thesis begins with an examination o f the theoretical support for AR, 
drawing on the economics of criminal behaviour. This chapter probes the claims 
made throughout the literature, illustrating how different approaches to AR should 
have different impacts on crime.
AR powers are likely ineffective in reducing crime if  offenders’ 
spending/saving behaviour renders them with little to recover. This next chapter 
examines offenders’ spending/saving using data from the UK’s Joint Assets Recovery 
Database.
Offenders can and will take steps to hide the fruits of their labours, and AR 
will be toothless if  offenders can do so. Most AR regimes include anti-money 
laundering (AML) components to prevent offenders from hiding their proceeds. The 
crime-reduction efficacy o f AML policies is a function o f the ability o f offenders to 
reduce their exposure to AR; o f banks/etc. to alert law enforcement when they 
know/suspect that an offender is laundering; and o f law enforcement to make use o f 
the information provided. The latter two issues are considered in turn.
Banks/etc. must alert law enforcement (by filing suspicious activity reports, or 
SARs) if they know/suspect that an offender is laundering proceeds. While this 
requirement likely deters some criminality, reporting does not deter all offenders.
This chapter explores whether banks/etc. targeting o f laundering represents more 
signal than noise.
Finally, as the criminality o f the undeterred who have been identified by 
banks/etc. will only be reduced if  law enforcement uses the SARs sent to them, the 
final chapter explores the law enforcement’s actual use and management o f SARs.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Asset recovery refers to the process through which criminals are deprived o f 
the proceeds/profits and/or instrumentalities o f crime. Asset recovery provisions— 
which commonly include criminal and/or civil confiscation, seizure and forfeiture, 
and in some cases taxation o f criminal eamings—are employed in the legislation o f 
jurisdictions worldwide, to varying degrees and for varying reasons, chiefly to fight 
profit-driven crime and terrorism.1 Asset recovery has become increasingly popular 
in the international arena: countries are encouraged by the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF), for example, to introduce confiscation legislation to counter money 
laundering, and recent attention has focused on confiscation as a means to counter the 
financing o f terrorism. Further, asset recovery enjoys high regard as an important 
component o f any domestic crime-control policy package. Along these lines, this 
research is motivated by developments in the United Kingdom, where a considerable 
expansion o f the asset recovery powers available to the criminal justice system has 
been brought about with the introduction o f the Proceeds o f Crime Act 2002 (POCA), 
a product o f the Government’s Asset Recovery Strategy.
What explains the use of asset recovery? A Cabinet Office report 
commissioned by Prime Minister Tony Blair— a document considered to be a driving 
force behind the introduction o f POCA and the concomitant expansion o f asset 
recovery powers— sums up the issues. It states that asset recovery can, among other 
things: deter people from crime by reducing the returns that can be anticipated; 
disrupt criminal networks and markets with an impact on volume crime (by removing 
the seed capital for future criminality); improve crime detection rates generally by 
providing a deeper understanding o f criminal markets; and potentially generate 
significant revenue flows (PIU, 2000). O f course, asset recovery also serves larger 
political ends: being in favour o f depriving criminals o f their criminal proceeds plays 
to a tough-on-crime image, regardless o f asset recovery’s efficacy.
But while the efficacy o f asset recovery as tool in the fight against crime 
seems reasonable prima facie, no empirical research has yet confirmed the validity o f
1 While the concepts remain the same, many jurisdictions employ different labels for confiscation, 
forfeiture, and the like. This research employs the general catch-phrase asset recovery to refer to all 
powers held by the state to deprive offenders o f  criminal proceeds/profits/instrumentalities.
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these assertions, particularly that asset recovery reduces crime. Some authors 
implicitly or explicitly question the efficacy o f asset recovery, and/or suggest that its 
use may have unintended consequences, such as: rather than cease criminal activity, 
offenders who have had their assets confiscated might feel compelled to re-offend (or 
to do so at a greater rate than normal) to provide for their basic needs or to maintain a 
certain standard o f living; and/or offenders may simply take avoidance measures—  
money laundering measures—to hide their assets better, rendering asset recovery 
powerless to reduce crime. Further, strands o f the literature suggest that asset 
recovery may present a challenge to traditional judicial standards of privacy, fairness, 
and human rights.
So the question remains, motivating this research: is asset recovery (and, 
indeed, supportive anti-money laundering policy) an effective public policy? That is, 
does asset recovery reduce crime? Moreover, asset recovery is a broad concept 
comprised o f numerous specific powers, including the ability o f  the state to recover 
assets used in crime, or purchased directly with criminal eamings, or representing a 
value equivalent to the proceeds/profits of crime. More specifically, then, should 
different approaches to asset recovery have differing impacts on crime? What are the 
assumptions that underlie the efficacy o f the approach— and are these reasonable? 
What are the weak spots? This thesis explores these issues as a step on the long road 
o f analysis— primarily by establishing a means o f examining the efficacy o f asset 
recovery, as opposed to testing asset recovery’s efficacy itself. This last point is 
critical: following Levi and Maguire (2004), it seems unreasonable to assume that 
there exists a single, straightforward approach to empirically evaluating asset 
recovery’s impact on crime (at least at present, with crippling limitations in data 
availability presenting one of many considerable hurdles). This implies that there is a 
long road o f discovery ahead, o f  which this thesis is a part.
The thesis seeks to contribute to the current state of knowledge—by 1) 
drawing on the body of literature grounded in the work o f Becker (1968) on the 
economics o f  crime and criminal behaviour (which has been advanced and expanded 
upon in the decades since, notably in the field of law-and-economics); and 2) 
exploring the weaknesses of the policy approach when viewed in this light. The
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thesis, as a public policy thesis, reflects the multi-disciplinarity of the field of public 
policy, and itself employs multiple social science methods and sources o f data.
This thesis is structured as follows: after this introduction, a background 
chapter describes asset recovery in greater detail; the relevant literature is 
summarised; and the theoretical foundations o f asset recovery (from the standpoint o f 
the economics o f criminal behaviour) are presented. The theory chapter serves to 
explore the underlying mechanism(s) through which asset recovery should work.
From this, three policy weaknesses are explored. The first such exploration 
examines the fact that offenders may be judgment proof. That is, they may spend the 
proceeds o f criminality, and in so doing may leave little or nothing for recovery, with 
clear implications for the ability o f asset recovery to deter/disrupt crime. Of course, 
offenders may simply hide the proceeds of crime. While financial investigators seek 
to discover all proceeds/assets, hidden or not, they may not always be successful. So 
the efficacy o f  asset recovery as a crime-reduction policy will be undermined by 
offenders’ ability to truly squirrel assets from view— i.e. to launder their proceeds. 
Countries like the UK have active anti-money laundering policy-packages, the main 
plank of which relates to suspicious activity reports (SARs) regimes. The crime- 
reduction success o f a SARs regime is a function o f three things: 1) offenders’ ability 
to creatively hide assets from view (or at least to make otherwise suspicious activity 
seem legitimate); 2) the reporting sector’s ability to spot suspicion when confronted 
with it; and 3) LEAs’ ability to make efficient/effective use of the SARs provided by 
the reporting sector. This thesis explores the latter two subjects, namely SARs 
targeting and LEA use o f SARs, as two distinct chapters. Lastly, a conclusion chapter 
summarizes the overall analysis and discusses its implications.
Most o f the material in this thesis has appeared in one form or another prior to 
inclusion here, and has benefited greatly from the comments of reviewers and 
research consumers. The chapter on the economics o f asset recovery was presented at 
the Midterm Meeting o f the European Law and Economics Association in Ghent, 
Belgium, in January 2005. The chapter on law enforcement agencies’ use o f SARs 
was produced for ACPO and the Home Office in mid-late 2005 (and has been 
summarised in numerous presentations since). And the chapters on the judgment
11
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proof problem and SARs targeting were both produced for the Home Office in early 
2006.
Finally, note that the UK’s criminal justice system (particularly law 
enforcement components discussed in the chapters which follow) has changed. Her 
Majesty’s Customs and Excise and the Inland Revenue were folded into one agency, 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, in April 2005. Similarly, the National Crime 
Squad, the National Criminal Intelligence Service, parts of Her Majesty’s Customs 
and Excise, and various other smaller agencies were folded into the Serious Organised 
Crime Agency in April 2006. The thesis employs the agency names used when each 
chapter was written (so historical names are used).
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2.1. Overview
Asset recovery is identified variously as criminal and/or civil confiscation, 
asset and/or cash seizure and forfeiture, taxation of criminal proceeds, the removal o f 
illegal gain, and/or the recovery o f the proceeds of crime. There are no agreed-upon 
definitions employed in the international literature (or the broader policy arena); this 
research employs the catch-phrase asset recovery to represent the process through 
which criminals are deprived o f criminal proceeds/profits and/or the instrumentalities 
o f crime.2 Asset recovery powers are employed for many reasons, including: as part 
o f an anti-drug strategy, generally in the fight against crime, to counter money 
laundering, or to counter the financing of terrorism. From a crime-fighting 
perspective, however, asset recovery is generally regarded as a tool in the fight 
against profit-driven crime, including acquisitive and organized crime. Asset 
recovery is in its youth: though its origins can be traced to medieval times, asset 
recovery regimes have only existed in most countries since the 1970s (since 1986 in 
the UK).
In practice— and in the most general terms— asset recovery is a multi-prong, 
multi-stage process o f some complexity, involving numerous entities, including the 
police (broadly defined to include the Police Service, Customs, and other 
investigative bodies), prosecution service, courts, and possibly receivers. Most asset 
recovery legal proceedings are based on police financial investigations, which trace 
the assets and liabilities/income and expenditure o f offenders. Financial 
investigations require the cooperation and input, usually compelled through various 
legal orders, o f the financial sector, law firms, accounting firms, tax authorities, 
benefits/social security offices, and the like. These organizations may be based within 
the local jurisdiction o f the investigative body, in-country, or even overseas, and may 
include law enforcement authorities o f foreign jurisdictions. The findings o f the 
financial investigation are relayed to the prosecuting authority, who may or may not 
take the case forward. If the case is taken forward, a judge then determines the merits 
o f the case (usually on a civil standard o f proof) and serves some form o f asset-
2 An important distinction is drawn between the recovery o f  gross proceeds and net profits, discussed in 
greater detail below.
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recovery-specific punishment (asset recovery proceedings are often distinct from the 
sentencing phase o f a criminal case). Finally, an enforcement authority may then 
become involved to ensure offender compliance with the court’s determination. The 
success or failure of most asset recovery cases rests in large part on the ability o f an 
offender to hide the existence and location of assets (i.e., the proceeds/profits o f crime 
and realizable assets), o f the police authority to uncover such assets, and o f all 
relevant bodies and cooperating organizations (including the prosecution and the 
courts, and even criminal justice entities in foreign countries) to be familiar with the 
law, to cooperate, and to act expeditiously (Levi (2003) comes to a similar 
conclusion). Cases can take anywhere between several months to several years.
Importantly, the authorities can only recover what is realisable, and, therefore, 
a criminal who has benefited considerably from crime, but who has no realisable 
assets— that is, someone who has saved neither illegitimate nor legitimate income, 
perhaps spending everything on a live-fast lifestyle—will generally not be subject to 
asset recovery penalties (in this sense, then, asset recovery is like a fine whose size is 
conditional on the proceeds o f criminality, but also conditional on wealth). This has 
broad implications for the efficacy o f asset recovery.
By way o f example: a drug trafficker is arrested by the police and ultimately 
convicted, receiving a term o f imprisonment of several years. In separate 
proceedings, the authorities (i.e., police, prosecution, court) determine that the 
offender earned a certain amount o f money from his criminality; the offender is then 
billed for this criminality. The bill is what is commonly known in the UK as a 
confiscation order. Prior to the introduction o f confiscation, the offender might have 
been free to enjoy the fruits o f his labours upon release from prison.
2.2. Asset Recovery Powers and Provisions: A Taxonomy
In the example above, confiscation represents an asset recovery power. But 
asset recovery is a multi-faceted policy instrument, and confiscation is only one of 
many powers within the broader tool-box o f an asset recovery regime. Approaches to 
asset recovery include the following: recovering assets which have been used to 
commit a crime (e.g., speedboats, cars), commonly known as the instrumentalities o f 
crime; recovering assets purchased directly with the proceeds o f crime; recovering a 
value equivalent to the proceeds o f crime; and taxing the proceeds of crime (in the
14
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likely event that offenders have not paid tax on criminal eamings). These asset 
recovery powers and various important provisions are discussed in turn below.3
2.2.1. Powers
Recovery o f  instrumentalities
Jurisdictions may recover the instrumentalities o f crime. These are the tools 
o f crime, though they may be assets which if used in other ways would not themselves 
be criminal. That is, the authorities may recover items which are illegal in their own 
right, like certain types o f firearms or drugs, and/or they may recover the boat used to 
smuggle the drugs or the house/car in which they were concealed. The boat, house, 
and car only represent instrumentalities if  used for illegal purposes.4 Cash may also 
be an instrument o f crime, and cash seizure powers in many jurisdictions allow cash 
suspected o f being the proceeds o f crime or intended for use in crime to be seized by 
the authorities on-the-spot. The recovery o f instmmentalities is primarily regarded as 
an in rem power (in which the action o f the state is directed against the thing—cash, 
house, boat— not the individual). A cash seizure, then, says nothing about the guilt or 
innocence o f the individual in possession o f the cash.
Recovery o f direct purchases
Many jurisdictions allow the authorities to recover assets purchased directly 
with criminal proceeds. An example o f this might be the recovery o f a car purchased 
directly with money earned through the sale o f cocaine (whereby the house, if 
purchased directly with legitimate eamings, may remain in criminal hands). One 
difficulty with direct purchase recovery is the forensic accounting headache 
associated with determining the items purchased directly with criminal funds. There 
may, o f course, be overlap between instrumentalities and direct purchases: the 
speedboat used to smuggle cocaine may have been purchased directly with the
3 Importantly, the intent o f  the present research— and o f  this section in particular— is to set the stage for 
an economic analysis o f the different asset recovery provisions, not to provide a thorough treatment o f  
the history or law o f  asset recovery (historical and legal perspectives are provided by a number o f  
authors; see, for example, Stessens (2000)).
4 Their recovery is often contentious (e.g., should a house be confiscated simply because someone used 
prohibited narcotics inside its walls?).
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proceeds o f previous criminality. Recovery of direct purchases is primarily an in rem 
power.
Recovery o f an equivalent value
Jurisdictions also often allow for the recovery o f a value equivalent to the 
proceeds/profits o f crime. Recovery o f an equivalent value is in many ways like a 
fine: guided by the amount estimated by the authorities to be criminal proceeds, a 
confiscation order (i.e., the “bill” for criminality referred to in the drug trafficker 
example above) specifies the sum to be paid to the state—but it does not specify 
which assets (e.g., cash, savings, house, car) should be used to satisfy the order.5 
Kilchling (2001) notes such a system has two principal benefits: “concealment, 
displacement or destruction o f assets is irrelevant; and the grasp to legal property is 
made possible.” Equivalent value recovery is regarded as an in personam  action, and 
is directed at the offender.
Taxation
A long-standing— though seldom used— power held by many states is the 
ability to tax all income, regardless of its source (i.e., irrespective of the legality or 
illegality o f the income-generating activity). Criminal eamings may be taxed, with 
interest and penalties for non-payment, by tax agencies or criminal justice entities. 
Taxation is often used as a fail-safe, if other avenues (e.g., recovery o f an equivalent 
value of criminal proceeds) are tried and found to be unsuccessful.
2.2.2. Provisions
Proceeds v. profits
The discussion has highlighted the difference between proceeds/profits (by 
always using both words when appropriate). This is because states often choose to 
recover gross criminal proceeds. In this case, the authorities may seek to recover the 
gross proceeds o f a crime or series of crimes, which will not be net of costs. Proceeds 
recovery is a contentious issue in certain jurisdictions. Debate on the appropriateness 
of proceeds recovery surrounds the question o f whether such a penalty should be
5 A variation o f this is sometimes referred to as the substitution o f  assets; see Pianin (1982).
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punitive or reparative (i.e., whether the offender should be put in a position which 
leaves him worse off than he was prior to committing the offence, of if it should 
simply leave him in the status quo ante).
General v. particular criminal conduct
Several jurisdictions allow for the recovery o f the proceeds/profits o f general 
aggregate criminal behaviour, not simply the particular offence for which the offender 
may have been caught and convicted (or perhaps not even convicted, as noted), 
subject to certain criteria. Criteria usually include being convicted o f a certain serious 
offences, or a number of lesser offences within a specified time frame. If criteria are 
satisfied, the court finds the offender to have a criminal lifestyle. In many ways, this 
is similar to using a higher penalty for repeat offenders (in the spirit o f “three-strikes- 
and-you’re-out” legislation).
Provisions to prevent avoidance
Offenders may choose to spend criminal eamings (or even non-criminal 
eamings, given the use o f equivalent value confiscation) only in the event that the 
authorities become aware o f their activities. Once arrested, or once it otherwise 
becomes clear that the authorities are closing in (perhaps the offender is given a tip 
that the authorities are on to him), it may be in the interest of the offender to move 
assets out o f sight or to spend them, before the authorities can recover them. 
Restraint prohibits such asset dissipation: for example, the authorities may place 
bank accounts or real estate under restraint, and any parties who disobey the restraint 
(e.g., bank staff, estate agents, solicitors) can be held in contempt of court.
Alternatively, offenders may simply refuse to comply with asset recovery 
punishments. In this case, most jurisdictions allow for the use o f other state- 
sanctioned forms o f punishment. Noncompliant offenders may be remanded in 
custody for a period of time in what is known as a default sentence. But the default 
sentence is not a term o f imprisonment in lieu o f payment; rather, the offender faces a 
debt overhang, as a confiscation order is only satisfied when paid in full. If  an 
offender who has not complied with a confiscation order is ever seen by the 
authorities to be living well— even if  he/she has served a default sentence— the 
authorities may revisit the matter and confiscate up to the originally court-approved
17
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amount. Finally, receivers may be appointed to manage the assets o f an offender 
(usually an imprisoned offender); receivers will normally sell off assets to satisfy 
confiscation orders.
Offenders may seek to simply hide assets out o f sight o f the authorities. But 
asset recovery has a broad reach. Overseas provisions o f asset recovery regimes 
permit criminal justice systems to confiscate the proceeds of criminal conduct held 
outside the country in question and prevent offenders from simply parking assets 
offshore.
Finally, most asset recovery regimes include anti-money laundering (AML) 
provisions. Money laundering is the “process by which the proceeds of crime are 
converted into assets which appear to have a legitimate origin, so that they can be 
retained permanently or recycled into further criminal enterprises” (Explanatory 
Notes to the Proceeds o f Crime Act, 2002). If offenders can easily hide the existence 
and location o f  assets (through money laundering), then asset recovery legislation is 
likely to be o f limited use in the fight against crime. AML provisions close many of 
the most important loopholes in asset recovery legislation by prohibiting the 
concealing, arranging, or acquiring o f criminal property. Further, AML provisions 
take advantage o f what is referred to as the regulated sector o f financial institutions, 
lawyers, accountants: actors in the regulated sector must disclose all suspected money 
laundering transactions, or else be themselves liable for prosecution.
Separate proceedings/recovery without conviction
Asset recovery may or may not represent a component of the overall criminal 
sentence. That is, convicted offenders may find themselves sentenced by the courts 
for the offence(s) in question (and thus given one or more o f a variety of custodial and 
non-custodial punishments, including imprisonment and fines), and then later be 
subject to asset recovery proceedings and penalties. This implies that asset recovery 
is usually an increase in overall sentence severity as perceived by the offender (even if  
asset recovery may technically be separate from the sentencing process). In some 
states, certain penalties, such as fines, are taken into consideration when the size of a 
confiscation order is determined. This has the effect o f  watering down the increase in 
sentence severity (though is generally done for practical reasons: the offender will
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only have so much in the way o f wealth to pay fines/confiscation orders, discussed 
below).
Along these lines, states may permit the application of asset recovery powers 
even in the event an offender avoids conviction. That is, not only may asset recovery 
proceedings be distinct from the traditional post-conviction sentencing phase, they 
may also be used in the event that no prosecution is advanced by the state, or before 
such action, or in the event that criminal conviction fails.6 This allows asset recovery 
powers to be used together in a holistic sense, as a policy package, described briefly 
below.
2.2.3. Adding it up; the UK asset recovery regime
Given the raft o f  available options, what does an asset recovery regime look 
like in practice? Most jurisdictions, not surprisingly, maintain regimes which 
encompass many or all o f  the powers and provisions described above. In brief, the 
regime in the UK is broadly as follows:7 if the authorities choose to pursue asset 
recovery actions, they must attempt criminal confiscation first. Criminal confiscation 
is the recovery o f an equivalent value of criminal proceeds; depending on the 
circumstances, this may represent up to six years o f proceeds (i.e., if  the offender is 
determined to have a criminal lifestyle). If  criminal confiscation should fail (perhaps 
because the offender escapes criminal conviction, or because the confiscation itself 
fails at some stage), the authorities may turn to civil recovery (the recovery of assets 
purchased directly with criminal eamings), followed by taxation of criminal eamings. 
Recovery of instrumentalities occurs at any stage, and includes cash seizure (the 
recovery o f cash suspected of being the proceeds o f crime or for use in crime). 
Restraint, receivers, default sentences, debt overhang, and overseas/AML provisions 
all act to limit the avoidance by offenders o f asset recovery sanctions.
6 Powers are often prioritised, with the state favouring the use o f  one particular power unless 
circumstances require otherwise.
7 Several sources provide in-depth treatments o f asset recovery legislation in the UK; see, for example, 
Millington and Williams (2003), Mitchell et al (2003), Rees and Hall (2003). Note that minor 
differences in policy exist between England & Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, though such 
differences are not discussed here.
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3.1. Overview
Much o f the literature surrounding asset recovery is in fact part o f a larger 
body o f legal and political work on money laundering or the war on drugs. In this 
regard, various sources simply encourage—or discourage— the use of asset recovery 
or describe its role in the larger anti-money laundering (AML) and criminal justice (or 
anti-terrorism) policy mix. Other sources focus on comparative issues surrounding 
the implementation and use o f AML and asset recovery legislation in various 
countries. Still other sources discuss the ability of asset recovery to generate revenue, 
in which efficacy is judged by amounts recovered in monetary terms, not reductions 
in rates o f crime. Finally, a small handful of sources explores the relationship of asset 
recovery to criminal behaviour and its potential to reduce crime. It is this handful 
which is o f greatest interest to the current programme o f research, and the discussion 
below largely focuses on the following documents, with others mentioned as 
necessary: Bowles et al (2000); Fried (1988); Levi (2003); Levi and Osofsky (1995); 
Naylor (1999b); and Performance and Innovation Unit o f the Cabinet Office, 
hereinafter PIU (2000).8 Strongest support for asset recovery amongst these comes 
from PIU, and strongest criticism comes from Naylor; the remaining relevant authors 
seem broadly supportive, though aware o f asset recovery’s limitations as well as its 
potential.
Numerous other sources only briefly mention but do not further explore the 
ability o f asset recovery to reduce crime. Such sources often focus on asset 
recovery’s role in the AML/drug control/criminal justice policy mix, on cross-country 
legislative comparisons, or on revenue generation, or may explore asset recovery from 
a human rights perspective. These sources include documents released by various 
government departments and agencies and NGOs (see, for example, Home Office 
(2002b) or Savona et al (2001)). They are not discussed in detail here given the 
limited depth o f  their contribution to the present analysis. There is also a sizable legal
8 Three articles by Naylor (2002, 1999a, 1999b) bear strong resemblance to each other; though they 
differ enough to warrant individual mention on occasion, reference here will be made primarily to 
Naylor (1999b). Also, Levi (1997) and Levi and Osofsky (1995) are o f  a similar nature; reference here 
will be made primarily to the latter.
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literature in the United States on the American forfeiture regime (particularly on civil 
forfeiture), a literature whose focus is not crime reduction, but the legality, 
proportionality, and desirability o f the regime. Further, a small but developing body 
of work discusses the financing o f terrorism, with a focus on foreign policy and/or the 
extent to which policies to counter terrorist financing should mirror policies to counter 
money laundering. These bodies o f work are similarly not discussed here in great 
detail (though for more information on the US forfeiture regime, see, for example, 
Tonry (1997), Jaipaul (1999), and also Worrall (2001); for more information on 
terrorist financing, see, for example, Greenberg et al (2002)). Finally, a large 
literature describes the economics o f crime and criminal behaviour, though not 
specifically asset recovery. This body of economic work will be employed in the 
programme of research to explore asset recovery in greater theoretical and empirical 
detail, but for the purposes o f this review will not be discussed.
Implicit in much of the existing literature—be it on money-laundering or the 
war on drugs generally or asset recovery and crime specifically— is the assumption 
that asset recovery is an efficacious anti-crime tool; this assumption, however, 
remains untested: no empirical research has yet been carried out on asset recovery to 
determine its crime-reduction efficacy. Further, very little work justifies the use of 
asset recovery from a theoretical perspective, and much o f the literature seems to rely 
not on theory or empirical evidence, but rather on anecdotal evidence or conjecture.
3.2. Support for and Opposition to Asset Recovery
What explains the use of asset recovery? Most sources propose reasons— 
assertions, given their untested nature— supporting the use o f asset recovery, though 
depth of coverage varies considerably.9 This is not to say that all o f the relevant 
sources concur with supporting assertions: some authors may mention various reasons 
for the use of asset recovery simply to later discuss how such reasons may be flawed.
9 Asset recovery powers manifest themselves differently in different jurisdictions: some countries may 
allow for the seizure and forfeiture o f assets (instrumentalities) used in the commission o f a crime (e.g. 
a speedboat used in drug-running), some may confiscate assets purchased directly with criminal 
proceeds, and others may confiscate a value equivalent to the proceeds/profits o f  crime— while some 
countries may do all (see Stessens (2000) for a discussion). Claims made in the literature generally do 
not differentiate between approaches (with the exception o f  Fried (1988) and many o f  the sources 
focussing on civil forfeiture in the US). Also, the wording o f assertions differs between authors but the 
concepts broadly remain the same.
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In any case, supporting assertions, which are fairly straightforward, fall into 
categories on crime reduction, revenue, and punishment.'0
With regard to crime reduction, based on the assumption that much crime is 
motivated by profit, asset recovery is claimed to deter crime by reducing the expected 
gains from criminality (Bowles et al, 2000; Fried, 1988; Levi, 2003; Levi and 
Osofsky, 1995; Naylor, 1999b; PIU, 2000); to disrupt criminal networks and markets 
with an impact on volume crime by removing the seed capital for future criminality 
(Fried, 1988; Levi, 2003; Levi and Osofsky, 1995; Naylor, 1999b; PIU, 2000);11 to 
improve crime detection rates generally by providing a deeper understanding of 
criminal markets through increased use o f financial investigation (Bowles et al, 2000; 
Levi and Osofsky, 1995; PIU, 2000); to prevent criminals from corrupting the 
legitimate economy with ill-gotten gains (the presence o f criminal wealth in the 
legitimate economy is sometimes thought to undermine a country’s political and/or 
financial stability, or to increase risks or insurance costs— see Wechsler (2001) for a 
discussion; Levi, 2003; Naylor, 1999b; PIU, 2000); and to remove negative role 
models from communities (PIU, 2000). Bowles et al (2000) add that asset recovery 
provides a good proxy for the amount o f social harm, and that it provides the 
authorities with an instrument to satisfy marginal deterrence (Fried (1988) concurs
I ?with the latter, though not in so many words).
10 The assertions supporting the use o f asset recovery presented here are made in works discussing 
criminal activity. FATF (2003b) is the rare exception to the financing o f  terrorism sources, in that it 
specifies how asset recovery might have an impact on terrorist activity. It notes the following (simitar 
to claims made regarding the impact o f asset recovery on crime):
Effective freezing regimes also combat terrorism by: (i) deterring non-designated parties who 
might otherwise be willing to finance terrorist activity; (ii) exposing terrorist financing 
“money trails” that may generate leads to previously unknown terrorist cells and financiers; 
(iii) dismantling terrorist financing networks by encouraging designated persons to 
disassociate themselves from terrorist activity and renounce their affiliation with terrorist 
groups; (iv) terminating terrorist cash flows by shutting down the pipelines used to move 
terrorist-related funds or other assets; (v) forcing terrorists to use more costly and higher risk 
means o f  financing their activities, which makes them more susceptible to detection and 
disruption; and (vi) fostering international co-operation and compliance with obligations under 
S/RES/1267(1999) and S/RES/13 73(2001).
11 Fried discusses disruption in the context o f “separating racketeers from legitimate businesses which 
they have comipted.”
12 The concept o f  marginal deterrence implies that more serious criminal activity should be punished 
more seriously, such that offenders face incentives to choose the least serious crime (see Bowles et al 
(2000) for similar thoughts).
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On revenue, asset recovery may also potentially generate significant revenue 
flows for the state in general or police in particular (Fried, 1988; Levi, 2003; Levi and 
Osofsky, 1995; Naylor, 1999b; PIU, 2000).13 Revenue could conceivably have an 
impact on criminal behaviour if funds were used to supply additional policing or other 
criminal justice system initiatives.
Finally, asset recovery may serve as punishment in a corrective justice 
framework, in which asset recovery, as noted by Naylor (1999b), supports the “moral 
principle that no one should be permitted to profit from commission o f a crime” 
(Alldridge, 2003; Bowles et al, 2000; Fried, 1988; Levi, 2003; Levi and Osofsky,
1995; Naylor, 1999b; PIU, 2000; Stessens, 2000).14 The principle that no criminal 
should profit from crime may be sufficiently important to policymakers and the 
populace to call for the use o f asset recovery. So even if asset recovery does not 
reduce crime, it may still have a role to play as a component part of a comprehensive 
crime policy package.
In contrast, several authors propose that the use o f asset recovery may have 
unintended consequences, and may cause crime rates to increase or may have no 
impact on crime. Opposition to asset recovery is not as straightforward as support, 
and fewer sources make mention o f such unintended consequences than of supporting 
assertions. Opposing assertions fall into categories on crime reduction (i.e., lack 
thereof), costs, and “collateral damage.”
Levi (2003), Levi and Osofsky (1995), and Naylor (1999b) claim that rather 
than deter criminality, asset recovery might encourage re-offending, or re-offending at 
a rate higher than normal: offenders who have been served a confiscation order might 
feel compelled (or more compelled) to re-offend upon release from prison to provide
13 In fact, this point is made, implicitly or explicitly, in most sources on asset recovery, including the 
broader bodies o f  work alluded to in Footnote Error! Bookmark not defined.).
14 Much o f  the debate in the international legal literature on asset recovery is centred on whether or not 
powers are punitive or corrective/reparative, discussed in the context o f  the confiscation o f gross 
proceeds or net profits (see, for example, Alldridge (2003), Fried (1988), and Stessens (2000)). 
Confiscation o f the former is thought to be punitive, while confiscation o f the latter puts the offender in 
the status quo ante, the position prior to committing the crime (POCA allows for the confiscation o f  
gross proceeds). The confiscation o f  proceeds v. profits has substantial implications for deterrence, and 
will be discussed in upcoming economic work.
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for their basic needs or to maintain a certain standard of living. Furthermore, 
Boudreaux and Pritchard (1996) propose that while asset recovery (US civil forfeiture 
in their article) might reduce the supply o f drugs, in so doing it might increase their 
price and thus the amount o f crime committed by users to pay for their habits. Fried 
(1988) argues that the deterrent value depends on whether gross proceeds or net 
profits are confiscated, with the impact o f the latter being weaker (see Footnote 14). 
Fried also suggests that the ability of asset recovery to deter criminality likely 
depends on the type o f criminal targeted (and notes that the threat of prison is 
probably a stronger deterrent for most offenders, especially white-collar offenders).
Further, Bowles et al (2000), Levi (2003), Levi and Osofsky (1995), NCIS 
(2003), and PIU (2000) suggest that offenders may engage in avoidance activities 
(i.e., activities to hide the existence and location o f assets from financial 
investigators), limiting the efficacy of asset recovery. (O f course, not all offenders 
will have the ability to take such defensive measures (Levi and Osofsky, 1995)). 
Savona et al (2001) suggest that international cooperation remains sufficiently 
problematic to hamper asset recovery cases with international dimensions, a fact 
which appears to have not escaped notice by the criminal element. Hence, if  
avoidance activities are not overly costly or difficult for the offender to use, and if 
such activity hampers the success o f asset recovery cases, the impact of asset recovery 
on rates o f crime may be limited.
Several sources claim that the ability o f asset recovery to disrupt crime may be 
overstated. Levi (2003), Levi and Osofsky (1995), and Naylor (1999b), propose that 
criminals may not require much in the way o f seed capital to carry out offences, and 
may be able to secure goods (e.g., drugs) for resale on credit. PIU (2000) 
acknowledges that the understanding o f the extent to which criminal firms resemble 
legitimate businesses needs further development (implying that the disruptive effect is 
uncertain). In any case, if  capital markets are deep and accessible, and if criminals 
can operate on credit (or need little operating capital in the first place), asset recovery 
may do little to disrupt criminal behaviour.15
15 It may be the case that lenders will become more reluctant to lend if  loans remain unpaid because a 
criminal’s assets have been confiscated (see Levi and Osofsky (1995) for similar thoughts).
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Criminals may choose to spend (i.e., consume), rather than save, rendering 
asset recovery powers largely ineffectual (the authorities can only recover what is 
realizable, and past consumption o f nondurable goods and services cannot be 
reclaimed if  the offender has no means o f satisfying a confiscation order). Several 
authors claim that in most cases criminals probably have very low savings rates (Levi, 
2003; Levi and Osofsky, 1995; Naylor, 1999b). Naylor (1999b) suggests that the use 
o f asset recovery will encourage offenders to modify their savings behaviour (if they 
save at all) by saving less. O f course, a change in consumption/savings patterns may 
also imply that there is less money available for use in the criminal marketplace 
(saving by one allows for investment by others: offenders may save for criminal or 
non-criminal purposes (e.g., retirement); if  a determinant of the supply o f criminal 
financing is how much offenders save, this changing in consumption/saving may itself 
have a disruptive effect.
Bowles et al (2000) suggest that removing illegal gains reinvested in 
legitimate activities usually has an opportunity cost which is greater than zero; Naylor 
(1999b) concurs. In other words, for those criminals who do save, many— or at least 
some— likely employ legitimate savings vehicles, including those in international 
capital markets (Naylor (1999b) alludes to the irony that criminals whose portfolio 
includes US government bonds are actually subsidizing the US government and its 
activities, including the war on drugs). Pulling capital out o f these markets has a cost, 
in that criminal savings behaviour allows for public and private spending. Naylor 
(2002) posits that this cost might be highest for developing countries (whose sources 
o f financing are limited). The implication is that both confiscation and changes in 
consumption/saving behaviour come at a cost to the economy. O f course, the claim 
that asset recovery can prevent criminals’ inefficient spending in the legitimate 
economy, and the counter-claim that removing illicit savings from the legitimate 
economy has a non-zero cost, may be overstated if criminals have low savings rates.
PIU (2000) notes that the use of asset recovery may place a financial burden 
on the criminal justice system through increased police, prosecution, and court costs, 
particularly in the months and years after the introduction o f POCA (though the PIU 
discusses cost implications not in opposition to the use of asset recovery, but rather as 
a point of fact, and suggests that asset recovery should generate net increases in
25
Chapter 3. Literature Review
revenue, as do most sources— see page 23). There may, then, be an opportunity cost 
in the use o f asset recovery: the funds could be used elsewhere in the criminal justice 
system, perhaps to greater effect. Alldridge (2003) makes a similar claim.
Turning to the last of the unintended consequences, several authors mention 
that the use o f asset recovery may cause what Naylor (1999b) refers to as “collateral 
damage”: the very use o f asset recovery may 1) present a challenge to traditional 
judicial standards of privacy, fairness, and human rights; and 2) it may skew policing 
priorities (through a targeting o f offenders driven by the desire to generate revenue, 
not to reduce crime). Most such criticisms appear in the sizable literature on the 
American forfeiture regime (see Footnote Error! Bookmark not defined.), a regime 
seen by many as excessive, particularly with regard to its approach to civil forfeiture 
(see, for example, Tonry (1997) for a catalogue o f abuses, and Worrall (2001) for a 
discussion o f the growing dependence of US law enforcement agencies on forfeitures 
for budgetary support).16 Note Boudreaux and Pritchard (1996):
Thus, revenue effects o f drug crime enforcement, rather than social welfare 
consequences, will determine the allocation of police efforts attacking various 
kinds of criminal behaviours... Allowing law enforcement agencies to retain 
proceeds from civil forfeitures affords agencies discretion over their budgets. 
As a consequence, agencies produce either sub- or supra-optimal drug 
enforcement, leaving society worse off.
Policy-makers in the UK seem to have recognized the need to avoid the pitfalls o f the 
US system, and have tried to incorporate sufficient protections in the legislation to 
safeguard human rights (PIU, 2000; though see Alldridge (2003) for a critique o f the 
UK system on human rights grounds, and Stessens (2000) for a more multinational 
critique). Levi (2003) notes that hypothecation is not widely practiced in the UK, 
preventing the police from the kind o f addiction noted by Worrall.17
16 Acrimonious debate rages between supporters and opponents o f the American regime. A primary 
concern lies with the potential in the US civil forfeiture regime— akin to the forfeiture o f  the 
instrumentalities o f crime— for disproportionate sentences. The regime was reformed in 2000, limiting 
the likelihood o f  abuses.
17 The introduction o f  a scheme to “incentivise” the police suggests that this may be changing.
26
Chapter 3. Literature Review
Finally, turning from the discussion o f supporting or refuting hypotheses, 
several authors suggest that the efficacy o f asset recovery might simply be limited by 
failings on the part of the authorities. Levi (2003) summarizes the issues— most of 
which are mentioned in some fashion by the Home Office (1998), Levi and Osofsky 
(1995), PIU (2000), and Savona et al (2001)— noting, among other things, that 
inadequate police training and resources, inadequate coordination and intelligence 
exchange between relevant parties, and a judicial reluctance to employ and enforce 
asset recovery powers and penalties may limit the success of asset recovery in 
practice.
In sum, the literature both encourages and opposes the use o f asset recovery, 
citing various untested assertions in support or to refute (see Table 3.1). No empirical 
research has yet confirmed the validity of the above assertions, however, and it is 
unclear which dominate on balance. Moreover, assertions are likely not mutually 
exclusive: for example, asset recovery may in fact disrupt crime, but it may also 
simultaneously encourage some criminals to hide their assets better to avoid detection 
and confiscation. Or asset recovery may deter crime in aggregate, while also 
encouraging certain individual offenders to commit crime at a higher rate than normal 
to regain confiscated assets (this scenario is not unlikely, though in this case crime 
rates may still fall: more crimes may be deterred than encouraged). Finally, failings 
in the criminal justice arena might undermine efficacy (that is, asset recovery might 
be a particularly effective crime-reduction policy, but its impact on crime might be 
hamstrung by various shortcomings on the part of law enforcement, prosecuting 
authorities, and the courts to make the most o f the powers available).
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Table 3.1. Assertions Supporting and Opposing the Use of Asset Recovery:
A Summary of the Literature
Assertion_______________________________________________________________________________________________
Supporting Deters crime by reducing the expected gains o f  criminality
Disrupts criminal behaviour by removing the seed capital for further criminality
Improves crime detection rates by providing deeper understanding of criminal markets
Prevents criminals from corrupting the legitimate economy
Removes negative role models from communities
Provides proxy for amount o f  social harm
Provides instrument to satisfy marginal deterrence
Generates revenue flows
Serves as punishment in a corrective justice framework
Opposing Encourages crime or no deterrent effect
Encourages the use o f  avoidance activities
Little seed capital required or no impact on criminal access to capital 
Savings behaviour will change or no savings at present anyway 
Pulling out o f legitimate economy has a non-zero opportunity cost 
Increased criminal justice system costs 
Skews policing priorities
_________________Collateral damage challenges standards o f  privacy, fairness, human rights_________________________
Sources: Various, including Bowles et a l (2000): Fried (1988): Levi (2003): Levi and O sofsh• (1995): Navlor (1999b): 
and PIU  (2000).
But despite its popularity amongst criminal justice policy-making circles, (and 
this despite the aforementioned criticisms), scant mention is made in the literature of 
the mechanics o f asset recovery, and little to this point has indicated why asset 
recovery should reduce crime. In other words, not only does asset recovery’s impact 
remain empirically untested, its theoretical support remains largely unexplored. In the 
event, only PIU (2000) and Bowles et al (2000) discuss why the above assertions— 
pro or con— might be valid. Both sources draw from the work on the economics of 
crime and criminal behaviour begun in 1968 by Becker. Bowles et al (2000) provide 
the most comprehensive treatment o f the issue. They note that the use o f asset 
recovery represents an increase in sentence severity, which, in the Becker framework, 
deters crime. They further suggest that the removal o f illegal gain (by which they 
mean profit) on its own, without further punishment, is suboptimal (otherwise, even if  
all net profits are confiscated, criminals are in the position they were prior to 
offending)— though the validity o f this claim depends on the proceeds v. profits 
approach employed, as well as certain assumptions. They also specify circumstances 
in which it might be better to confiscate only a proportion o f the gains, not their 
entirety (e.g., to minimize socially wasteful avoidance activity). These issues and
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more account for a significant component o f the larger research programme, and are 
discussed in the following chapter.
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This chapter examines the theoretical support for asset recovery’s use in the 
fight against crime— seeking to contribute to the current state o f knowledge—by 
drawing on the body of literature grounded in the work of Becker (1968) on the 
economics o f crime and criminal behaviour (which has been advanced and expanded 
upon in the decades since, notably in the field of law-and-economics), and by building 
on the asset-recovery-specific work o f Bowles et al (2000).
The chapter is structured as follows: after this introduction, the theoretical 
foundations o f the economics o f criminal behaviour are presented; the implications of 
the literature and theory are discussed; and a conclusion section summarizes the 
analysis.
4.1. The Economics of Criminal Behaviour
This chapter employs the parsimonious law-and-economics approach derived 
from Becker’s seminal 1968 work on the economics o f crime— alluded to in the work 
o f PIU (2000) and employed by Bowles et al (2000)— to explore the theoretical 
underpinnings for asset recovery.19 An abundant literature on the economics o f crime 
has been developed since the publication o f Becker’s work (itself reviving theories of 
Bentham and Beccaria). Much of the literature has been generated by scholars in the 
growing field o f law-and-economics. Broadly, the objective o f the literature has been 
two-fold: the analysis o f criminal behaviour, and the design o f optimal law 
enforcement/punishment. The present chapter is most concerned with the former, 
which focuses on exploring and explaining individual and aggregate participation in 
criminal activity (i.e., the supply o f offences), while the latter discusses not only 
behaviour but also optimal crime policy from a social welfare (i.e., efficiency) 
perspective.
On criminal behaviour and the supply of offences, Becker stipulated that 
criminals were not irrational, but rather rational, and that as a result, the tried-and-
18 The author wishes to thank participants at the Midterm Meeting o f  the European Association o f Law 
and Economics in Ghent, Belgium (February 2005) and two anonymous readers for their comments.
19 For summaries o f  the law-and-economics approach, see also Polinsky and Shavell (2000) and 
Garoupa (1997).
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tested microeconomic theory o f behaviour under uncertainty could be applied to the 
analysis of crime. That is, criminals were (are) rational actors whose behaviour could 
(can) be explained in a utility-maximizing framework.20 Criminals engage in criminal 
activity if  the benefits o f doing so outweigh the costs (though, as Becker notes, this 
does not require “perfect knowledge or lightening-fast calculation” on the part of 
offenders). Formally, the expected utility EU  o f engaging in a criminal activity can 
be represented as follows:
EU  = p U ( y - f )  + { \ - p ) U ( y )  (1)
■ where y  is income (monetary and psychic) from an offence,
• c /0  is the offender’s von Neumann-Morgenstem utility function,
■ /  is the monetary equivalent of punishment, which may include the opportunity 
cost o f imprisonment captured by lost wages i f  is often informally called the 
“severity of punishment”),
■ and p  is the (subjective) probability of conviction (often informally called the 
“certainty o f punishment”);21
a crime is committed if  EU  > 0 (Becker, 1968). From comparative statics, the
implication o f critical importance is that offenders respond to incentives: increases in
the certainty (p) or severity (/) of punishment can prevent (i.e., deter) crime by
reducing expected utility (as Becker notes, partial derivatives o f the expected utility
- . . ,  . . u dEU . dEU .function with respect to certainty and seventy of punishment ( -  - a n d  ) are
dp 0 /
both negative, assuming marginal utility of income is positive). With risk neutral 
offenders (in the strict economic sense), equation (1) reduces to Ey = y - p f  from 
which it can be seen that a crime will only be committed if  y  > p f ; increases inp
20 See also the seminal Cornish and Clarke (1986) for perspectives on rational choice in criminology.
21 “Certainty” in this case does not connote sureness.
31
Chapter 4. Theoretical Underpinnings
and/or/ may change the direction of the inequality. This concept is often referred to
22in the literature as the “deterrence hypothesis.”
From Becker, and with contributions from various authors, can be developed 
an expected net returns per offence function ( E y ) which represents gross returns ( g ) 
less costs o f committing the crime less expected punishment costs.23 Costs o f 
committing the crime themselves may be thought o f as the sum of 1) the direct costs 
o f crime production (e.g., costs o f instrumentalities/equipment; transport; inputs, like 
narcotics for resale; wages of criminal staff; interest payments on official or unofficial 
credit; money laundering expenses); 2) foregone earnings (if an offender is robbing a 
bank, he cannot simultaneously be sitting behind his desk in the office where he is 
legitimately employed); and 3) distaste for crime. On expected punishment costs, 
Polinsky and Shavell (2000) separate the severity o f punishment variable into fines 
and imprisonment (allowing individuals to have differing disutilities o f  each). The 
expected net returns from crime function is most easily visualized with the 
assumption of risk-neutral offenders, and can be thought o f as follows:
Ey  = g - c  — w - d  -  p{n + m) (2)
• where g  is gross proceeds (i.e., gross income, monetary and psychic) from an 
offence,
■ c is direct costs o f crime production,
w is foregone earnings (wages foregone whilst committing the crime, which 
assumes that crime and employment are mutually exclusive),
■ d  is the monetary equivalent o f the distaste for crime,
22 While the focus o f  the present research is criminal behaviour and the supply o f  offences, Becker 
notes that deterrence is often costly. He goes on to discuss optimal policy from a social welfare 
perspective, in which the exercise is to minimize— by setting p  and f -—the sum of 1) damages from 
offences, 2) costs o f  apprehending and convicting offenders, and 3) the social cost o f  punishments 
(Becker, 1968). Increases in the certainty o f punishment p  require more spending on police or other 
efficiency gains therein (and may similarly require more prosecution and court resources); increases in 
the severity o f punishment/ through imprisonment require incurring imprisonment costs (e.g., housing, 
food, prison guards); increases in the severity o f  punishment/  via higher fines, however, are viewed as 
costless (as a transfer). His analysis suggests, among other things, that a high-fine/low-probability 
approach is optimal.
23 Ehrlich (1996) discusses such a formulation explicitly, while other authors’ references to an expected 
net return per offence function is implied.
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■ p  is the (subjective) probability of conviction,
• n is fines levied if  convicted,
• m is the monetary equivalent o f imprisonment (the disutility o f imprisonment per 
unit time multiplied by its length);
a crime is committed if Ey  > 0 (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973, 1981, and 1996; 
Polinsky and Shavell, 2000). Increases in all variables but g  reduce expected net 
returns and thus reduce crime; an increase in g  increases Ey  and should thus increase 
crime.
Equations (1) and (2) describe individual decision-making processes. The 
behaviour o f individuals per unit time (e.g., per month, per year) can similarly be 
thought o f as a function o f the certainty and severity of punishment and w, a host o f 
variables (like [foregone] income in legal activities and the distaste for crime noted 
above) that might affect the decision to participate in crime (Becker, 1968). 
Underlying social norms might be included here (Eide, 1994): “norms may be 
regarded either as restrictions on the set of feasible actions or factors altering the 
overall evaluation o f various courses o f action and their outcomes.” The behaviour of 
individuals per unit time may be further aggregated to explain an overall supply o f 
offences function O as follows:
0  = 0 ( p , f , u )  (3)
- where p , f  and u represent average values (of the certainty and severity o f 
punishment and the other relevant variables described above);24
and it is assumed that the aggregate function behaves as does the individual choice 
specification, with increases to p  and f  reducing crime (Becker, 1968). When viewed 
in aggregate, it can be seen that a reduction in the overall supply of offences comes 
about via changes to the behaviour o f marginal offenders (Ehrlich, 1996): some crime 
will exist simply because the benefits o f crime exceed the costs, and increases to the
24 This specification employs the general p ,f ,  and u variables, and could just as easily employ the more 
specific representations thereof found in equation (2).
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certainty and severity o f punishment may or may not drive expected net return per 
offence below zero.. .but when looking at the behaviour o f all offenders, it is not hard 
to imagine that increases in the punishment variables will affect at least some 
decisions to commit crime— those o f the marginal offenders—and thus aggregate 
crime rates will fall.25 Much o f the analysis in the present chapter will explore the 
manner in which asset recovery provisions may or may not affect the net returns per 
offence function, and thus the aggregate supply o f offences.
O f course, like everything in life, it gets more complicated. Becker provides a 
framework in which participation in criminal activity is straightforward: do so if  the 
reward outweighs the expected costs (i.e., if  the net return per offence is positive).
But the model has little to say about the extent o f participation, once the decision to 
participate has been made. This is explored only with models of somewhat greater 
complexity. The issue is very similar to that of hours worked in labour supply 
decisions: when deciding whether or not to work, a rational actor will not enter the 
labour market if the net wage is negative— but if it is nonnegative, the extent of labour 
market participation will depend on the individual’s preferences for labour (i.e., 
consumption) and leisure. For example, increases in income tax rates will lower the 
net wage—but whether the individual works more or less in response to a lower net 
wage cannot be determined theoretically.
Along these lines, several authors (see, for example, Ehrlich (1973), Heineke 
(1978), Schmidt and Witte (1984)) have employed various theoretical rational choice 
models which allow for choice between labour/leisure/crime. These models (which 
are seldom found in the specific law-and-economics literature, rather existing in a 
larger, more technical body o f work on the economics o f crime) allow for more 
realistic behavioural choices, but in so doing lose the unambiguous predictive power 
o f  the Becker model. The allowance for choices regarding the use o f time— with 
returns to crime and legitimate employment as functions of time— implies the 
existence of income and substitution effects, as with models o f labour supply (Becker
25 Clearly, some criminals who are not deterred will in fact be caught, convicted, and imprisoned. So 
increases in the punishment variables may reduce crime not through deterrence but through 
imprisonment: incarcerated offenders cannot commit crime outside o f prison walls (ignoring tales o f  
mafia dons controlling criminal enterprises from prison cells).
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allows for the choice only between specialization in crime or no crime: crime and 
employment are mutually exclusive). An increase in the severity o f punishment/  
makes crime more costly (the substitution effect) and thus the offender devotes less 
time to criminal activity. At the same time, however, an increase in/ makes the 
offender worse off (the income effect), and thus the offender devotes more time to 
criminal activity. The net impact o f these competing pressures depends on the risk 
preferences o f offenders and cannot be determined theoretically.26
This is not to suggest that these models have no predictive power whatsoever. 
Rather, as noted by Eide (1999):
If one is willing to stick to the rather common assumption o f decreasing 
absolute risk aversion, and also that psychic effects can be monetized, and that 
there is just one type of sanctions, the effects are clear: crime is deterred by 
increases in the probability and in the severity o f punishment, and enhanced 
by increases in exogenous income, and in gains from both legal and illegal 
activities...For risk-neutral people an increase in the probability or severity of 
punishment and a decrease in the gains to crime will reduce the supply o f 
crime, whereas changes in exogenous income, and in the remuneration o f  legal 
activity have no effect.
So while these models can only provide guidance under certain assumptions, the 
assumptions themselves may not be outlandish. In fact, while it sounds reasonable to 
call all criminals risk-loving, this is likely not the case (at least not in economists’ 
strict sense of the term).27
26 Note that Becker’s findings on the deterrent effects o f increases to p  and/remain valid independent 
of risk preferences.
27 Note Schmidt and Witte (1984):
We sometimes observe criminals engaging in very risky activities, such as armed robberies o f  
gasoline stations or convenience stores, which have expected incomes that appear to be 
dominated by sure (and legal) alternatives. One explanation is that such individuals are risk 
lovers, but a more convincing explanation is that they think it is fun to rob gas stations or 
stores. They are not doing it for the money; or, more precisely, they are not doing it for the 
variance in their income distribution that it induces.
And see Katz (1988) for more on offenders’ attraction to the “rush” o f crime.
35
Chapter 4. Theoretical Underpinnings
Further, a large body of empirical work confirms the validity o f the deterrence 
hypothesis, which has been surveyed in technical and non-technical pieces by 
Heineke (1978), Pyle (1983 and 1995), Schmidt and Witte (1984), Cameron (1988), 
Eide (1994 and 1999), Freeman (1999), and Witte and Witt (2000). Empirical 
research broadly suggests that increases in the certainty and severity o f punishment 
deter crime (for some recent examples, see Levitt, 1996; Levitt, 1997a; Levitt, 1998; 
Marvell and Moody, 1996; Witt and Witte, 2000). But the possibility that increases in 
the severity of punishment may in certain circumstances, under certain assumptions, 
cause increases in crime should not be overlooked.
This analysis will largely employ the Becker-based approach (and will assume 
that offenders are risk neutral unless otherwise noted) because it serves as an 
appropriate vehicle for clearly illustrating the differences between various asset 
recovery powers. The greater complexity offered by the models of Ehrlich and others 
is not required to demonstrate the differences between powers. The analysis will not 
ignore the implications o f  the other models, however.
4.2. Discussion
So, should asset recovery represent a successful crime-reduction policy?
What should be made o f the various crime-reducing/crime-increasing claims made in 
the literature?28 And should the different powers/provisions have differing impacts on 
crime? This section addresses such questions using the parsimonious law-and- 
economics model o f criminal behaviour, but also bearing in mind the implications of 
models o f greater complexity. The section begins with an exploration o f the recovery 
o f an equivalent value of criminal profit, which can be considered the general case; it 
then discusses the implications o f specific powers/provisions, and a regime in its 
entirety. The discussion is kept general, though on the whole can be accurately 
viewed as marginally UK-centric.
28 The intent o f the present chapter is to explore the theoretical support for the ability o f asset recovery 
to reduce crime. As such, it does not examine several assertions made in the literature on issues 
including: revenue flows, corrective justice, criminal justice system costs, policing priorities, collateral 
damage, impact on the legitimate economy.
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4.2.1. The general case: recovery of an equivalent value of criminal profit
Profit recovery represents a general, easily understood component o f an asset 
recovery regime. The analysis below explores the ways in which profit recovery can 
affect expected net returns per offence (and thus rates o f crime). The intent is to 
illustrate whether or not the general case should reduce crime, and how it should do 
so. Each component of the expected net return function is explored, starting with 
expected punishment costs, followed by the costs o f committing the crime, and 
closing with gross returns to crime. Many o f the thoughts below are relevant to all 
flavours o f asset recovery, not just profit recovery; these broader findings are 
identified as such.
Expected punishment costs
Severity o f  punishment
This section builds on the work o f Bowles et al (2000), who present an 
analysis o f the recovery o f criminal profits which they call the removal o f  illegal gain. 
Bowles et al note (as does PIU (2000), in a more general sense) that profit recovery 
represents an increase in expected punishment costs in the Becker framework. 
Formally, from Bowles et al, while expected punishment costs without profit recovery 
are a function o f the certainty and severity o f punishment, with profit recovery the 
severity of punishment is increased by the amount y, the gains from crime. 
Incorporating this into the expected-net-retum-per-offence model discussed earlier 
(equation (2)), the individual choice specification becomes (where gains are defined 
as y  = g - c - w - d  and all other variables are as described on page 32, noting that 
the severity o f punishment variable has been disaggregated into its component fines 
and imprisonment):29
E y - y -  p{n + m + y ) (4)
29 There exists some (limited) disagreement in the economics o f  criminal behaviour literature on 
whether or not Becker, in his approach (upon which most subsequent work has been implicitly based), 
already implicitly assumes that the severity o f  punishment for an offence (/) includes the 
proceeds/profits o f  crime (y; see, for example, Brown and Reynolds, 1973; Pyle, 1983). This analysis 
assumes that the severity o f  punishment without asset recovery is distinct from (and does not include) 
the benefit from crime (such that the use o f  asset recovery over-and-above the existing punishment 
does indeed represent an increase in sentence severity). Also, asset recovery is often distinct from the 
sentencing process, and thus should have a separate p — this is discussed below.
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Driven by the deterrence hypothesis, then, there is reason to expect that the 
use of profit recovery powers should deter at least some [profit-driven] crime: ceteris 
paribus, expected punishment costs are higher with the recovery of criminal profit 
than without. As a result, expected net returns from crime are lower, and may in 
many cases be driven below zero, thereby deterring crime— as a crime is only 
committed if the expected net return is positive. As noted, this is not to suggest that 
all crime will be deterred, but rather that when viewed in aggregate, the expected net 
return per offence will have been made negative for many crimes, and thus the overall 
supply o f offences will fall.
Critically, however, Bowles et al (2000) state that “unless detection is 
virtually certain the prospect o f confiscation o f the proceeds [sic] from an offence 
may reduce, but will certainly not eliminate, its ex ante profitability” in the absence of 
additional penalties. Expected net returns per offence will always be nonnegative in 
theory if  profit recovery is the only sanction.30 There is thus a strong call for profit
31recovery to be accompanied by other forms o f punishment. O f course, in practice it 
may be accounting profit, not economic profit, that is recovered. In thinking o f the 
costs facing a firm or individual, economic cost includes opportunity costs (like 
foregone wages, w), while accounting cost does not; accounting profit is thus larger 
than economic profit. It further seems unlikely that distaste for crime (d) will be 
deducted from gross returns as a cost in establishing the amount of criminal profit. In 
this case, profit recovery on its own might indeed have a deterrent effect: for 
offenders with nonzero distaste for crime and nonzero foregone earnings, expected net
30 With profit recovery as the only sanction ( n = 0, m = 0 ), Ey — y  — p y  — y(l — p)  ; because 
0 < p < 1, and assuming the crime was profitable prior to sanctions (y  > 0 ), then Ey > 0 (i.e., it 
remains nonnegative even with profit recovery).
31 In some jurisdictions, fines may be taken into consideration when the size o f  a confiscation order is 
determined, implying that if  recovery is used, the value o f any fine levied drops to zero. The call for 
additional punishment thus implies that imprisonment alone must play the complementary role in this 
case. But imprisonment may not be sufficiently deterrent, as the disutility o f  financial penalties and 
imprisonment may differ. Levi and Osofsky (1995) discuss anecdotal evidence that some convicted 
offenders fight a confiscation order harder than they fight a prison sentence. This is not surprising 
when viewed in the economics-of-criminal-behaviour framework. It may be the case that many 
offenders have only limited legitimate employment opportunities. For such offenders, the opportunity 
cost o f  imprisonment— a function o f  lost wages due to incarceration— may not be very high (though 
offenders may still assign a high disutility to being imprisoned due to other distaste factors (like a lack 
o f freedom)).
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32returns per offence may drop below zero with the use of recovery powers. This may 
only be true for first-time marginal offenders (it seems unlikely that habitual offenders 
will have much distaste for crime, and their foregone earnings may not be huge), 
though it is the marginal offenders who are likely of greatest importance to changes in 
crime rates. In any case, the lesson of Bowles et al, that profit recovery on its own 
will have a limited impact, should not be forgotten.
Certainty o f  punishment
But while profit recovery should theoretically reduce crime, to what extent 
would we expect this to be the case? A determinant o f its efficacy— and that o f asset 
recovery in general— clearly is the extent to which expected punishment costs really 
increase through its use.33 Perhaps expected punishment costs must meet a certain 
threshold level to have a noticeable impact on rates o f crime: expected net returns 
may be sufficiently large that only sizable changes in expected punishment costs, or 
other costs, for that matter, will reduce crime (Ehrlich, 1996).
Expected punishment costs are a function o f both the certainty and severity o f 
punishment, so even a large increase in sentence severity may do little to deter crime 
if the certainty o f that increased punishment is particularly low. O f course, expected 
punishment costs depend in large part on a string of probabilities, not least because 
the profit/asset recovery process is complex. Equation (4) can perhaps better be seen 
as follows (noting that from this point forward, y  now refers to accounting profit, such 
that y  = g ~ c ) .  Here expected punishment costs are a function o f the certainty of 
traditional punishment and the certainty o f profit/asset recovery, p R (the separation 
of p R from p  allows for the fact that profit/asset recovery may not be used in all 
criminal cases):
Ey  = y - d  -  w -  p(n + m + p Ryr)  (5)
32 With no further punishment, n + m =  0 ,  so Ey = g  — c — w  — d — p (g  — c). If w  > 0  and/or 
d >  0 ,  expected net returns may fall below zero.
3j The comments in this section are o f  relevance to profit recovery specifically and asst recovery 
powers in general. The words profit/asset will be used in conjunction to indicate relevance to the 
specific and the general.
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where
Pr  = ( P  FI ) ( P f „ u n d \ F I  K^COI Found P Compliance\CO  ^ P  Fundsremain ) (6)
■ and p R represents the probability of a profit/asset recovery case being successful,
■ p FI is the probability that a financial investigation is carried out,
' P fouhj\fi *s conditional probability that profits are identified/located given that
a financial investigation is carried out,
' Pco\Found IS conditional probability that a confiscation order is served given that
assets are identified,34 
’ P c o m p i i a n ^ c o  *s ^  conditional probability that the offender in question will comply
with the confiscation order (given that one has been served),
P Fundsremain *s the probability that recoverable assets remain (or the proportion of 
identified assets which may be recovered by the authorities),
• r is a discount rate (where r = -— ),35
0 + 0'
• the remaining variables are as before;
and so any number o f things may lower (or raise) the probability o f a profit recovery 
case being successful. The value o f the string of probabilities p R is unlikely to be 
equal to one.36 In particular, if  any one o f the component probabilities is close to or
34 The term confiscation order is used in the UK to refer to the “bill” that the offender receives for 
his/her criminality. It is used here out o f convenience. In the event, in the UK, the gross proceeds o f  
crime may be recovered (discussed below) through criminal confiscation (though civil recovery, also 
discussed below, more closely resembles profit recovery).
35 This formula provides the present value o f  the punishment served in year t when multiplied by the 
nominal cost o f the punishment; e.g., a confiscation order o f 100000 GBP which an offender estimates 
won’t be served for two years, and which an offender discounts at 10 percent (i.e., i =  0 .1 ), will have 
a present value o f  nearly 83,000 GBP. This is not to suggest than an offender operates with such 
precision, but certainly some form o f  discounting occurs.
36 Bowles et al (2000) discuss the possibility that the state may wish to recover a proportion o f criminal 
profits, not the entirety, for efficiency reasons (e.g., “observation and avoidance are costly”). It seems
reasonable to assume that p R will be well below the efficient level, such that moderate increases to 
p R will be unlikely to be wasteful from a net social welfare perspective.
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equal to zero, profit recovery will have little impact on crime. The determinants o f
p R are discussed in turn.
■ The probability that a financial investigation is (will be) carried out, p n  , may be 
low. It may be the case that the authorities are insufficiently trained and/or staffed 
to carry out a desired level of financial investigations, or that profit recovery is 
used infrequently for other reasons (e.g., its use is not embraced by police 
management).
- The probability that profits are identified and located, p Found\FI, is perhaps the most
involved o f the probabilities contributing to the overall p R. It depends on a 
number o f factors, including the ability o f an offender to employ avoidance 
activities to hide the existence and location of profits, of the police authority to 
uncover such profits, and o f all relevant bodies and cooperating domestic and 
foreign organizations to be familiar with the law, to cooperate, and to act 
expeditiously.
■ Even if  profits are identified and located, a judge may decide to not serve a 
confiscation order for various reasons (e.g., lack of evidence, lack of awareness of 
the recovery powers), or may allow an offender to plea bargain the size o f the 
confiscation order to an amount considerably smaller than was initially 
recommended by the financial investigators/prosecution. All have an impact on 
the size o f />c o |f w .
• O f course, offenders might not comply with (i.e., pay) a confiscation order.
Evidence suggests that fines, similar in nature to confiscation orders, are often 
neither taken seriously by offenders nor enforced by the authorities (Mackie et al, 
2003; PIU, 2000). As such, PCompliance\co may be low.
- O f utmost importance is the propensity for offenders to save illicit and legitimate 
earnings, which determines whether or not funds remain for recovery; the efforts of 
police, prosecutors, and the courts may be of little use if no recoverable assets 
exist. Some asset recovery authors claim that the impact o f asset recovery may be 
limited by changes to savings behaviour (or that offenders save little at present
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anyway). There are two separate issues: one is descriptive (offenders don’t save), 
one behavioural (offenders will stop saving). In a scenario in which offenders save 
neither legitimate or illegitimate earnings— spending everything on nondurable 
goods and services— indeed, profit/asset recovery will be weakened. If p Fundsrema,„
approaches zero (i.e., offenders don’t save or stop saving), then the contribution to 
expected punishment costs made by profit/asset recovery itself approaches zero 
(with little impact on the expected net returns from crime). Future research to 
illustrate the spending/savings propensities of offenders is called for. Additionally, 
offenders may structure criminal business(es) to minimize exposure to profit/asset 
recovery; behavioural implications must also be examined in future work.
• Finally, when considering whether or not to engage in criminal activity, expected 
punishment costs represent the net present value of future penalties (e.g., foregone 
earnings due to imprisonment or asset recovery). Because punishment is delivered 
in the future, the costs must be discounted at a (subjective) discount rate. From 
Davis: “ .. .the propensity o f an individual to break the law will depend on his 
attitude toward the future” (Davis, 1988). As suggested by Garoupa (2003), 
“criminals exhibit hyperbolic discounting”; in other words, they over-discount.
The result o f such behaviour is a low subjective overall p R.
What matters to deterrence, o f course, is subjective probabilities. Thus far the 
discussion has revolved around objective values; subjective probabilities are some 
unspecified function of objective probabilities. Offenders operate through their own 
subjective perceptions, not through objective clarity. And both the complexity of the 
profit/asset recovery process and the perceptions o f the likelihood of various events 
might contribute to an underestimation o f the true certainty of punishment. Sah 
(1991) suggests that because no perfect source of information on the certainty of 
punishment exists, potential offenders may look to the experiences of others in their 
vicinity for guidance. This might contribute to an underestimation—or even 
overestimation— of the true certainty o f  punishment and/or profit/asset recovery.37
j7 There may be a potential benefit to a subjective underestimation o f the certainty o f  profit/asset 
recovery by offenders: offenders will under-spend on avoidance activities. And some offenders will be 
caught, convicted, and imprisoned (and maybe served confiscation orders), regardless o f whether or not 
their subjective interpretations were right or wrong.
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And how things are framed (i.e., the context in which information and decision points 
are presented, particularly as sure things or not, and as losses or gains) matters 
considerably, as noted by Kahneman and Tversky (2000).
Lastly, the asset recovery literature suggests that asset recoveiy can improve 
crime detection rates by providing deeper understanding of criminal markets, thereby 
reducing crime. Both anecdotal evidence (conversations with the law enforcement 
community) and common sense indicate that this may be the case. An increase in the 
certainty o f punishment from improvements in crime detection rates will deter crime: 
from equation (5), an increase in p, ceteris paribus, leads to a decrease in expected net
returns per offence ( —  < 0). If the use of profit/asset recovery improves crime 
dp
detection rates by providing deeper understanding of criminal markets— simply 
through the use o f financial investigation— asset recovery may reduce crime even if 
little revenue is raised (Pianin, 1982, citing Myers and Brzostowski, 1981, and Smith 
and Weiner, 1980). Profit/asset recovery in this context likely operates with a lag 
(after sufficient increased intelligence filters through the system).
Costs o f committing the crime
Expected punishment costs (above) are the primary channel through which 
expected net returns per offence are affected by profit/asset recovery. The use o f 
profit/asset recovery also has an impact on criminal operating costs, however, and 
from the deterrence hypothesis, increases in costs reduce crime.38 While it seems 
difficult to imagine that all such costs o f committing the crime are affected, some 
stand out or at least merit mention. Further, some of the ways in which profit/asset 
recovery affects costs are likely to be immediate, while others will operate with a lag. 
In the present context of profit recovery, costs are deductible, though cost increases 
still have the effect o f lowering Ey and thus reducing crime (bearing in mind the 
potential need for additional punishment).
38 dEy dEy dEy
Increases in the costs o f  offending reduce crime: --------<  0 ,  --------<  0 , --------<  0 .
dc dd dw
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Avoidance activities
The literature on asset recovery notes that its use would likely encourage the 
use o f avoidance activities (e.g., money laundering services/methods), with the 
implication that this might lower the effectiveness and thus crime-reducing impact of 
asset recovery. This claim is not out o f line: Malik (1990) suggests that criminals will 
choose the level o f avoidance that minimizes expected losses (the expected 
punishment and outlays on avoidance), and that an increase in the expected 
punishment increases avoidance outlays; work by Andreoni (1995) suggests that the 
use o f avoidance activities may undermine the deterrent effects of crime-control 
policies. Avoidance activity may or may not render asset recovery powerless to 
reduce crime, however. While it is hard to imagine that offenders will not make at 
least some cursory attempt to hide their assets from view, clearly offenders will have 
mixed abilities, and many will continue to offend as before (and likely get caught;
Levi and Osofsky, 1995). Further, avoidance activities have a cost (e.g., 
fees/percentages paid for money laundering services; PIU, 2000, alludes to such costs, 
though with little supporting evidence).39 Such costs are captured in the present 
model in direct costs of crime production, c\ an increase in the use o f avoidance 
activities will increase the costs required to commit an offence, and lower Ey. On the 
other hand, avoidance activities may hamper the success of financial investigations 
and asset recovery cases: avoidance activities lower the probability that assets are 
found given that a financial investigation takes place (discussed above). This in turn 
lowers the general probability that assets will be recovered (which “dilutes” 
deterrence (Bowles et a l , 2000)). The impact o f the use of avoidance activity is thus 
unclear; crime will be deterred if the change in expected return to crime {Ey) due to an 
increase in the direct costs of crime production is greater than the change in Ey due to 
avoidance activities lowering the probability that assets are found (i.e. crime will be
a  f a  r  d E y  d E y  deterred i f  > ------ ).
dc dp R
39 Indeed, avoidance activities are socially wasteful; it may be in the interest o f  society to confiscate 
part, not the entirety, o f the proceeds o f  crime to limit avoidance activity expenditures (Bowles et al, 
2000).
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Cost o f  capital
Certain costs of committing a crime (e.g., narcotics for resale) must likely be 
met before criminal returns are realized. Offenders without sufficient wealth to cover 
such costs must borrow funds from official (e.g. banks) or unofficial (e.g., criminal 
financiers) sources o f credit.40 Profit/asset recovery has no affect on the legitimate 
cost o f capital, but it likely does have an impact on unofficial criminal interest rates. 
Criminal credit sources may require higher repayment to compensate for the higher 
risk o f default posed by the use o f profit/asset recovery. This should be felt 
immediately. But the cost of capital from these unofficial criminal lenders might also 
increase over time, as the supply o f criminal capital dries up through profit/asset 
recovery action by the state. From the deterrence hypothesis, these cost increases 
reduce crime, though they are only o f relevance to offenders in need o f financing who 
have no access to legitimate credit markets. It is unclear what percentage of profit- 
driven criminals fall into this category.
Along these lines, the asset recovery literature suggests that asset recovery can 
disrupt criminal behaviour by removing the operating capital for further criminality. 
Certainly, the successful use o f profit/asset recovery removes some capital (i.e., 
wealth) from criminals who have been caught.41 For criminals without access to 
outside borrowing who are pondering re-offending, the removal of capital may indeed 
prevent future criminal activity because the post-recovery wealth may be insufficient 
to cover the costs o f criminality. Similar disruptive results may be felt by offenders in 
need of capital only with access to highly-segmented unofficial credit markets, should 
capital be recovered from the principal financiers) o f such segmented markets 42 As 
with capital costs above, this only applies to a specific subset o f offenders, and it is 
unclear whether or not this represents a typical offender (at the very least, capital
40 This includes non-monetary credit, like narcotics provided prior to payment on terms o f  trust.
41 Though, as noted, this may or may not be equivalent to the entire profits/proceeds o f  crime, given 
avoidance activities.
42 Highly-segmented unofficial credit markets refer to situations in which only one criminal financier 
(or very few) supplies a small number o f  borrowers, and these borrowers have no other available 
sources o f  funding in the short-run.
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requirements likely vary by crime type). Further research is needed to establish the 
spending/saving behaviour and capital requirements/sources o f capital of offenders.
The disruption assertion presented in the literature almost seems to imply that 
asset recovery can prevent recidivism. Undoubtedly, there will be examples of 
disruption, at least until offenders shore up replacement capital, and recidivism will be 
reduced. But recidivism in the economic model o f crime represents rational 
behaviour: “If for an offender preferences are stable and the opportunities available 
remain the same, the degree of criminal activity will not tend to decrease after a 
conviction” (Eide, 1999). In other words, if  the risks and rewards to crime remain 
unchanged, an offender who offended in the first place will likely offend again, unless 
required financing is disrupted. Further, it may be the case that asset recovery reduces 
capital-intensive crime, but leads to displacement into non-capital-intensive crimes. 
This may be particularly true for offenders with few options in the legitimate labour 
market, for whom crime is viewed as the only means o f satisfying basic needs. It is 
not clear whether such displacement is bad— Levi and Osofsky (1995) propose that 
many offenders “will trade from the bottom again, with the greater conviction risks 
attached to street-level dealing.”
Distaste fo r  crime
The asset recovery literature suggests that asset recovery can reduce crime by 
removing negative role models from communities. This is consistent with Eide’s 
(1994) norm-guided rational offender, for whom rational decisions to commit crime 
are additionally influenced by social norms. In the present context, this is captured in 
an increase in the distaste for crime over time. In other words, the presence of a 
negative role model likely renders one’s distaste for crime rather low, but in the 
absence of such people, crime may grow to be viewed as distasteful (i.e., social norms 
about crime change, and thus the removal o f a negative role model is associated with 
an increase in d, and a concomitant decrease in Ey). Implicit in this argument are the 
assumptions that 1) the offenders who will be targeted under profit/asset recovery are 
the relevant powerful role models; 2) it is the wealth to be recovered that makes the 
offender a role model; and 3) that such role models would not/could not be removed 
by other means. These seem to be optimistic on the face of it, though possible.
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Regardless, any impact o f removing role models will likely not be felt immediately,
43but will occur over time (if at all).
Gross returns to crime
Finally, the question remains whether or not profit/asset recovery affects gross 
returns to crime, g. A thought experiment is useful: can profit/asset recovery affect 
the sale price o f 100 kg of heroin? The answer is likely not, unless profit/asset 
recovery is stunningly successful, drastically reducing the supply o f heroin, for 
example. If  this were to be the case, a new equilibrium quantity and price would 
emerge (without associated demand reductions, the quantity supplied would be lower, 
but the price o f heroin would be higher). For the purposes of this chapter, profit/asset 
recovery is assumed to have no effect on gross returns.
Implications o f  models o f greater complexity
But what o f the implication o f the models o f Ehrlich and others, which suggest 
that increases in the severity o f punishment might, through income effects, increase 
crime? In the event, certain asset recovery authors propose that its use might 
encourage re-offending, or re-offending at a rate higher than normal. These authors 
generally makes this claim in reference to offenders who have been subject to some 
type of profit/asset recovery action. In truth, this may apply to all offenders. The 
analysis has thus far employed the straightforward Becker-based model and has 
assumed that offenders are risk neutral. While this may be the case, it is also possible 
that offenders are risk-loving (though Schmidt and Witte (1984) state that “risk-loving 
behaviour is commonly not assumed to exist” ; see also footnote 27). If so, and guided 
by a model o f behaviour like that of Ehrlich, the impact of an increase in the severity 
o f punishment— through the use of profit/asset recovery— is indeterminate. In truth, 
as noted above, existing empirical research broadly supports the deterrence 
hypothesis, so the use of profit/asset recovery should likewise reduce crime. But the 
changes to the severity o f punishment through asset recovery might be so large that 
they represent uncharted territory (profit/asset recoveries can be of the order of 
millions of pounds, much higher than existing fines).
43 Alternatively, it would be possible to view the removal o f negative role models as having an impact 
on the subjective certainty o f punishment (see page 43).
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Summary o f  the general case
In sum, profit recovery should reduce crime by lowering expected net returns 
per offence. It does this by increasing expected punishment costs and to some extent 
criminal operating costs, and by removing operating capital. But profit recovery 
should have little impact on crime in the absence o f other forms o f punishment, as 
noted by Bowles et al (2000; this is not the case with proceeds recovery and/or 
criminal lifestyle cases, discussed below). Moreover, its impact should depend in 
large part specifically on the certainty o f profit recovery, itself a string of 
probabilities, and on the capital requirements of and capital availability to offenders 
(and their spending/saving habits). Lastly, the possibility exists, though it seems 
unlikely, that profit/asset recovery may increase crime through income effects; there 
is a need for empirical research to test the crime-reduction hypothesis. Note that 
many o f the findings of this section are applicable not just to profit recovery, but to 
asset recovery as a general concept, and have been identified as such.
4.2.2. Beyond the general case: different powers/provisions and their
associated impacts on crime
Asset recovery regimes are multi-faceted, and different powers/provisions 
may have different impacts on crime. Most powers/provisions differ from the general 
case in a very straightforward way, primarily in how they affect the size of expected 
punishment costs. Unless otherwise noted, issues raised with the general case remain 
valid. These specific powers/provisions will be discussed in a concise manner, 
employing the approach used above (note that the order o f the discussion differs 
slightly from that used in the background section).
Proceeds v. profits
Importantly, jurisdictions may choose to recover the equivalent value not just 
o f net profits but o f gross proceeds (this is the case in the UK: criminal confiscation is 
a proceeds recovery power). This manifests itself in the Becker-based model as an 
increase in the severity o f punishment: while severity with profit recovery is net o f 
costs (though likely not net o f foregone earnings and distaste for crime), severity in 
proceeds recovery represents the gross proceeds, g, and therefore expected
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punishment costs are higher.44 These higher expected punishment costs are critical, as 
they imply that proceeds recovery may, in fact, deter criminality on its own without 
the need for further punishment.45 If criminal costs (c) are near zero, proceeds and 
profit recovery are virtually identical in impact; for crimes with high costs, however, 
the difference can be considerable. This in not to say that the difference can be 
infinite: the upper bound o f costs is equivalent to gross returns to crime, g  (that is, a 
rational actor will not commit a crime if  the costs outweigh the benefits even before 
punishment is factored in )46 While even with profit recovery there may be incentives 
to reduce operating costs, it seems reasonable to assume that with proceeds recovery, 
crimes with high operating-cost-to-proceeds ratios will likely be deterred. We might 
expect a move away from capital-intensive criminality. Further research on the 
behavioural changes o f offenders to asset recovery incentives is required.
General v. particular criminal conduct
Similarly, the severity o f punishment may increase by a far greater amount 
than even the gross proceeds o f a single criminal act, if  an offender is convicted and 
subsequently found by the court to have a criminal lifestyle. In this case, the offender 
stands to lose what may be thought of as a sum o f proceeds (or profits, though the 
usual approach employs proceeds) from previous criminality— known as general 
criminal conduct— even if  that criminality is previously unknown to the authorities.
In the decision-making o f an as-yet unknown (to the police) lifestyle criminal should 
be the realization that with each subsequent crime comes the risk o f apprehension and 
conviction and confiscation o f the sum of criminal proceeds (of up to six years o f 
assets in the UK). Formally:
44 So in this case, Ey = y  — d  — w — p(n + m + Pngf“) , remembering that for this analysis, net 
profits (y) are assumed to refer to accounting profits, such that y  = g  — c .
45 Interestingly, while Bowles et al (2000) do in fact mention many o f  the various aspects o f asset 
recovery regimes (e.g., proceeds not profits, criminal lifestyle), they choose to analyze only the 
recovery o f an equivalent value o f criminal profit, ignoring issues raised here.
46 This implicitly assumes that gross returns to crime are all monetary as opposed to psychic (i.e., the 
“rush” from committing a crime). This assumption seems reasonable when thinking about profit- 
driven crime.
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Ey, =y ,  - d ,  ~ P ( n, + "*, + p K'£t g iri) (7)
I — I
• where the subscript indicates values for the i,h crime,
• all other variables are as before.
It should be clear that this can represent a sizeable increase in expected punishment 
costs over and above the case o f particular (i.e., one-off) profit recovery or even 
particular proceeds recovery. This may also be counter to marginal deterrence. 
Marginal deterrence encourages offenders choosing between committing one o f 
several harmful (to society) acts to choose the least harmful one (Bowles et al, 2000; 
Stigler, 1970; Friedman and Sjostrom, 1993). Bowles et al (2000) note that profit 
recovery helps satisfy marginal deterrence, and the same should be true for proceeds 
recovery. But with aggregate proceeds/profits recovery, if the offender is convicted 
of any crime satisfying the criteria for criminal lifestyle, the same punishment will be 
handed down, at least to spend-as-you-go offenders-—similar to a fine equal to 
wealth— leaving little incentive for choosing the least harmful crime.
Critical to the impact o f the recovery o f the proceeds of general criminal 
conduct, however, is what is available for recovery. If the offender has spent all past 
criminal proceeds on non-recoverable goods and services, then asset recovery will 
little impact on crime, no matter whether aggregate or one-off proceeds or even 
profits may be confiscated. This is a common issue throughout asset recovery.
Recovery o f  direct purchases
Recovery of direct purchases most closely resembles a flavour o f profit 
recovery, and should reduce crime accordingly (from equation (5). But establishing a 
link between criminal funds and purchases may be considerably more difficult than 
estimating the proceeds o f crime. As such, p Found\F} from equation (6) is lower than
with the general equivalent value case, with a resulting lesser impact on crime. 
Alternatively, p Found\Fl appears as with the general case, but at higher cost to society
(due to the need for more in-depth— and thus more costly— financial investigations). 
As with the general case, direct purchase recovery o fparticular criminal conduct is 
unlikely to deter on its own (unless the distaste for crime and/or foregone earnings are
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high), though the recovery of the general criminal conduct of a “lifestyle” criminal 
may. Civil recovery in the UK employs a slightly flexible direct purchase recovery 
approach, allowing for the recovery o f up to twelve years of assets.47
Taxation
Taxation similarly resembles a flavour of profit recovery. In this case, 
criminal eamings are taxed at their appropriate marginal rate, plus interest and 
penalties levied for non-payment. These are captured in a proxy variable z, which 
represents the (average) effective rate of taxation.48 The tax can be viewed as 
stochastic, and the proxy z can simply be included with the certainty of profit 
recovery in equation (5) as follows (with all variables as described above):
Ey = y - d - w - p ( n  + m + p Ryrz) (8)
Taxation powers exhibit a lesser deterrent effect than the general case of equivalent 
value profit recovery if the effective tax rate is less than 100 percent, a greater 
deterrent effect if  the effective tax rate is greater than 100 percent (Naylor (1999) 
argues implicitly that this may in fact be the case), and an equivalent effect if  the 
effective tax rate equals 100 percent49 The effective tax rate depends critically on the 
size o f non-payment penalties and interest. Taxation o f particular criminal conduct on 
its own should not deter criminality without additional punishment— unless the 
effective tax rate is greater than 100 percent. This is not necessarily the case for the 
taxation o f something akin to general criminal conduct (i.e., the sum o f criminal
47 In the UK, while the criminal lifestyle provision is specific to criminal confiscation (recovery o f  
particular or general (aggregate) criminal proceeds), the concept o f the recovery o f  a sum o f previous 
criminal eamings remains valid for civil recovery and taxation. Note also that civil recovery in the UK 
does not require a criminal conviction.
48 (vx + >"jc(l -I-/) ' H- qr)
The effective rate o f  taxation, z, is as follows: z = ------------------------  where y  is criminal profit,
y
as before; x is the marginal tax rate; / is an annual interest rate; t is years o f interest to be paid; and q is 
the penalty for nonpayment. For an aggregate tax recovery, y  in this case would be replaced by a sum 
o f  y  variables.
49 The analysis here is based on the Becker model. Tabbach (2002) provides an analysis o f  the taxation 
o f criminal income under various tax schemes, drawing on the Ehrlich-based model mentioned on page 
35.
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eamings for some period o f time), though it still depends on the effective tax rate. 
Taxation recovery in the UK allows for the recovery of up to twenty years of assets.50
Recovery o f instrumentalities
The recovery o f instrumentalities—often referred to as seizure and/or 
forfeiture—is the least straightforward of the asset recovery powers. It enters the 
model separately, with its own probability ( p s ) and severity (5), because the recovery
of instrumentalities occurs independently of other punishments (shown here with, 
though independent of, proceeds recovery, with all variables as described above):
Ey = y - d - w - p ( n  + m + p Rg r ) - p ss (9)
As with all examples o f the model, increases in either p s or s reduce crime. The
certainty variable here, p s , is almost random, as it may result from a random traffic
violation (in which suspected cash is found coincidentally in the car boot) just as 
easily as a pre-planned drug raid (in which the cash is found on the kitchen table).
The severity o f punishment in the case of instrumentalities is where things become 
complicated. It may or may not be related to the offence in any meaningful way (e.g., 
the authorities in some jurisdictions may seize a house in which drugs were stored for 
ten minutes, even though the value o f the seizure is unrelated to the amount o f drugs 
or seriousness o f the crime). In this case, the recovery o f instrumentalities can have a 
dramatic impact on the expected net return per offence even for crimes likely to yield 
small profits (and the seizure o f high-value items like houses not used as 
instrumentalities in the true sense runs counter to marginal deterrence, at a cost to 
society). Unlike proceeds/profit, direct purchase, and tax recovery, which all happen 
after-the-fact, the recovery o f instrumentalities may occur before, during, or after the 
crime. The severity of punishment variable may then need to capture the implications 
o f an incomplete criminal activity.
50 As with civil recovery (recovery o f direct purchases), taxation recovery in the UK may occur in the 
absence o f a conviction,. Also note that the twenty-year time-frame appears to be more o f a guideline 
than a strict limit.
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It is easiest to think about the various scenarios in which instrumentalities are 
recovered one by one. Cash recovery (cash seizure/cash forfeiture) is the least 
complicated recovery of instrumentalities. As noted, the impact o f cash seizure on 
crime (the crime in question) depends on the timing of the seizure: if it is before the 
profit-generating crime has taken place— if the cash represents financing to be used 
for the purchase o f narcotics— then the seizure might disrupt crime (and thus perhaps 
5  represents the value of c, operating costs). If the cash represents the proceeds or 
profits from crime, then the severity variable is o f a value equivalent to g  ory, 
respectively. And because the process is independent of criminal proceedings, the 
suspect may be convicted on a related charge and later subject to a criminal 
confiscation (proceeds recovery). If the forfeiture is not one of cash but rather of the 
car used to transport narcotics, then s may take the value of the cost o f the car, or the 
use o f the car (which may be a sunk cost, o f little concern to the offender). Third 
party rights are critical here: if the car is borrowed/rented, and the owner is unaware 
o f its use in crime, it may not, depending on the jurisdiction, be subject to forfeiture. 
Even if the car is forfeited, if  borrowed, its loss may not be viewed as a loss to the 
offender. The issue for criminal deterrence, then, is whether or not, and how, the 
recovery o f instrumentalities represents a loss to the offender. Lastly, contraband may 
be recovered, though this will likely not occur in the absence of criminal conviction 
and further punishment. With contraband, both the value o f goods are lost (lost to the 
offender), and the crime is likely left unfinished, with no profits realized. From a 
behavioural standpoint, recovery o f instrumentalities, like all recovery powers, should 
create incentives for the design o f criminal businesses, and will likely have an impact 
on the ownership of various instrumentalities, and the subcontracting o f certain 
businesses to other separate firms or individuals.
Provisions to prevent avoidance
Restraint, receivers, default sentences, debt overhang, and overseas and
AML provisions all reduce expected net returns per offence (and thus reduce crime), 
primarily by affecting components o f p R, the probability o f a profit/asset recovery 
case being successful, and by raising criminal operating costs, c. In brief:
• The use o f restraint/receivers at the outset o f financial investigations should 
bolster the deterrent effect o f asset recovery, because its use affects the probability
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that funds remain, and the probability that offenders comply with a confiscation 
order ( p  Fundsremam and p Compiianc^ co , respectively, from equation (6)). Similarly,
restraint may reduce the extent o f hyperbolic discounting, as assets are generally 
restrained at a much earlier stage than punishment is meted out, bringing the 
impact o f recovery into the present (equivalent to reducing r, the discount rate).
■ Default sentences increase P  Comphance\CQ • Default sentences should reduce crime
even for those offenders with low disutility o f imprisonment, for whom a default 
sentence may be inconsequential: individuals generally cannot themselves offend 
whilst incarcerated (the incapacitation effect).
- From an ex ante perspective, debt overhang increases the probability that 
offenders comply with a confiscation order. Debt overhang is a double-edged 
sword, however. From an ex post, post-confiscation order perspective, debt 
overhang makes legitimate employment more expensive relative to crime. This is 
because criminal activity may be more easily hidden from the view of authorities 
than legitimate employment; debt overhang itself is therefore like a tax on 
legitimate income alone. The implications o f this depend on the assumptions made 
about offenders, as with the more complex Ehrlich-type models discussed earlier 
(see page 34); with risk neutral offenders, the taxation o f legal income but not 
illegal income increases crime (Tabbach, 2002).
■ Naylor (1999b) argues that the use of asset recovery powers might increase the 
incidence o f money laundering by offenders. This may indeed be the case, but 
AML provisions should counter such an increase. Disclosures o f suspicious 
activity (disclosed from the regulated sector) increase the general certainty of 
punishment, p  51 Also, AML/overseas provisions should increase criminal 
operating costs by making criminal avoidance activities more expensive.
51 Too many disclosures can swamp the system, however. As Ehrlich and Brower (1987) note, “if  the 
volume o f  offences increases due to changes in exogenous factors, then the extra load on law 
enforcement agencies could decrease their effectiveness, and thereby cause a reduction in arrest and 
conviction risks and related sanctions.”
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Adding it up
So what does a regime look like in its entirety? In the UK, because recovery 
o f instrumentalities, civil recovery, and taxation may all be used in the absence of a 
conviction, the expected net returns function facing an offender includes components 
representing each power, not just one alone. This is captured as follows:
Ey, = y, -  d, -  VV, -  [pin, + m, + p R( ^ g ,  -  «,->;) + 0  -  pKPc/ViZ-Vii + O -  P)0 ~ /vM /V /w Z-V ",) + (10)
/ = l  i = l  ;=1
■ where p c is the probability o f a civil recovery being pursued by the state,
- p T is the probability o f a tax recovery being pursued by the state,
• all other variables are as before;
and, as always, a crime is committed if  Ey > 0. In words, expected net returns per 
offence equal the net returns less expected punishment costs (criminal confiscation 
less civil recovery less taxation less instrumentalities). What is important to note is 
that despite appearances, expected net returns will not always be driven below zero 
due to several mitigating factors. First, and briefly, cases may be specific to 
particular, not general criminal conduct, such that aggregate sums will not be pursued.
Further, because the legislation in the UK requires that criminal confiscation is 
attempted before civil recovery, and civil before taxation, the likelihood that civil and 
taxation powers are used is moderated by (1 -  p ) , the likelihood o f no conviction.
And the state will not take each and every failed conviction forward, so civil and tax 
recovery have their own certainties which are likely to be less than one. In other 
words, the marginal increase(s) in expected punishment costs posed by civil and tax 
recovery may not be as large as at first glance. Of course, even if a case is taken 
forward, the certainty o f a recovery succeeding, p R, is likely itself to be less than one 
(not least because of the use o f avoidance activity and the probability that funds 
remain for recovery may be considerably less than one, depending on spending/saving 
behaviour)— and subjective probabilities matter far more than objective reality.
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Summary o f specific powers/provisions
Using the general case o f the equivalent value of criminal profit as a guide, 
this section has illustrated (theoretically) that different powers and provisions of asset 
recovery have different impacts on crime. Bearing in mind the conclusions o f the 
section on the general case, critically important to the deterrent effect o f the different 
asset recovery powers is the manner in which asset recovery affects the severity of 
punishment. As such, the recovery of proceeds should exhibit a stronger deterrent 
effect than that of profits, and the impact of the recovery o f aggregate proceeds should 
be greater still. If taxation is used, the deterrent effect is driven in large part by the 
size of interest and penalties (and high interest/penalties can allow this largely profit- 
based power to emulate the stronger proceeds recovery approach). The recovery of 
instrumentalities is somewhat of a wild card: the certainty of the forfeiture o f various 
crime-related items is moderately more random than the certainties of other recovery 
powers. And its impact on crime depends critically on whether the forfeiture o f items 
represents a tangible loss to the offender . Finally, various provisions (restraint, 
default sentences, debt overhang, and overseas and AML provisions) increase the 
likelihood that assets will be recovered and/or increase criminal operating costs, 
which reduce expected net returns per offence and thus reduce crime.
4.3. Conclusion
This chapter has presented the theoretical basis for the use o f asset recovery, 
drawing on the economics of criminal behaviour literature begun by Becker (1968) 
and building on the asset-recovery-specific work o f Bowles et al (2000). It represents 
an application o f economists’ deterrence hypothesis, itself an application of the theory 
o f decision-making under uncertainty. The chapter suggests that there is indeed 
theoretical support for the use of asset recovery in the fight against crime (i.e., to deter 
crime). It provides backing to the generally unsubstantiated claims made throughout 
the asset recovery literature. It indicates, ceteris paribus, 1) that asset recovery should 
deter at least some crime; 2) and that different asset recovery powers should have 
differing impacts on crime, because they affect the expected returns to crime in 
different ways.
In sum, asset recovery should reduce crime by lowering expected net returns 
per offence. It does this by increasing expected punishment costs and to some extent
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criminal operating costs, and by removing operating capital. But its impact should 
depend on the capital requirements o f and capital availability to offenders, as well 
as—critically—the certainty of asset recovery (which is affected, among other things, 
by offenders’ ability to simply hide the proceeds of crime through money laundering 
activity). This ability is explored in two o f the chapters that follow (specifically in 
chapters relating to suspicious activity reports). The impact of asset recovery should 
also depend on offenders’ spending/saving habits, also explored in a subsequent 
chapter. Finally, the possibility exists, though unlikely, that asset recovery may 
increase crime through income effects.
With regard to particular powers, the recovery of criminal proceeds should 
exhibit a stronger deterrent effect than that of profits (which itself should have little 
impact on crime in the absence of other forms of punishment), and the impact of the 
recovery o f aggregate proceeds should be greater still. The deterrent effect of taxation 
recovery is driven in large part by the size of interest and penalties (and high 
interest/penalties can allow this largely profit-based power to emulate the stronger 
proceeds recovery approach). The recovery of instrumentalities is somewhat of a 
wild card, and its impact on crime depends largely on whether the forfeiture of items 
represents a tangible loss to the offender. Finally, various provisions increase the 
likelihood that assets will be recovered and/or increase criminal operating costs, 
which reduce expected net returns per offence and thus reduce crime.
57
Chapter 5. The Judgment Proof Problem
Chapter 5. The Judgment Proof Problem (Or “Do Offenders Spend It All— And
Implications for Asset Recovery?”)52
In criminal law, monetary sanctions are generally preferred to non-monetary 
sanctions. This is because the former represent transfers to the state, while the latter 
carry often considerable costs (i.e. costs o f imprisonment). But monetary sanctions 
may not alone deter criminality; as Shavell (1985) notes, “the monetary sanction 
needed to deter will [may] exceed a party’s assets.” That is, offenders’ wealth (i.e. 
net worth) may be insufficient in comparison to the benefit (i.e. proceeds) generated 
by a criminal act, such that the threat o f monetary sanction may hold little or no 
deterrent effect.
This problem is captured in the judgment proof concept (though the concept is 
primarily used in tort law).53 According to Shavell, writing in a different article 
(1986), an injurer is judgment proof if he/she is unable to pay fully the losses for 
which he/she is liable. Asset recovery powers, such as confiscation and cash 
forfeiture— favourably viewed by law enforcement authorities in a number of 
jurisdictions as quite efficacious in reducing crime-—and other monetary sanctions, 
such as fines, are likely ineffective in reducing crime if offenders’ spending and 
saving behaviour renders them judgment proof (or somewhere far along a continuum 
of judgment “proofness”), regardless o f the extent to which they have benefited from 
crime.54 With little to recover, the ex ante deterrent effect of asset recovery is 
virtually nil— as is its capacity to raise revenue ex post. Further, the ability o f asset 
recovery to disrupt criminality depends on the capital requirements o f and capital
52 The author wishes to thank the members o f the Criminal Money Flows project team o f the Financial 
Services Authority; Tristram Hicks and Charlotte Pilgrim o f the London Regional Asset Recovery 
Team; Tina Mawson, JARD business coordinator; Stephen Prichard o f the Home Office; and Stephen 
Smith o f University College London. Giuseppe Mattiacci provided useful comments on the judgment 
proof problem. The Home Office is gratefully acknowledged for its contribution to research costs.
53 In criminal law, unlike tort law, monetary sanctions can be backed up with custodial (non-monetary) 
penalties. So offenders un-deterred by monetary sanctions may not be completely judgment proof. But 
the concept should be clear enough. O f course, offenders— particularly hardened criminals— may 
exhibit a low disutility o f imprisonment; the threat o f  custodial sanctions may in fact be hollow.
54 Bowles et al (2000) note that asset recovery can, in fact, counter the judgment proof problem, as the 
proceeds o f  crime can be used to satisfy financial penalties (so offenders who were judgment proof 
prior to crime may be served post-crime financial penalties). This is only the case if eamings are 
saved, not spent.
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availability to offenders, related to offenders’ judgment proof status and their broader 
financial behaviour.
So are offenders judgment proof? That is, are they likely to be unresponsive 
to monetary sanctions? And how do they spend their income? What assets do they 
hold? Very little is known about offenders’ financial behaviour. Levi and Osofsky 
(1995), for example, suggest that “many of the proceeds o f crime are spent before 
arrest,” but do so with no systematic empirical backing. This gap in understanding 
limits the ability o f policy-makers to predict the likely impact o f asset recovery (and 
indeed general financial penalties) on crime. The lack of understanding on offenders’ 
spending and asset holding behaviour also prevents policy-makers from assessing the 
performance of such financial penalty regimes in recovering criminal assets vis-a-vis 
some theoretical upper limit on the value of assets available for recovery.
The present chapter seeks to fill this gap in understanding by using data from 
the UK’s Joint Assets Recovery Database (JARD), which has hitherto not been 
analysed in any depth. The chapter presents a profile of acquisitive offenders, to gain 
an understanding o f their spending/saving habits, as well as their more general 
personal and criminal characteristics. The chapter is the first to empirically explore 
the financial behaviour and potential judgment proof status o f offenders. The chapter 
is structured as follows: after this introduction, a background section briefly 
summarizes the literature on monetary sanctions, the judgment proof problem, and 
existing studies o f  offenders; the specifics of the data are discussed, including 
recognized shortcomings; the findings are presented in sections on judgment proof 
status and saving behaviour, including the policy implications o f the analysis; and the 
chapter concludes with thoughts for future research.
5.1. Background
In the economic model o f crime, an offence is committed if  the expected net 
benefit of offending exceeds expected punishments costs— the latter o f which include 
the monetised net present value o f imprisonment and any monetary sanctions.55 The 
ability o f and preference for monetary sanctions to deter criminality is noted in a
55 For an overview o f  the economic model o f  crime, see, for example, Eide (1999).
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number of sources throughout the economics of crime and law-and-economics 
literature (most dating back to Becker, 1968; Stigler, 1970; and, o f course, Bentham 
and Beccaria). Monetary sanctions are preferred to custodial sanctions (i.e. 
imprisonment) because the former are transfers to the state, while the latter carry 
various costs (e.g. maintaining and staffing prisons; foregone output of incarcerated 
offenders). But monetary sanctions carry their own disadvantages.56 These are 
addressed in Shavell’s specific treatment o f the use o f monetary and non-monetary 
sanctions in deterrence (Shavell, 1985, and also 1987). Here, while Shavell notes the 
preference for the use of monetary sanctions, he also explicitly recognises that the size 
o f an offender’s assets— his/her net worth, or wealth— is critical in determining 
whether or not an offender will be deterred though monetary sanction. He takes this 
to its logical conclusion: “In the extreme case, for instance, it is impossible to deter a 
person with no assets by the threat of monetary sanctions.” Further, because 
offenders will not be arrested/convicted 100 percent of the time (i.e. with probability 
of one), Shavell notes that the lower the probability o f arrest/conviction, the higher 
needs to be the monetary sanction. This, o f course, increases the likelihood that the 
sanction will be larger than net worth. Finally, Shavell states that the ability of 
monetary sanctions to deter crime depends on the benefit the offender derives from 
committing the crime; the greater this benefit (imagine the highly-lucrative crime of 
VAT fraud), the greater the monetary sanction needs to be to deter the crime— and 
again it seems likely that the necessary sanction will exceed net worth. Thus, 
monetary sanctions may not always be feasible (i.e. sufficiently deterrent), and thus 
non-monetary sanctions have an important role to play.
Shavell is not alone in recognizing the role o f wealth in limiting the efficacy o f 
monetary sanctions, o f course. Most authors make at least passing reference to the 
issue when discussing the use of fines in the deterrence framework. Levitt (1997b), 
for example, suggests that with imperfect information on criminals’ wealth, or with 
the majority of offenders’ wealth held in the form of human capital, the state cannot 
simply impose a fine on offenders, who can claim to have insufficient wealth to pay
56 And monetary sanctions are not costless, o f course. Though rarely mentioned in the literature, at 
least not in any depth, monetary sanctions carry administration and enforcement costs. These will not 
necessarily always be insignificant. Further, monetary sanctions based on financial investigations, like 
asset recovery, will command investigative and other criminal justice system resources.
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the fine. Imprisonment is necessary in enforcing the fine (“pay the fine or go to 
jail”).57
That a potential offender may be undeterred by monetary sanction is captured 
neatly in the largely civil law concept o f judgment proof. As noted above, an injurer 
is judgment proof if  he/she is unable to pay fully the losses for which he/she is liable 
(Shavell, 1986).58 This concept is primarily, though not exclusively, found in tort 
law. It is typically mentioned in discussions of injury prevention (whereby injury 
implies injuries both big and small, from car accidents with one injured party to 
nuclear or other environmental disasters, with injured parties in the hundreds or 
thousands); the injurer is the tort law analogue o f criminal law’s offender (defendant). 
O f course, as noted above (see footnote 53), in the case of tort law, custodial sanctions 
(like prison) are rarely if  ever used to back-up monetary penalties. The judgment 
proof literature is richer than that which deals exclusively with the wealth-driven 
limitations o f monetary sanctions in criminal law. Judgment proof status is often 
described in the context of discussions surrounding the pros and cons o f strict liability 
v. negligence and the provision o f insurance (see, for example, Shavell, 1986; 
Mattiacci and de Geest, 2003). The point in the present chapter is not to contribute in 
any normative sense to the theoretical debate on the judgment proof problem, but 
rather to borrow the concept from civil law and to subsequently explore in a positive 
sense whether or not offenders as a group may fall into the judgment proof category 
(or the extent to which they may)— and the policy implications thereof.
Asset recovery refers to the process through which criminals are deprived of 
the proceeds/profits and/or instrumentalities of crime. This chapter explores asset 
recovery through the lens o f criminal confiscation. A (criminal) confiscation order 
represents the primary vehicle through which asset recovery penalties are levied. A 
confiscation order is served following a financial investigation of an offender’s
57 Levitt also suggests that to overcome the problem o f limited offender asset-holding, it might be 
possible for the state to lay claim to some portion o f future eamings (i .e. tax future income based on 
human capital), similar to the concept o f child support which is paid over time. O f course, an offender 
might be in a position to refuse to work. Further, such an arrangement might drive an offender to 
specialise in crime, depending on the relative tax rates, as criminal eamings are only taxed if found, 
while legitimate eamings will be taxed by the state (in the traditional sense and also with the state’s 
claim on future eamings akin to child support; see Tabbach, 2002, for more on taxation and crime).
58 Shavell’s concept differs from one o f  pure insolvency.
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affairs; it is only served on convicted offenders. Asset recovery represents a 
somewhat non-standard flavour o f monetary sanction: asset recovery penalties are not 
fixed in size and vary for each individual confiscation. In this regard, while the 
penalty for a certain offence (e.g. parking in a no-parking zone) may be a standard 
fixed amount for each offending party, the asset recovery sanction for an offender’s 
drug trafficking conviction, for example, will be based on a financial investigation of 
the offender. Specifically, a confiscation order is served in the amount o f the 
offender’s estimated benefit from the crime(s) in question, or his/her net worth, if 
benefit equals or exceeds wealth. The latter option seems probable for the most 
profitable crimes. Confiscation orders in the UK are served for the amount o f the 
gross proceeds of crime, not the net profit. That is, offenders cannot deduct criminal 
business expenses from the value o f their confiscation order. Computing the 
offender’s estimated benefit depends in part on the crime(s) for which the offender 
was convicted. Offenders convicted of certain serious offences, or of a number of 
lesser offences within a specified time frame, are assumed to have had a criminal 
lifestyle— and with a criminal lifestyle, the FI may assume that criminal benefit is 
comprised o f up to six years’ o f proceeds. If the offender is not convicted o f any 
lifestyle offences, then the confiscation seeks to recover the particular proceeds of the 
specific crime(s) in question.
In thinking about efficacy, and guided by Shavell (and others), it is essential to 
consider whether or not offenders are likely to be judgment proof with respect to asset 
recovery (and to monetary sanctions in general). This depends critically, o f course, 
on offenders’ spending and saving behaviour. If offenders as a group have a 
propensity to spend heavily as they go— perhaps on the proverbial wine, women, and 
song— then it seems unlikely that asset recovery will have much of a bite: truly 
deterrent asset recovery penalties and other monetary sanctions may be impossible to 
levy due to limitations in wealth.59
59 Of course, monetary sanctions are complemented in the criminal justice system by imprisonment. 
And many offenders may be deterred from crime for a variety o f reasons, not simply the size o f the 
monetary penalties. Such reasons include distaste for crime, cost o f committing the crime. Also, note 
that the concept o f  judgment proof relates to the concept o f less eligibility (see, for example, Sieh, 
1989) and the potential impotence o f certain crime-fighting policies (like prison). With the concept o f  
less eligibility, the standard o f living in prison should not exceed the standard o f living outside o f  
prison— such that offenders are motivated to stay out o f prison.
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But very little research exists on the financial behaviour of offenders 
themselves. Levi (2003) sums it up (though for a specific subgroup o f offenders): 
“Currently, we have only a modest idea about how much the proceeds o f so-called 
victimless crimes (drugs trafficking and vice) constitute; how much offenders save 
from crime; and what they do with their money.” What scant work there is includes 
Shavell (1985), who notes in passing that criminals have little wealth, based on (now 
dated) summary statistics from the US Department of Justice. Weisburd et al (1991, 
the final in the series of research outputs of the Yale Studies on White-Collar Crime) 
present some limited but enlightening financial information on a sample of white- 
collar offenders (who appear to be far less well-off, to say the least, than the “white- 
collar” title might suggest in the lore of crime). Other statistical reports (e.g. Lynch et 
al, 1994) present information on employment before arrest, but with little indication 
o f income from that employment (or income from crime, for that matter), let alone net 
worth. Various other authors (e.g., Reuter et al, 1990; Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000; 
Dorn et al, 1992, to name a few) explore drug-related offenders and their eamings, but 
do so qualitatively and/or focus too exclusively on a specific sub-population of the 
drug market to be o f broad use here. Still other sources (e.g. Lewis and Mhlanga, no 
date) present descriptions of offenders and certain financial characteristics. They 
touch on estimated eamings from crime, but net worth and/or specific asset holdings 
fall outside their scope. In all cases, no studies focus exclusively on offenders’ 
benefit from crime and net worth, in any holistic, systematic sense.60 This is the 
motivation for the present chapter.
5.2. Data
The analysis is based on JARD data on confiscation orders made between 
April 2004-September 2005, inclusive. The JARD dataset contains information on 
the population o f confiscation orders for the UK (4,236 orders in this 18-month 
sample, of which a subset are used for most analyses), including information on assets
60 Both the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NC1S) and the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) 
have drafted restricted intelligence products profiling offenders’ financial behaviour in some fashion. 
The present chapter draws on a broader and more detailed series o f records and should serve to inform 
the future work o f  these agencies. Read in conjunction with NCIS/ARA products, the present chapter 
should also contribute to the larger store o f  knowledge on offender financial behaviour.
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held by offenders. Specifically, JARD includes personal characteristics of offenders; 
the primary offence for which the offender was convicted; FI-estimated and court- 
agreed values for criminal benefit and the confiscation order amount; investigating 
law enforcement agency and date o f order; and information on assets held by 
offenders. JARD is coordinated by staff housed by the Assets Recovery Agency; this 
dataset was compiled by the JARD coordinator.
JARD data are themselves based on financial investigations of offenders to 
determine 1) estimated criminal benefit; and 2) available (or “realisable”) amounts. 
Estimated criminal benefit refers to the proceeds of crime for the previous six years 
(e.g. if  the offender has been convicted o f any of a number of specific serious 
offences set forth in the Schedule 2 of the Proceeds o f Crime Act 2002; in this case, 
the offender is assumed to have had a criminal lifestyle and the state will seek to 
recover the proceeds o f his/her general criminal conduct). Estimated benefit may also 
refer to the proceeds o f the specific crime or crimes in question (if the offender has 
been convicted o f lesser offences); in this case, the state will seek to recover the 
proceeds o f his/her particular criminal conduct. Available (sometimes called 
“realisable”) amount refers to an offender’s net worth (wealth) at the time of the 
investigation. This information feeds into the court’s determination o f what is 
referred to as the agreed benefit and order amount.
The financial investigations supporting JARD entries will generally have been 
based on evidence gleaned from an exhaustive set o f sources. These may include: 
information obtained in house/business searches and/or through offender/accomplice/ 
associate interviews; databases held by the police, other government departments, and 
the private sector (such as the Police National Computer (PNC) system, force 
intelligence, Land Registry, Companies House, Voter Registration,
Experian/Equifax); and, o f course, bank records. Financial investigators (FIs) will 
typically look for attempts made by the offender to disguise the true ownership and 
source o f assets (perhaps through transfers to and from associates, including family); 
assets owned by the offender but hidden somehow (e.g. held in the name of another 
person) will typically be identified in a confiscation order should evidence support the 
offender’s true ownership status.
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To contextualise the dataset, offenders in this JARD sample represent only a 
subset o f offenders. A model is as follows: of all offenders, only a subset is known to 
the authorities, some o f whom will be arrested/charged. O f these, a subset will be 
convicted, and a further, smaller subset will be subject to the confiscation process. O f 
these, a subset will be served confiscation orders (see Figure 5.1). These final 
confiscation orders will be recorded on JARD.61
Figure 5.1. Attrition in the Process
A l l  o f f e n d e r s  
Note: not to scale.
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The data are to some extent suboptimal, o f course. Research o f this type is 
susceptible to the criticism that the sample (offenders who were caught) is not 
necessarily representative o f the larger population o f interest (all offenders). That this 
may be the case cannot be ruled out. Moreover, it would be difficult to argue against 
the presence of sample selection bias: because not all convicted offenders are subject 
to the confiscation process, it is impossible to ignore the possibility that the data refer 
only to cases which appeared larger, and/or more outwardly serious, and/or easier to 
FIs. Put another way, in an environment o f constrained police resources, it may be
61 In truth, confiscation investigations may be launched before an offender is even arrested. But 
offenders must be convicted before the confiscation hearing can take place, and confiscation orders are 
only served on convicted offenders. The point o f  the model is to illustrate attrition. Note also that 
JARD also houses information on confiscations in-progress (as well as information on cash 
seizures/forfeitures and civil recoveries); the dataset used for the present chapter includes only 
completed confiscations (all post-conviction by definition).
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the case that confiscations involved few offenders with outwardly little to recover.62 
Further, as asset recovery was employed on a more limited basis prior to the 
introduction of POCA, the data— largely generated post-POCA— may contain the 
low-hanging fruit picked in the new POCA environment.63 And the data can only 
present information on known assets; those offenders who were particularly good at 
hiding assets from view may appear to have far less to recover than was the case.
But it seems foolish to dismiss this approach out-of-hand and to ignore its 
potential contribution. Research specifically on offenders’ finances represents 
previously uncharted territory. It may, in fact, be the case that these sources are 
perfectly representative of the larger population; we just don’t know. Also, many 
confiscations in the data may have been handled proactively— in the early stages o f an 
investigation, before it may have become apparent that an offender did or did not hold 
recoverable assets. And the results of a police financial investigation must be 
sufficiently robust to survive challenges from defence counsel and judicial scrutiny, 
so it is likely that evidence o f benefit and assets will be based on sound investigation 
not wild speculation. Finally, the data are novel in that offenders therein run the 
gamut o f acquisitive crime types, from duty evasion to drug trafficking.
5.3. Findings
So do acquisitive offenders appear judgment proof with respect to asset 
recovery? And who are acquisitive offenders? What is their net worth, and how do 
they hold their assets? This section begins with an analysis o f offenders’ judgment 
proof status in subsections on personal-criminal and financial characteristics. The 
chapter then turns to offender saving behaviour. This latter section seeks to answer 
the question: what did offenders do with the money (especially if  they’re judgment 
proof)?
62 Though this is not entirely the case. Some police forces in the UK have taken the policy decision to 
serve confiscation orders on all offenders, not just those with apparent wealth.
63 This is not to imply that POCA powers (specifically) have been used in all cases made against 
offenders in the samples, but simply to note that with POCA came a stronger focus on the use of 
financial investigation. The asset recovery powers wielded against some o f  the offenders may derive 
from the Criminal Justice Act or Drug Trafficking Act, conceptually similar to POCA for the purposes 
o f this analysis, depending on the when the underlying offences actually occurred.
(continued)
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In the course of the analysis, facts are interpreted as 1) accurate as reported; 
and 2) representative of the complete picture (i.e. offenders have not successfully 
hidden any benefit/assets from view). This is optimistic, and the implications of 
relaxing the assumption are discussed in a later section. Also, when discussing 
offender asset-holding behaviour, if any assets have been specifically recorded, values 
for unmentioned asset types are assumed to be zero. That is, if an FI has noted that 
offender X holds 100,000 GBP in property and 10,000 GBP in vehicles—but 
mentions no other specific assets— it is assumed the values for other asset types, such 
as cash, financial assets, jewellery, etc., are zero.
5.3.1. Offenders’ Judgment Proof Status
This section aims to describe offenders in the JARD dataset and to explore 
their benefit from crime; their net worth upon arrest/conviction/confiscation; and the 
extent to which their net worth approaches their criminal benefit— or represents some 
(perhaps much smaller) proportion thereof.
As noted above, the JARD dataset contains information on 4,236 confiscation 
orders (i.e. 4,236 records); it appears that no offender appears more than once.64 But 
not all records are used (largely due to missing data issues), and more records are used 
for certain analyses than others. Along these lines, because no “available amount” 
figure is entered onto the database (even though FIs will determine this in their 
financial investigations), there is no strict equivalent for net worth.65 A broad proxy 
variable is as follows: for all confiscation orders in which the court-determined agreed 
benefit exceeds or equals the court-determined order amount variable, the value of the 
order amount variable is assumed to represent net worth. Anecdotal evidence from 
the financial investigative community and from viewing prosecutor’s statements
64 Some 4,528 records were originally provided by JARD administrators, 292 o f which were dismissed 
for almost complete lack o f  information. Anecdotal information provided by various FIs suggests that 
these were likely errors entered by FIs that had not yet been deleted from the system.
65 JARD’s asset-specific information could perhaps be used to compute available amounts, but there 
aren’t enough records with full asset-specific data to allow for certain analyses o f interest (e.g. 
exploring differences in net worth by primary offence). FIs appear to have been given little guidance 
on how to complete JARD’s optional open-ended text descriptor fields for specific assets. Moreover—  
and this is the worrying factor— the quality o f data on assets varies wildly; much o f  the data is not 
usable.
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(submitted in the confiscation process) suggests that order amount is sufficiently 
synonymous with available amount. To keep the analyses consistent, the sample has 
been restricted to the records for which this is the case: o f the records with sufficient 
data to generate this agreed-benefit-to-order-amount ratio— some 3,687 records—only 
seven failed to meet the criterion of agreed benefit exceeds or equals order amount.66 
This implies that the majority of the discussion below employs a subset, rather than 
the total, o f the overall 4,236 records; this subset contains 3,680 records (see Table 
5.1). Note that the court-determined agreed benefit and order amount variables have 
been used here instead of the FI-determined estimated benefit and order application 
variables (these also exist in JARD). This is the case because often FIs will not 
apportion amounts to individual offenders in cases in which more than one offender is 
part o f the criminality in question. So the FI-determined estimated benefit amounts 
will often refer to the gross proceeds of a group of offenders, not individual offenders, 
and may include double-counting; the presiding judge will generally be responsible 
for apportioning the benefit between offenders in groups. Only the court-determined 
amounts have been used in the analyses below; comparisons between the FI- 
determined amounts and those determined by the court are presented in an appendix.
Table 5.1. Number of JARD Confiscation Order Records Used
FY2004/05
FY2005/06 
(Apr.-Sep.) Total
Overall confiscation orders N= 1,774 N=2,462 N=4,236
With non-missing entries for order amount N -1,774 N=2,462 N -4,236
With non-missing entries for agreed benefit N =l,396 N -2,327 N=3,723
With sufficient data to generate benefit/amount ratio N=l,375 N -2,312 N=3,687
Used for net worth/benefit/judgment proof analyses N=l,371 N=2,309 N -3,680
Source: JARD.
Findings have not been weighted. Many JARD data fields are optional, and 
consequently may be skipped by FIs entering their confiscation order data (see Table
5.2, below, which sets forth data fields and associated data availability). Responding 
to optional queries seems to be down to FI personalities; some FIs appear to not mind
66 In other words, in only seven o f 3,687 confiscation orders was order amount greater than agreed 
benefit.
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the data-entry process, while others do. Various non-response analyses suggest that 
non-response bias, while present, is manageable without weighting.67
Table 5.2. Number o f JARD Records With Valid (i.e. Non-Missing) Data
Variable Total
Overall confiscation orders N=4,236
Order amount N=4,236
Agreed benefit N=3,723
Age N=4,120
Gender N=4,017
Ethnicity N=2,301
Primary offence N=4,236
Associated ML offence N=4,236
Type o f  criminal conduct N=2,896
Specific assets information N= 1,449
Source: JARD.
Means are displayed in many of the tables below, as they are most easily 
interpreted/understood. But the criminal benefit and net worth variables are non- 
normally distributed. Comparing means for statistically significant differences 
typically requires normally distributed data, though larger sample sizes may 
sufficiently overcome this requirement. Data transformations (natural logs, which 
yield normally distributed data in this case—which can then be compared in standard 
compare-means fashion) and nonparametric tests such as the Kruskal-Wallis test (the 
nonparametric equivalent of one-way ANOVA) were used to further explore 
associations between variables, though such analyses are generally only referred to in 
the body of the text (i.e. without tables).
Personal-Crimin al Characteristics
Personal characteristics o f the JARD data (i.e. for the 3,680 records) are 
presented in Table 5.3. In sum (ignoring non-responses), nearly 90 percent of
67 For example, the difference in means for the order amount variable between the group o f  
confiscation orders for which the agreed benefit exceeds or equals the order amount and the group for 
which this is not the case is not statistically significant at the p<0.05 level. The same can be said for 
the agreed benefit variable. Differences in means were also checked for natural log transformations o f  
order amount and agreed benefit (as the two have non-normal distributions); these are not significant 
either.
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offenders in the JARD sample are male; roughly 68 percent are in their 20s and 30s; 
and more than two-thirds are white (though note the high number of non-responses 
here). JARD does not contain more detailed personal information, unfortunately (i.e. 
there is no information on marital status, dependents, occupation, and educational 
attainment, all of which might affect criminality).
Table 5.3. Personal Characteristics
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Gender
Valid Male 3,133 85.1 89.6 89.6
Female 365 9.9 10.4 100.0
Total 3,498 95.1 100.0
Missing No response 182 4.9
Total 3,680 100.0
Age
Valid 20-29 1,283 34.9 35.7 35.7
30-39 1,151 31.3 32 67.6
40-49 740 20.1 20.6 88.2
50-59 306 8.3 8.5 96.7
60-69 105 2.9 2.9 99.6
70-79 13 0.4 0.4 100
Total 3,598 97.8 100
Missing N o response 82 2.2
Total 3,680 100.0
Ethnicitv
Valid Asian 202 5.5 9.8 9.8
Black 305 8.3 14.8 24.6
Mixed 48 1.3 2.3 26.9
White 1,463 39.8 70.9 97.8
Other 45 1.2 2.2 100.0
Total 2,063 56.1 100.0
Missing No response 1,617 43.9
Total 3,680 100.0
Source: JARD. The 20-29 age range includes 81 offenders under age 20.
Criminal characteristics are presented in Table 5.4. These JARD data are 
dominated by the primary offence o f drug trafficking (69 percent), followed by 
burglary/theft/handling/robbery (nearly 11 percent) and other fraud/embezzlement/ 
deception/crimes o f dishonesty (nearly 10 percent).68 The dominance o f drug
68 Note that primary offence classifications were drawn right from the JARD database, save for 
burglary/theft/handling/robbery, which is an amalgamation o f  burglary/theft, handling, and robbery (all
(continued)
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offences appears to be an artefact o f a previous focus of asset recovery on drug 
offences almost exclusively— and, of course, because drug trafficking is viewed as 
one of the classical acquisitive crimes (it seems reasonable to assume that this 
dominance will change to some extent, perhaps due to things like the government’s 
recent renewed focus on fraud). As an indicator, statistics for convictions in Crown 
Courts in England and Wales for 2004 suggest that drug offences represent only 14.2 
percent of all non-motoring convictions; while an amalgamation of robbery, theft and 
handling, and burglary represents 29.8 percent of all non-motoring convictions (Home 
Office, 2005).
The primary offences were recoded into aggregate groups of drug dealing, 
other blue collar, and white collar (these classes are mentioned by Reuter and Truman 
(2004), and seem a sensible aggregation of the larger offence list); the aggregate 
classification allows for relationships between primary offences and other variables to 
be efficiently explored.69 Some 68 percent o f offences in the JARD sample were 
classified as drug dealing, while nearly 12 percent were other blue-collar, and 20 
percent were white collar offences. Some 83 percent of confiscation orders in the 
sample were served for general, as opposed to particular, criminal conduct (though 28 
percent o f the 3,680 records had no response for this field). And, lastly, the use of 
associated money laundering charges (when the primary offence is not itself money 
laundering) appears rare, happening in only three percent o f the JARD cases. Though 
there is no way to tell from the data alone, this is likely the case because: historically, 
money laundering as a change was shunned by police/prosecutors due to perceived 
and actual complexity in proving the charge, and it offered little marginal benefit.
o f which had very similar financial characteristics). Certain primary offences are not used in the 
present analysis, as they were either unspecified (classified as not stated  in the JARD database), or 
appeared too infrequently (less than 0.5 percent o f the time) to be o f  analytical benefit. These included 
people trafficking, terrorism, and vehicle offences.
69 Drug dealing refers to the primary offence o f drug trafficking., other blue collar refers to 
burglary/theft/handling/robbery and pimps and brothels/prostitution/pornography:; and white collar 
refers to counterfeiting/intellectual property/forgery, excise duty fraud, money laundering-drugs, 
money laundering-other, other fraud/embezzlement/deception/crimes o f  dishonesty, tax and benefit 
fraud, and VAT fraud.
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Table 5.4. Criminal Characteristics
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Primary offence
Valid Burglaiy /Theft/Handling/Robbery 372 10.1 10.5 10.5
Counterfeiting/Intellectual 66 1.8 1.9 12.4
Property/ Forgery
Drug Trafficking 2,431 66.1 68.6 81.0
Excise Duty Fraud 107 2.9 3.0 84.0
Money Laundering-Drugs 56 1.5 1.6 85.6
Money Laundering-Other 80 2.2 2.3 87.8
Other Fraud/Embezzlement/ 345 9.4 9.7 97.6
Deception/Crimes o f dishonesty
Pimps and Brothels/Prostitution/ 25 .7 .7 98.3
Pornography
Tax and Benefit Fraud 32 .9 .9 99.2
VAT Fraud 29 .8 .8 100.0
Total 3,543 96.3 100.0
Missing Not used 137 3.7
Total 3,680 100
Primary offence classification
Valid Drug dealing 2,431 66.1 68.2 68.2
Other blue collar 418 11.4 11.7 79.9
White collar 715 19.4 20.1 100.0
Total 3,564 96.8 100.0
Missing Terrorism 1 .0
Not known 115 3.1
Total 116 3.2
Total 3,680 100.0
Type o f  criminal conduct
Valid General 2,202 59.8 83.3 83.3
Particular 441 12.0 16.7 100.0
Total 2,643 71.8 100.0
Missing No response 1,037 28.2
Total 3,680 100.0
Associated money laundering offence
No 3,559 96.7 96.7 96.7
Yes 121 3.3 3.3 100.0
Total 3,680 100.0 100.0
Source: JARD. Crime types are pulled directly from JARD, save fo r  burglary/theft/handling/robbery 
which is an amalgamation o/burglary/theft, handling, and robbery.
O f course, it seems unlikely that acquisitive criminals are all alike. In 
particular, it seems fair to assume that criminals involved in duty offences, for 
example, are a different breed from those in the drug trade. Much of the later 
analyses use primary offence as the independent variable; primary offence is critical 
to the asset recovery process, as it determines whether or not the state can assume the
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offender has a criminal lifestyle (thereby assuming that criminal benefit is equal to six 
years of proceeds, as opposed to one-off particular criminal conduct). And primary 
offence is assumed to play a role in the size of criminal proceeds (explored in more 
detail below).70
In the event, criminals involved in different offences do in fact appear to differ 
along a number o f fronts in the JARD data. One important— and perhaps not 
surprising— relationship appears to exist between primary offence and age: JARD 
drug-related offenders were more likely to be younger, while white collar offenders 
(like excise duty fraudsters) were more likely to be in their 40s (though the 
relationship between age and primary offence does not appear to be overwhelmingly 
strong). Mean ages by primary offence are presented in Table 5.5 (sorted by 
descending mean age; between-group differences in means are significant at the 
p<0.01 level). It could be the case that the white collar offences command greater 
levels o f education and/or professional experience, both o f which we would expect to 
be associated with age. Unfortunately, JARD’s lack o f education and occupation data 
preclude unpacking this further.
Table 5.5. Age by Primary Offence
Primary offence Mean N
Std,
Deviation Median
Tax and Benefit Fraud 47.73 30 9.336 47.5
Excise Duty Fraud 45.66 105 9.341 44.0
VAT Fraud 41.62 29 11.712 40.0
Pimps and Brothels/Prostitution/ 40.96 25 11.946 41.0
Pornography
Other Fraud/Embezzlement/ 39.45 341 12.317 38.0
Deception/Crimes o f dishonesty
Money Laundering-Other 39.34 77 12.943 36.0
Counterfeiting/Intellectual 38.06 64 11.816 33.5
Property/Forgery
Money Laundering-Dmgs 36.24 54 11.990 34.5
Burglary/Theft/Handling/Robbery 35.65 370 11.436 34.0
Drug Trafficking 33.58 2,369 10.173 32.0
Total 35.24 3,464 11.084 34.0
Source: JARD.
70 O f course, there may be different likelihoods o f investigation/prosecution/conviction depending on 
crime type, which will clearly affect the JARD data (which, as discussed, relate to convicted offenders 
who have been served confiscation orders).
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JARD primary offence was also weakly associated with gender and with 
ethnicity. These were explored with cross-tabulations; all associations were 
significant (chi-square p<0.01). Female offenders—while vastly outnumbered by 
their male counterparts—did seem to exhibit marginally higher rates o f participation 
in white-collar over drug and blue-collar offences than their male counterparts. The 
ethnicity relationship appears far more subtle; statistical significance here appears 
more an artefact o f a large sample than strong underlying patterns.
The associated money laundering offence and criminal conduct variables both 
offer little o f value to the present analyses. The former may have been misunderstood 
by FIs: 33 percent of the 136 JARD records for which there was an associated money 
laundering offence themselves were derived from primary offences o f money 
laundering (i.e. money laundering-drugs or money laundering-other). This is 
suggestive o f confusion and consequent double-counting. The criminal conduct data 
may be less salient here due to changes in POCA and its predecessors. Many of the 
confiscation orders in JARD (at least in this dataset; this will change as time passes) 
were pre-POCA orders. The legislation has changed such that general and particular 
criminal conduct were interpreted slightly differently in pre-POCA and POCA 
circumstances. So the criminal conduct variable may send conflicting messages, and 
is less a proxy for anything of interest (e.g. the seriousness of the crime(s)).
Financial Characteristics
Criminal benefit
JARD contains information on offenders’ estimated criminal benefit, captured 
here with JARD’s agreed benefit variable. (To reiterate, criminal benefit refers to the 
estimated gross proceeds of the particular criminal offence or the general course o f 
criminality in question, up to six years in length.) Criminal benefit as a concept is not 
without complications, however. In the UK, the benefit amount may include income 
levels never actually received by the offender, since no expenses may be deducted in 
the proceeds-not-profits approach. Also, there is no timeframe involved here, so it’s 
not possible to consider criminal benefit in any way as criminal income per unit time. 
This is unfortunate, as it limits the ability to compare these data with other studies of 
criminal and legitimate income.
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Criminal benefit identified in JARD is useful in indicating the relative income- 
generating capacity o f various crime types. JARD Agreed benefit ranged from 0 to 
156,577,417 GBP (see Table 5.6). While the maximum is an outlier (a VAT fraud), it 
is striking how large this number is. Another outlier is on the order o f some 112 
million GBP, and a few others are less large but still o f considerable magnitude 
(between 10 and 18 million GBP). These are likely not outliers in the classic sense, 
but rather simply the values o f criminal benefit for extremely profitable crimes. The 
difference between the mean and median are illustrative of the skewness o f the 
distribution.
Table 5.6. Criminal Benefit (Agreed Benefit)
N  Min. Max. Sum Mean
Std.
Deviation Median
3,680 £1 £156,577,417 £834,306,601 £226,714 £3,243,795 £12,388
Source: JARD.
Mean criminal benefit differed quite considerably in the sample by primary 
offence, not surprisingly (see Table 5.7, sorted by descending mean estimated 
benefit). Between-group differences in means are significant at the p<0.01 level (i.e. 
differences between means exist for at least two of the primary offences); this is also 
the case with natural log transformations. The Kruskal-Wallis test similarly suggests 
a statistically significant association between agreed benefit and primary offence 
(p<0.01). Differences between primary offences are clearest when offences are 
classified into the drug dealing, other blue collar, and white collar categories. As with 
the specific offence types discussed above, between-group differences in means in the 
sample are significant at the p<0.01 level; this is also the case with natural log 
transformations. The Kruskal-Wallis test similarly suggests a statistically significant 
association between agreed benefit and primary offence classification (p<0.01).
While being cautious of widely different Ns for each primary offence, the 
magnitude of the agreed benefit means for VAT fraud is remarkable. One wonders 
why more offenders aren’t in fact VAT fraudsters (the differences in means between 
the VAT fraud and excise duty fraud, next on the list for highest estimated benefit, are 
significant for the agreed benefit variable). It may be the case that VAT fraud is 
sufficiently complex (particularly when compared to, say, drug-related offences) that
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71fewer offenders understand the offence and its modus operandi. Along these lines, 
white collar offences appear to yield the highest criminal benefit (save for the 
pimps/brothels/etc. offence). Median values are considerably smaller than the means, 
though still illustrate the relative earning potential of the different crime types.
Table 5.7. Criminal Benefit (Agreed Benefit) by Primary Offence
Mean N Std. Deviation Median
Primary offence
VAT Fraud £10,557,368 29 £34,849,260 £619,040
Money Laundering-Other £644,765 80 £1,630,239 £100,426
Other Fraud/ Embezzlement/ £328,499 345 £1,312,941 £41,003
Deception/Crimes o f dishonesty
Excise Duty Fraud £320,557 107 £552,783 £100,000
Pimps and Brothels/Prostitution/ £299,091 25 £449,714 £66,829
Pornography
Counterfeiting/Intellectual £186,097 66 £341,525 £36,768
Property /Forgery
Money Laundering-Drugs £158,689 56 £319,525 £43,854
Tax and Benefit Fraud £128,867 32 £274,116 £34,459
Drug Trafficking £95,410 2,431 £509,617 £6,000
Burglary/Theft/Handling/ Robbery £91,069 372 £238,610 £21,417
Total £226,917 3,543 £3,304,435 £11,691
Primary offence classification
White collar £742,195 715 £7,274,161 £51,954
Other blue collar £109,955 418 £281,755 £23,328
Drug dealing £95,410 2,431 £509,617 £6,000
Total £226,872 3,564 £3,294,932 £11,980
Source: JARD.
JARD agreed benefit is correlated with age (p<0.05 level), though not strongly 
so (the relationship is stronger between age and the natural log of the benefit 
variable). This may be the case because the white collar crime types like VAT fraud 
and excise duty fraud command a more mature offender (this is consistent with the 
research on white-collar offenders; see, for example, Wesiburd et al, 1990). The 
difference in means between male and female offenders for the benefit variable is not 
significant. This may be down to the non-normality of the distribution; the difference
71 O f course, it may indeed be the case that offenders are turning to VAT fraud in droves, but they’re 
simply not getting prosecuted/convicted and pursued for confiscations. This may be the case because 
law enforcement (HMCE/HMRC in this case) does not completely understand VAT fraud, or has other 
competing priorities.
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in means between male and female offenders for the logged transformation of benefit 
is indeed significant at the p<0.01 level, and the Kruskal-Wallis test suggests a 
statistically significant relationship between gender and criminal benefit. Between- 
group means differ for ethnicity (p<0.01; the same can be said for the logged 
transformation of benefit and also the Kruskal-Wallis test). Mean and median 
differences between criminal benefit and age range, gender, and ethnicity are 
presented in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8. Criminal Benefit (Agreed Benefit) by Age Range, Gender, and Ethnicity
Mean N Std. Deviation Median
A ee ranee
<40 £218,177 2,343 £4,007,360 £9,081
>=40 £269,541 1,164 £967,725 £30,994
Total £235,225 3,507 £3,322,434 £12,800
Gender
Male £250,156 3,133 £3,510,858 £12,130
Female £65,462 365 £253,469 £9,560
Total £230,884 3,498 £3,324,073 £12,000
Ethnicitv
Asian £815,266 202 £7,931,356 £21,143
Black £150,539 305 £817,375 £10,293
Mixed £3,449,418 48 £22,595,555 £6,083
White £177,373 1,463 £711,501 £16,621
Other £109,112 45 £172,905 £35,000
Total £310,508 2,063 £4,301,048 £16,276
Source: JARD.
Net worth
JARD also contains proxy information on offenders’ net worth (wealth), as 
noted above. Net worth (or a proxy thereof) is captured in the JARD order amount 
variable (the amount for which the court ultimately served the confiscation order). 
The variable broadly refers to a sum of the value o f the assets which might be used to 
satisfy a confiscation order, typically including funds held in bank accounts, 
insurance, real estate, vehicles, and other savings vehicles— net o f financing, such as 
mortgages. JARD order amount ranged from 0 to 18,648,679 GBP (see Table 5.9), 
the largest being an offence of “other fraud/embezzlement/deception/crimes of
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dishonesty”. The next four outliers (all with values o f more than 5 million GBP) 
represent three white collar offences and one drug offence. The net worth variable 
displays a similarly skewed distribution (with the median being far less than the mean 
net worth). All offenders in the sample had positive net worth.
Table 5.9. Net Worth (Order Amount)
;V Min. Max. Sum Mean
Std.
Deviation Median
3,680 £0 £18,648,679 £180,236,233 £48,977 £422,419 £1,938
Source: JARD.
Mean net worth differed quite considerably by primary offence, as with 
criminal benefit (see Table 5.10, sorted by declining mean order application). 
Between-group differences in means are significant at the p<0.01 level, suggesting 
that differences between means exist for at least two of the primary offences; this is 
also the case with natural log transformations. The Kruskal-Wallis test similarly 
suggests a statistically significant association between order amount and primary 
offence (p<0.01). Differences between primary offences are again made clearer when 
offences are classified into the drug dealing, other blue collar, and white collar 
categories. Between-group differences in means are significant at the p<0.01 level; 
this is also the case with natural log transformations. The Kruskal-Wallis test 
similarly suggests a statistically significant association between order amount and 
primary offence classification (p<0.01).
The magnitude of the order amount mean for VAT fraud is striking, as above 
with criminal benefit (it is decidedly less than the VAT fraud agreed benefit variable, 
however; this is discussed in detail in the judgment proof section, below). White 
collar offences similarly appear to yield the highest net worth—though the 
pimps/brothels/etc. offence remains a blue-collar contender. The order of median net 
worth tracks the rank order o f the mean in terms of offences, though less well than 
with criminal benefit.
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Table 5.10. Net Worth (Order Amount) by Primary Offence
Mean N Std. Deviation Median
Primary offence
VAT Fraud £661,843 29 £1,633,178 £39,586
Other Fraud/Embezzlement/ £165,248 345 £1,160,117 £13,000
Deception/Crimes o f  dishonesty
Pimps and Brothels/Prostitution/ £123,280 25 £193,374 £20,000
Pornography
Excise Duty Fraud £94,327 107 £190,154 £24,000
Money Laundering-Other £90,366 80 £117,234 £47,872
Counterfeiting/Intellectual £69,947 66 £153,551 £11,073
Property/Forgery
Tax and Benefit Fraud £65,209 32 £108,678 £30,480
Money Laundering-Drugs £60,149 56 £112,287 £13,899
Burglary /Theft/Handi ing/Robbery £30,174 372 £91,015 £3,070
Drug Trafficking £23,151 2,431 £190,099 £1,063
Total £49,163 3,543 £429,965 £1,840
Primary offence classification
White collar £144,892 715 £881,299 £19,493
Other blue collar £37,058 418 £104,787 £3,430
Drug dealing £23,151 2,431 £190,099 £1,063
Total £49,205 3,564 £428,826 £1,871
Source: JARD.
JARD order amount is correlated with age (at the p<0.01 level), though not 
strongly so (the relationship is slightly stronger between age and the natural log of the 
variable). The difference in means between male and female offenders for order 
amount is not significant. Between-group differences in means are not significant for 
order amount and ethnicity (this is the case with both standard and logged 
transformations of the variable), though the Kruskal-Wallis test does suggest a 
statistically significant relationship between ethnicity and the order amount variable. 
Mean and median differences between net worth and age range, gender, and ethnicity 
are presented in Table 5.11.
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Table 5.11. Net Worth (Order Amount) by Age Range, Gender, and Ethnicity
Mean N Std. Deviation Median
A ee ranee 
<40 £24,739 2,343 £202,166 £1,251
>=40 £102,676 1,164 £690,798 £7,355
Total £50,607 3,507 £432,371 £2,000
Gender
Male £52,633 3,133 £453,369 £1,885
Female £17,395 365 £42,477 £1,900
Total £48,956 3,498 £429,411 £1,895
Ethnicitv
Asian £79,838 202 £518,804 £7,243
Black £86,028 305 £720,840 £2,650
Mixed £132,916 48 £739,291 £1,960
White £57,613 1,463 £509,715 £3,407
Other £29,849 45 £49,375 £5,769
Total £65,136 2,063 £547,561 £3,480
Source: JARD.
Judgment p roo f status
At the heart of the matter is offenders’ judgment proof status, which is 
determined by the net worth and criminal benefit of offenders. The issue is this: do 
offenders maintain sizable bank accounts and/or purchase expensive houses and cars 
which may be recovered by the authorities (or sold to satisfy confiscation orders), or 
do they seem to spend licit and illicit proceeds on non-recoverable nondurable goods 
and services? Or, put more simply (and more easily testable), is offender net worth 
greater than the identified benefit from crime?
A judgment proof offender is defined in the present context as one whose ratio 
of net worth to criminal benefit is less than one, using the order amount and agreed 
benefit variables, respectively. The judgment proof ratio ranges from 0 to 1, with a 
mean of 0.47 (N=3,680; see Table 5.12 and Figure 5.2). The judgment proof score 
differs by the size of the order amount, whereby the larger the amount, the higher the 
judgment proof ratio score (between-group means are significant at the p<0.01 level; 
the Kruskal-Wallis test similarly suggests an association between the judgement proof 
score and aggregate order amount; see Table 5.13).
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Table 5.12. Judgment Proof Ratio
N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation Median
3,680 0 1.00 0.4715 0.4014 0.3801
Source: JARD.
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Figure 5.2. Scatterplot o f Agreed Benefit and Order Amount
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Source: JARD. Outliers o f  more than 5,000,000 GBP (18 in total) have been dropped fo r  both variables, so 
N-3662). No points lie above the 45-degree line because only records fo r  which agreed benefit equals or 
exceeds order amount are used in the analysis.
Table 5.13. Judgment Proof Score by Aggregate Order Amount
Order Amount (aggregated) Mean N Std. Deviation Median
Low (<50,000 GBP) 0.4503 3,204 0.40578 0.3325
Medium (50,001-250,000 GBP) 0.6074 356 0.34635 0.5985
High (>250,000 GBP) 0.6354 120 0.31193 0.6280
Total 0.4715 3,680 0.40141 0.3801
Source: JARD.
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Some 974 (26.5 percent o f the sample) has an order amount which does indeed 
match agreed benefit (a judgment proof score of one implies that the order amount 
equals the agreed benefit; this may happen with greatest frequency when FIs search 
for assets until the value reaches that o f the criminal benefit). But this implies that the 
rest— some 73.5 percent of this sample— is judgment proof under Shavell’s definition 
(see Table 5.14 and Figure 5.3). This is a critical, if  not surprising, finding: it implies 
that nearly three quarters o f the offenders in the sample have net worth which is 
valued at less than the estimate of the benefit generated by the crime or crimes for 
which they are responsible. And some 42 percent of the sample has net worth which 
is valued at only 25 percent or less o f the benefit generated.
Table 5.14. Judgment Proof Ratio Frequencies
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid 0.00 509 13.8 13.8 13.8
0.01-0.25 1,034 28.1 28.1 42.0
0.26-0.50 512 13.9 13.9 55.9
0.51-0.75 393 10.7 10.7 66.6
0.76-0.99 256 7.0 7.0 73.5
1.00 974 26.5 26.5 100.0
Total 3,678 99.9 100.0
Missing System 2 .1
Total 3,680 100.0
Source: JARD.
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Figure 5.3. Frequency Distribution o f  Judgment Proof Scores
1.200 
1,000 
800 
600 
400 
200 
0
0.00 0.01-0.25 0.26-0.50 0.51-0.75 0.76-0.99 1.00
Source: JARD. Note the scale is non-linear in that it exaggerates the very bottom and very top o f  the 
spectrum (i.e. it presents separate categories fo r  those who are entirely judgment proof—with a judgment 
proof ratio o f  0.00—and those who are in no way judgment proof—with a judgment proof ratio o f  1.00; a 
linear scale would aggregate the 0.00 category in with the 0.01-0.25 and the 1.00 category in with the 0.76- 
0.99).
Judgment proof status in the sample varies by primary offence, not 
surprisingly (see Table 5.15, sorted by descending mean judgm ent proof ratio score, 
and Figure 5.4). Between-group means are significant at the p<0.01 level; the 
Kruskal-W allis test similarly suggests an association between the judgem ent proof 
score and primary offence (p<0.01). The same can be said for differences in mean 
judgment proof scores between primary offence classes or drug dealing, blue collar, 
and other white collar offences. Interestingly, though, for the bulk o f  the primary 
offences, judgm ent proof status doesn’t appear to differ in a truly meaningful way in 
terms o f  means (statistical significance, o f  course, d oesn ’t necessarily imply 
meaningful difference). That is, the mean judgm ent proof score for m ost o f  the 
primary offences hovers around 0.5, g ive or take— save for tax and benefit fraud; 
m oney laundering-other; m oney laundering-drugs (for which the judgem ent proof 
score is higher); and burglary/theft/handling/robbery and VAT fraud (for which the 
score is lower). Median judgem ent proof scores exhibit a much broader range (note
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the median tax and benefit fraud score of 1.00 and the median VAT fraud score of 
0.11). The ranking of primary offences by median scores doesn’t differ 
overwhelmingly from the ranking o f offences by means, however. VAT fraud, the 
dominant offence in terms of mean criminal benefit and net worth, is probably the 
most interesting o f all the offences, in that its mean and median judgment proof scores 
are considerably lower than those of the other offences. It may be the case that either 
criminal benefit from VAT fraud is considerably over-estimated and/or the net worth 
is considerably underestimated (perhaps because VAT fraudsters are very good at 
hiding assets from view). These issues are addressed in more detail below.
Table 5.15. Judgment Proof Score by Primary Offence
Mean N Std. Deviation Median
Primary offence
Tax and Benefit Fraud 0.7901 32 0.34734 1.0000
Money Laundering-Other 0.6486 80 0.40865 0.9557
Money Laundering-Drugs 0.5947 56 0.38613 0.6462
Other Fraud/Embezzlement/ 0.5345 345 0.40886 0.4864
Deception/Crimes o f  dishonest
Counterfeiting/Intellectual 0.5122 66 0.39642 0.5232
Property/F orgery
Excise Duty Fraud 0.4945 107 0.43169 0.3913
Pimps and Brothels/ 0.4618 25 0.38993 0.4360
Prostitution/Pornography
Dmg Trafficking 0.4562 2,431 0.39143 0.3585
Burglary/Theft/Handling/Robbeiy 0.4300 372 0.42798 0.2469
VAT Fraud 0.3017 29 0.35779 0.1091
Total 0.4716 3,543 0.40127 0.3805
Primary offence classification
White collar 0.5460 715 0.41202 0.5397
Drug dealing 0.4562 2,431 0.39143 0.3585
Other blue collar 0.4308 418 0.42305 0.2647
Total 0.4712 3,564 0.40116 0.3801
Source: JARD.
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Figure 5.4. Mean and Median Judgment Proof Score by Primary Offence
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Source: JARD.
The judgm ent proof ratio score is correlated with age (at the p<0.01 level), 
though not strongly so. The difference in means in the sam ple between younger and 
older offenders and also between male and fem ale offenders for the judgment proof 
score is significant (p<0.01); these findings are supported by the Kruskal-W allis test 
(p<0.01). Between-group differences in means are not significant for judgm ent proof 
score and ethnicity. Mean and median differences betw een judgm ent proof ratio 
score and age range, gender, and ethnicity are presented in Table 5.16.
■  M e a n  ■  M e d i a n
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Table 5.16. Judgment Proof Score by Age Range, Gender, and Ethnicity
Mean N Std. Deviation Median
A ee ranee 
<40 0.4429 2,343 0.39834 0.3333
>=40 0.5214 1,164 0.40376 0.4882
Total 0.4689 3,507 0.40180 03733
Gender
Male 0.4650 3,133 0.39999 0.3692
Female 0.5378 365 0.41501 0.5407
Total 0.4726 3,498 0.40214 03849
Ethnicitv
Asian 0.5028 202 0.39653 0.4854
Black 0.5198 305 0.37939 0.4960
Mixed 0.6092 48 0.35938 0.5960
White 0.4793 1,463 0.40116 0.3733
Other 0.4705 45 0.38843 0.4813
Total 0.4904 2,063 039671 0.4138
Source: JARD.
What, then, did these offenders do with their criminal benefit, particularly if 
they held only some percentage thereof (47 percent on average, if  the JARD sample is 
any guide)? Six options— which are not mutually exclusive— prevail: 1) offenders 
spent the difference (or part of it) on non-recoverable nondurable goods and services; 
2) offenders originally invested in depreciating assets; 3) offenders reinvested the 
difference in their own or others’ criminal enterprise; 4) offenders practised 
successful avoidance activity; 5) the authorities under-estimated net worth; and 6) 
offenders never had the money in the first place—the authorities over-estimated their
I')benefit from crime. These possibilities are discussed in turn:
■ Non-recoverable nondurable goods and services: Life has costs, and all 
members of society, criminal or not, will have financial obligations. Ignoring 
housing costs (which may in some way be recoverable if they lead to home 
ownership), these will include utilities, food, clothing, travel costs, medical/dental
72 Of course, it is also possible that the ratio o f assets to criminal benefit may be over-stated. For 
example, FIs may underestimate criminal benefit (the denominator o f  the equation) for various reasons.
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expenses, tax payments, and, optionally, school fees, holidays, alcohol, drugs, 
prostitutes, gambling, and the like.73 Such expenses cannot be reclaimed by the 
state.
■ Depreciating assets: Even if  all criminal income has been placed into potentially 
recoverable assets, these assets may depreciate over time. Cars represent a 
standard example of a depreciating asset: drive it off the lot, and your new car is 
now worth less than when it was parked in the showroom five minutes ago. But 
other assets may similarly depreciate, depending on a number o f factors. While 
real estate has generally appreciated, market corrections or sharp downturns have 
occurred in most countries in the last 50 years. And micro-level factors 
occasionally effect decreases in value (imagine a house sited next to land being 
considered for the next nuclear energy plant). Financial assets similarly go 
through periods o f boom and bust, or stagnant growth (i.e. real depreciation). So 
depending on offenders’ luck and/or investment ability, their asset portfolios may 
have shrunk over time.
■ Criminal reinvestment: Along the lines o f avoidance activity, offenders may 
choose to invest part o f their wealth in further criminal activity. In fact, 
bankrolling others’ criminality may represent one avoidance strategy: assets are 
parked in the hands of others who must repay the loans at a specified future time 
(perhaps under threat o f violence). In this way, the risk is shared (if not fully 
farmed-out) with the bank-rolled offenders. Asset recovery may be thought of as 
a stochastic tax on criminal behaviour. To some extent, criminal reinvestment 
might represent a rational shift from capital to labour; it is much more difficult for 
the state to tax this labour (i.e. human capital). Interestingly, one implication of 
this is that asset recovery policies might prompt continuing criminal involvement 
by those who might otherwise retire from crime.74
73 On housing costs: mortgage interest costs and/or rental payments are not recoverable, and may be o f  
considerable size. Confiscations which require the sale o f  the family home (to satisfy the confiscation 
order) are not always easy, in that such a sale displaces the spouse and children, who some judges may 
feel were not responsible for the criminality, even though they may have enjoyed its rewards.
74 There might then be more inter-generational lending between criminals; a greater availability of  
finance for crimes requiring large capital investments; and a greater need for the enforcement 
infrastructure to ensure that these debts are repaid.
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■ Avoidance activity: It is very difficult to imagine that offenders will not take 
efforts to hide the existence and location o f recoverable assets. Their ability at 
doing so, however, will differ, as will law enforcement’s ability in finding hidden 
assets.75 Offenders may employ third parties (e.g. family/friends/associates) to 
purchase and hold assets. Or assets may be purchased/parked offshore, perhaps in 
offshore trusts/bank accounts or perhaps property—and indeed offshore holdings 
may be in the name of third-parties. O f course, increases in financial investigator 
efficiency, better law enforcement intelligence/information, and more 
international cooperation can all reduce the efficacy o f offenders’ avoidance 
activity. But with the present data, the use o f avoidance activity skews the 
findings such that the judgment proof nature of the sample is over-estimated.
■ Under-estimation of net worth: A corollary of this is that FIs take no more than 
a cursory look at assets, underestimating offenders’ un-hidden net worth out of 
convenience or perhaps to avoid spending scarce investigative resources (once an 
FI has found as much as the state will be able to confiscate— i.e. criminal 
benefit— there's little point in searching for more). This seems likely for at least 
some confiscation investigations. Further, perhaps the findings are the result o f an 
insufficiently appropriate proxy: perhaps the JARD order amount variable under­
estimates net worth. There is (limited) anecdotal evidence that some judges have 
not fully embraced asset recovery and/or feel that the confiscation of all available 
assets is draconian (though it is often said that the legislation was written to be 
draconian); in these cases, order amount will potentially under-estimate net worth.
■ Over-estimation of criminal benefit: It is possible that the state will over­
estimate, perhaps dramatically so, offenders’ criminal benefit. Due to the nature 
of the proceeds v. profits approach, it is likely that at least a portion of the 
criminal benefit will represent expenses which were never recovered by the 
offender. And in the event that an offender is arrested in possession of contraband 
which is subsequently seized, it may be the case that the contraband is valued at
75 Avoidance activity may be costly (in fact, these costs are socially wasteful), and not all offenders 
will be willing/able to spend potentially scarce resources on avoidance.
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what may be an inappropriate price (e.g. drugs seized and valued at street as 
opposed to wholesale price; stolen goods valued at replacement as opposed to 
resale value).
What are the implications for asset recovery? If the JARD sample is 
representative of all acquisitive offenders—and not just those who get caught—then 
these judgment proof findings may temper our faith in asset recovery’s deterrent 
effect. Bearing in mind that offenders are not likely to be arrested/convicted with 
probability o f one (i.e. 100 percent of the time), then truly deterrent sanctions would 
need to be some multiple of the estimate of the criminal harm. But here we’re seeing 
that rather than a multiple o f criminal benefit (i.e. of agreed benefit), only a fraction is 
available for recovery.
This is not to suggest, however, that the policy should have no impact on 
crime. Asset recovery penalties are typically served in conjunction with nonmonetary 
sanctions, like imprisonment. That is, confiscations are part of the overall punishment 
picture, and accompany prison sentences. The two together may represent a sufficient 
deterrent, whereas the two in isolation might not. Because we can’t know ex ante 
whether offenders will be judgment proof with respect to monetary sanctions and/or 
have low disutility of prison, having both forms o f punishment is very likely the right 
way to go.76 In fact, these findings confirm the importance o f imprisonment as a 
complement to, not substitute for, asset recovery-style sanctions.
Moreover, no doubt asset recovery (and other monetary sanctions) should 
deter at least a subset of offenders. This subset might include offenders whose crime 
type(s) carry a greater likelihood o f arrest/conviction (thus requiring a smaller 
multiple of the criminal harm to deter). Further, for those offenders who carry out 
crime which meets the criteria for recovering the proceeds o f general criminal conduct 
(i.e. the proceeds of a criminal lifestyle going back some six years into the past), asset 
recovery may have the capacity to deter. This is the case because for each subsequent
76 If offenders have a low disutility o f imprisonment, yet are judgment proof in terms o f financial 
penalties, then there is little to deter them from crime. Imprisonment, however, will still prevent (most) 
criminality due to incapacitation.
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crime, the offender considers whether or not to carry out the offence based on a 
subjective analysis o f the marginal benefits and costs of doing so. With asset 
recovery policies in place, the cost o f the “next” crime to the offender if  caught will 
include not only the harm (proceeds) of that particular crime, but also o f previous 
crimes which the offender may have gotten away with. So even if some 47 percent or 
more o f the six years of criminal benefit is no longer available for recovery, this may 
still be enough to deter the “next” offence. O f course, for offenders facing a 
confiscation for particular criminal conduct—unlike general criminal conduct 
allowing the state to recover six years of proceeds— if the average offender’s 
spending behaviour is such that less will remain for confiscation than the benefit o f 
the crime in question, the deterrent effect is indeed watered-down.
What these findings also raise is the possibility that depending on the 
goals/targets of asset recovery (e.g. reduce crime, raise revenue, etc.), it may be most 
efficient to target particularly large or small orders and particular crime types— if, as 
above, particular crime types are more likely to exhibit large benefit and/or order 
amounts—and small gaps (where the gap between order amount and agreed benefit is 
another way o f thinking of judgment proofness) between the two (see Figure 5.5).
For example, if law enforcement in the UIC—as we know— is seeking to meet targets 
on growing year-on-year confiscation order amounts, then law enforcement perhaps 
should consider undertaking a linear programming effort to design an strategy that 
optimises confiscation receipts subject to the spending and saving behaviour relating 
to certain crime types (and, of course, constraints relating to capacity in the criminal 
justice system). If the goal is to reduce harm, then it might be best to focus on those 
crime types generally seen to be the most harmful to society (e.g. based on the Home 
Office work on harms and the costs of crime; see Dubourg and Prichard, 2007). To 
complicate matters further, an effective strategy might also be to focus on the crime 
types most likely to yield large recoveries—but then to use those recovered proceeds 
to fund law enforcement efforts fighting the most harmful crimes. The present 
findings do not allow us to design the definitive law enforcement strategy going 
forward, but they do allow us to start thinking of these things in much greater detail.
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Figure 5.5. Gap Between Order Amount and Agreed Benefit by Primary Offence
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Source: JARD.
5.3.2. Offenders’ Saving Behaviour
So what did the offenders in the sample do with their ill-gotten (as well as any 
legitimate) gains? This section explores asset holding behaviour, in terms o f  
offenders’ stock o f  assets upon arrest/conviction/confiscation. This section is more 
speculative than the judgment proof section above, as JARD data quality is more o f  a 
concern here. Many fewer records are used in the analyses below  than in those above 
(which is one reason why this section is distinct).
JARD contains som e information on offenders’ specific assets (i.e. those 
comprising available amount), though in open-text format and only for a subset o f  the 
confiscation orders. Assets were coded from the open-text descriptor field into the 
follow ing types: antiques, art, business, cash, financial assets-bank/buiiding society, 
financial assets-general insurance products, financial assets-life assurance products,
A s noted, asset-specific data are captured in optional data fields, and not all FIs provided the optional 
information.
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financial assets-pension products, financial assets-other, jewellery, other physical 
assets, property, and vehicles.78 Records which contained at least one asset-specific 
field which could not be coded into an existing category (perhaps because the open- 
text asset description was unclear) were ignored, so as not to skew results. Complete 
asset-specific information was provided for 937 o f the 3,680 usable confiscation 
orders (25.5 percent). These 937 orders capture 30,378,207 GBP of order amount 
(16.9 percent of the 180,236,233 GBP of order amount found in the 3,680 orders).79 
The 937 records discuss 1,878 specific assets (offenders typically hold multiple 
assets, of course). To put this subsample of confiscation orders in context, 
personal/criminal/financial characteristics of the 937 orders are presented in Tables 
5.17-5.19.
Note that there are statistically significant differences in means between the 
937 orders with complete assets information and the 2,734 orders without such 
information for the logged transformations of the agreed benefit and order amount 
variables (p<0.01).8° The nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test suggests an association 
between having complete assets information and the agreed benefit variable (p<0.01), 
but not the order amount variable. Findings have not been weighted. It is not clear 
how the data could best be weighted, and weighting could do more harm than good. 
The analyses below should be treated as speculative until better data can support or 
refute the findings. Briefly, the subsample is not dissimilar to the broader sample 
used above in the judgment proof section in terms o f gender, age, and ethnicity.
Drug dealing offences seem to be slightly over-represented in comparison to the 
broader JARD sample, while other blue collar and white collar offences are slightly 
under-represented.
78 There is certainly a call for JARD to be modified in the asset-specific fields to include a field with 
pre-selected answer choices describing assets (along the lines o f the coding used here).
79 The total value o f the assets identified for these 937 records (37,389,999 GBP) exceeds that captured 
in order amount (30,378,207). This may be the case because the assets identified will generally have 
been done so by FIs independent o f the court’s assessment o f benefit and order amount.
80 Differences in means are not significant for the original, non-transformed values o f the benefit and 
amount variables, however. This is likely due to the non-normality o f the distributions.
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Table 5.17. Asset-Specific Subsample Personal Characteristics
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Gender
Valid Male 807 86.1 89.0 89.0
Female 100 10.7 11.0 100.0
Total 907 96.8 100.0
Missing No response 30 3.2
Total 937 100.0
A ee
Valid 20-29 311 33.2 34.4 34.4
30-39 304 32.4 33.6 68.0
40-49 182 19.4 20.1 88.2
50-59 75 8.0 8.3 96.5
60-69 28 3.0 3.1 99.6
70-79 4 .4 .4 100.0
Total 904 96.5 100.0
Missing No response 33 3.5
Total 937 100.0
Ethnicitv
Valid Asian 46 4.9 8.2 8.2
Black 105 11.2 18.6 26.8
Mixed 14 1.5 2.5 29.3
White 389 41.5 69.0 98.2
Other 10 1.1 1.8 100.0
Total 564 60.2 100.0
Missing No response 373 39.8
Total 937 100.0
Source: JARD.
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Table 5.18. Asset-Specific Subsample Criminal Characteristics
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Primarv offence
Valid Burglary/Theft/Handling/Robbery 51 5.4 5.6 5.6
Counterfeiting/Intellectual 11 1.2 1.2 6.8
Property/ Forgery
Drug Trafficking 715 76.3 78.1 84.8
Excise Duty Fraud 26 2.8 2.8 87.7
Money Laundering-Drugs 14 1.5 1.5 89.2
Money Laundering-Other 24 2.6 2.6 91.8
Other Fraud/Embezzlement/ 58 6.2 6.3 98.1
Deception/Crimes o f dishonesty
Pimps and Brothels/Prostitution/ 4 .4 .4 98.6
Pornography
Tax and Benefit Fraud 2 .2 .2 98.8
VAT Fraud 11 1.2 1.2 100.0
Total 916 97.8 100.0
Missing Not used 21 2.2
Total 937 100.0
Primarv offence classification
Valid Drug dealing 715 76.3 77.8 77.8
Other blue collar 58 6.2 6.3 84.1
White collar 146 15.6 15.9 100.0
Total 919 98.1 100.0
Missing Terrorism 1 .1
Not known 17 1.8
Total 18 1.9
Total 937 100.0
Source: JARD. Crime types are pulled directly from JARD, save fo r  burglary/theft/handling/robbery 
which is an amalgamation o/burglary/theft, handling, and robbery.
Table 5.19. Asset-Specific Subsample Financial Characteristics
N Min. Max. Mean
S td
Deviation Median
Agreed benefit 937 £1 £9,434,309 £145,257 £687,124 £6,026
Order amount 937 £1 £2,465,132 £32,421 £135,806 £1,710
Judgment proof ratio 937 0.00 1.00 0.5437 0.3764 0.5481
Source: JARD.
So how did these offenders hold their assets? Table 5.20 (below) sets forth 
asset holding behaviour for the 937 offenders. Cash was held most frequently (held in
80.7 percent o f the 937 records); followed by vehicles (20.9 percent); real estate (16.2 
percent); and financial assets in bank/building society accounts (13.2 percent). Some 
asset types were held very infrequently; these included antiques (held in 0 percent o f
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the 937 records); financial assets in general insurance products (0.1 percent); art (0.2 
percent); and businesses (0.2. percent). It’s not clear if this is the case because of 
underlying asset-holding patterns, or because FIs didn’t look for these things. A not 
unlikely scenario (and one supported by this author’s experience with financial 
investigators) is that FIs may have looked for those assets most easily identified, then 
moved on (driven by resource constraints). There is no way to establish from these 
data whether or not (and to what extent) this might be the case, but it cannot be ruled 
out. From an economic standpoint, it makes sense to prevent crime to the point that 
the marginal benefit o f doing so equals the marginal cost of doing so. This is not 
justification for only carrying out cursory investigations, however—not least because 
offenders as a group will very likely leam over time what FIs look for and what it 
harder to find, parking assets in the latter category.81
Other (a catch-all category) exhibits the highest mean value in the subsample 
(this for the bail security o f one offender); followed by real estate; businesses; and 
other financial assets (which includes shares, bonds, etc.). Offenders’ assets as a 
percentage of total asset value were held primarily in real estate (54.4 percent); 
followed by cash (21.2 percent); financial assets in banks/building societies (8.5 
percent); other financial assets (6 percent); and vehicles (5.1 percent). This is not 
overwhelmingly surprising; real estate typically represents one of the largest 
purchases made by an individual or a household. Of course, while real estate is 
generally an appreciating asset, cash and vehicles—more than 26 percent of total asset 
value— are not (no interest is earned by cash buried in the garden or hidden under the 
bed). This may explain in some part (at least a small part) why the judgment proof 
ratio described in the earlier section is not closer to 1.00 (this, along with the various 
other factors noted in the judgment proof section, above). These findings also imply 
that at least nearly 60 percent of assets—held in real estate and vehicles—are held in 
somewhat illiquid fashion.
81 Assuming that it may be too costly to thoroughly investigate each offender, and given that offenders 
leam where/how FIs search for assets, one solution might be to thoroughly investigate a random 
sample o f  offenders. This should provide at least some deterrence (particularly since investing abroad, 
for example, is likely to be more expensive for the offender). Thanks go to one o f  the early readers o f  
the present chapter for suggesting this.
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JARD captures very limited information on whether or not assets were hidden 
and/or held offshore. Unfortunately, this information is captured in a question with 
four answer options— cash, other, hidden, overseas— which are not mutually 
exclusive. For example, assets might be in the form of cash (one of the answer 
choices) which was actually hidden overseas (both hidden and overseas are 
themselves answer choices); and it’s not clear at all what is meant by other. (This
JARD field should be modified appropriately, given its potential importance as
82intelligence and for confiscation order enforcement.)
Differences in asset holding behaviour in the subsample were explored for 
different classes of offenders (see Table 5.21 and Figure 5.6). Because of the virtual 
paucity o f data, comparisons are made between primary offence classes (drug dealing, 
other blue collar, and white collar), not the primary offences themselves. Tests for 
statistical significance are not carried out on these speculative data. In general, mean 
asset values are higher for the white collar offences than for those in the drug dealing 
and other blue collar classes. This is most evident with cash, financial assets in 
banks/building societies, financial assets-other, other physical assets, and vehicles. 
Also, the share of asset value held in each asset type differs by primary offence class. 
For example, blue collar offenders hold more o f their assets in real estate (74 percent) 
than drug dealing offenders (61 percent) and white collar offenders (47 percent); drug 
dealers and white collar offenders both hold 22 percent of their asset value in cash, 
while other blue collar offenders hold 11 percent in cash. The present data do not 
allow for detailed analyses o f the drivers of differences in asset-holding behaviour. It 
seems reasonable to assume that patterns will change as net worth increases, and also
82 This information is captured for each asset, so for the 1,878 assets described with the 937 records of 
interest here, what do we see? Again, this is only a preliminary finding, as answer options were not 
mutually exclusive. Forty-four assets (2.3 percent o f the 1,878) were classified as overseas, 
representing 2,170,168 GBP (5.8 percent o f the total asset value o f  37,389,999 GBP). These included: 
five cash (65,518 GBP in total); 12 financial assets in banks/building societies (782,282 GBP in total); 
one financial asset-other (15,000 GBP in total); one other physical asset (60,000 in total); 16 real estate 
(1,111,430 GBP in total); and nine vehicles (135,938 GBP in total). Thirty-four assets (1.8 percent o f  
the 1,878) were classified as hidden, representing 1,824,069 GBP (4.9 percent o f the total asset value of 
37,389,999 for the 937 records). These included: 16 cash (889,763 GBP in total); five financial assets 
in banks/building societies (158,498 GBP in total); one financial asset-life assurance (2,295 GBP in 
total); four financial asset-other (79,882 GBP in total); two jewellery (55,000 GBP in total); three real 
estate (594,907 GBP in total); and three vehicles (43,724 GBP in total). It seems hard to imagine that 
such small percentages o f  assets were parked offshore and/or hidden. This is suggestive o f either FIs 
not looking (or not finding things), and/or not understanding the question.
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because certain crime types may require certain assets (one would have thought that 
cash would be found on drug dealers more than other offenders).
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Table 5.20. Asset-Holding Behaviour
Records with 
asset
% o f  all 
records
<N=9J7) Mean Std. Deviation Median Sum
% o f  total 
value o f  assets
% o f  total 
value o f  assets 
(excluding 
cash)
Antiques 0 0 0 % to to £0 to 0.0% 00%
Art 2 0 2% £13.388 £12.122 £13,388 £26.777 0.1% 0 1%
Business 2 0.2% £90.506 £36.071 £90.506 £181,012 0.5% 0.6%
Cash 756 80.7% £10.496 £47.224 £916 £7.934,923 21.2%
Financial asscts-bank/building soc. 124 13.2% £25.738 £121.785 £2.288 £3.191.474 8.5% 10.8%
Financial asscts-gcneral insurance products 1 0.1% £1.209 £1.209 £1.209 00% 0.0%
Financial assets-)ife assurance products 8 0.9% £24,527 £46.087 £8,903 £196.220 05% 0.7%
Financial assets-other 33 3 5% £68.024 £187.258 £17,282 £2.244.805 6.0% 76%
Financial assets-pension products 7 07 % £4.267 £3.236 £3.313 £29.872 0.1% 0.1%
Jewellery 40 4.3% £6.423 £14.956 £1.700 £256,925 0.7% 0.9%
Other 4 0.4% £ 199.247 £397.169 £994 £796.989 2.1% 2.7%
Other physical assets 34 3.6% £7.570 £16.862 £1.006 £257.385 0.7% 0.9%
Real estate 152 16.2% £133,883 £151.123 £85.000 £20.350.202 54 4% 69.1%
Vehicles 196 20 9% £9.797 £28.201 £3,395 £1.920.207 5.1% 6.5%
Source JARD. Note that means, etc. only draw from  those records with non-zero asset values, not all 937 records.
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Table 5.21. Asset-Holding Behaviour by Primary Offence Class
Drue dealing Other blue collar White collar
Mean Valid V Sum M ean Valid .V Sum Mean Valid N Sum
Art £21.960 1 £21,960 £4.817 1 £4.817 0
Business £90.506 2 £181.012 0 0
Cash £4.382 651 £2,852.641 £16.507 23 £379.659 £64,206 71 £4.558.644
Financial asscts-bank building soc. £8.624 67 £577,832 £8.394 13 £109.116 £61.919 39 £2.414.849
Financial asscls-gencral insurance products £1.209 1 £1,209 0 0
Financial asscts-life assurance products £18,464 2 £36.928 £656 I £656 £39.306 4 £157.223
Financial asscts-othcr £36,910 13 £479.834 £35.956 5 £179,780 £109.085 14 £1.527.190
Financial asscls-pcnsion products £4.021 3 £12,062 £4.399 1 £4.399 £4.470 3 £13.410
Jewellers £3.242 26 £84.280 £14.500 4 £58.000 £14.197 8 £113*574
Other £1.000 1 £1.000 0 £265.330 3 £795.989
Other physical assets £5.182 23 £119,186 £2.871 6 £17.226 £24.195 5 £120.973
Real estate £137.801 56 £7.716.880 £110.754 24 £2.658.090 £141.627 68 £9.630.619
Vehicles £6,936 120 £832.329 £8.687 19 £165.057 £17.775 51 £906.541
S o n n e  JARD
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Figure 5.6. Proportion o f  Value o f  A ssets Held by Primary O ffence Class
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Figure 5.6. Proportion o f  Value o f  A ssets Held by Primary Offence Class (continued)
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5.4. Conclusion
This chapter has presented information derived from the UK’s Joint Assets 
Recovery Database (JARD) with regard to criminal confiscations. It has explored 
offenders’ benefit from crime (captured in the JARD agreed benefit variable); their 
net worth (captured in the order amount variable); and how the two stack up (in terms 
of their judgment proof status). In the event, JARD agreed benefit ranged from one to 
more than 156 million GBP, with a mean o f 226,714 GBP and a median of 12, 388 
GBP. JARD order amount (net worth) ranged from zero to more than 18 million 
GBP, with a mean of nearly 49,000 GBP and a median of some 1,938 GBP. Both 
variables differed considerably by primary offence, with the white collar crimes, 
particularly VAT fraud, leading the pack in both agreed benefit and order amount.
The most critical finding is that guided by the imperfect yet informative 
available data, offenders on average appear to save some 47 percent of their benefit 
from crime (though this differed, o f course, by offence type). Bearing in mind that 
offenders are not likely to be arrested/convicted with probability of one (i.e. 100 
percent of the time), then truly deterrent sanctions would need to be some multiple of 
the estimate of the criminal harm. But here we’re seeing that rather than a multiple of 
criminal benefit (i.e. of agreed benefit), only a fraction is available for recovery. This 
tempers to some extent our faith in asset recovery’s efficacy in deterring crime, 
though it is in no way suggestive o f a complete inability to deter. For one thing, the 
finding reinforces the importance o f asset recovery as a complement to, as opposed to 
substitute for, imprisonment: the two together may represent a sufficient deterrent, 
whereas the two in isolation might not. Moreover, no doubt asset recovery (and other 
monetary sanctions) should deter at least a subset of offenders (e.g. offenders whose 
crime type(s) carry a greater likelihood of arrest/conviction, thus requiring a smaller 
multiple o f the criminal harm to deter; and/or offenders who carry out crime which 
meets the criteria for recovering the proceeds o f general criminal conduct). What 
these findings also raise is the possibility that depending on the goals/targets of asset 
recovery, it may be most efficient for law enforcement to target particular crime 
types.
The chapter has also explored offenders’ asset holding behaviour, though the 
data employed in the asset-holding analyses are o f somewhat suboptimal quality. In
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the subsample of JARD data used, offenders’ assets as a percentage of total asset 
value were held primarily in real estate (54.4 percent); followed by cash (21.2 
percent); financial assets in banks/building societies (8.5 percent); other financial 
assets (6 percent); and vehicles (5.1 percent).
There are most certainly calls for future research. The most obvious future 
research relates to the search for/use o f better data. JARD data quality is low on a 
number of fronts. Given the importance of these data in driving policy, it seems 
reasonable to recommend that the data-entry process is streamlined and modified— 
perhaps by taking the role of JARD data entry clerk away from FIs and placing it in 
the capable hands o f specific staff members with JARD-only responsibilities. In any 
case, better data are needed to confirm or refute findings in this, particularly those 
relating to asset-holding behaviour.
Offender financial behaviour presumably differs (perhaps through a causal 
relationship) in the presence o f children and/or other dependents, with sufficient 
educational attainment, and/or with legitimate employment. But data on these 
characteristics don’t exist, and/or are not of sufficient quality to be of use. Future 
research should seek to capture these data-points, along with the other relevant 
personal/criminal/financial characteristics. Better data along these lines would allow 
for explorations o f the factors which drive certain types o f criminal activity— and 
might suggest appropriate policy interventions to combat crime. And better data 
would allow for analyses of offence choice: if more money can be made with white 
collar crime, and drug dealing and other blue collar crime involves violence and its 
consequent risks, why are more offenders not forgoing such crime for the white collar 
frauds/etc.? What are the barriers to participation in white collar crime (or even 
simply are there barriers to participation in such crime?)?
Along these lines, the present data have not allowed for any serious analyses 
of flows, just stock variables (most notably with net worth). The data don’t even 
allow for analyses o f income (legitimate or otherwise, both flows) per unit time. 
Future analyses should look to capturing better data on flows, particularly on illicit 
and legitimate earnings per unit time— and subsequently comparing these data to 
findings related to legitimate income across the UK. Such analyses would help to 
illustrate whether or not offenders in general or those carrying out specific offences
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might be earning more or less than their non-criminal counterparts. This also might 
go some way to understanding whether or not criminal activity is a substitute for or 
complement to legitimate employment—and would help to suggest the merit of 
crime-control policies based on improving offenders’ employment opportunities.
This research has sought to explore the criminal benefit, net worth, judgment 
proof status, and specific asset-holding behaviour of acquisitive offenders. It has not 
sought to compare the financial characteristics of offenders to non-offenders (though 
see Prichard, 2007). Future research (particularly that drawing from better data) 
should look to the statistical and economic literature on income and wealth across the 
population to examine differences between offenders and their legitimate 
counterparts.
Lastly, future research might seek to involve the UK’s Enforcement Task 
Force, which is responsible for enforcing outstanding confiscation orders, particularly 
those pre-POCA. What is it about these particular confiscation orders that makes 
them outstanding? Is it that offenders had insufficient funds to pay off the orders— 
were they judgment proof—or were the orders simply un-enforced and thus ignored 
(itself suggesting a dynamic component to the issue)? What have offenders done with 
their assets in the meantime?
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Chapter 6. Regulated Sector Targeting of Suspicious Activity: Signal or Noise83
A suspicious activity report (SAR) is a piece o f information which alerts law 
enforcement that certain customer activity—perhaps a series of large out-of-character 
deposits or the cash purchase of a high-value asset— is in some way suspicious and 
might indicate money laundering or terrorist financing (and thus criminal and/or 
terrorist activity). In the UK, SARs are sent by members of the regulated sector (e.g. 
banks and building societies, law firms, accounting firms) to the Serious Organised 
Crime Agency (SOCA) for processing, and are subsequently passed to law 
enforcement, including SOCA itself, via the online SARs database (known as Elmer) 
for action.84 The SARs regime is designed to deter and displace money laundering 
and predicate offences; to facilitate the detection and sanctioning of such crimes after 
the fact; and to disrupt such crimes in progress (see, for example, KPMG, 2003; 
Reuter and Truman, 2004; Gold and Levi, 1994; HMT, 2004).85
While the very existence of the SARs regime likely deters some criminality, 
suspicious activity reporting clearly does not deter all offenders from offending. As 
such, the targeting accuracy of the regime is critical to its crime-reduction efficacy— 
and to the impact o f asset recovery on crime (after all, if  offenders can simply launder 
their criminal proceeds, then the state will have little luck in financial investigations, 
and will underestimate offenders’ realisable amounts in confiscations—at the very 
least).86 While it is difficult to ascertain with certainty regulated sector entities’ 
accuracy in recognizing and reporting on suspicious activity, there are proxies for 
success. In this regard, hits (i.e. matches) on various law enforcement databases (e.g. 
Police National Computer, local force intelligence databases) and indeed Elmer itself 
may serve as indicators o f accurate targeting.
83 The author wishes to thank the three cooperating police forces and NCIS SF1 for their help with data 
provision. The Home Office is gratefully acknowledged for its contribution to research costs.
84 SARs were originally sent to NCIS. In April 2006, NCIS became part o f the UK’s Serious 
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA).
85 To these are often added “to protect the integrity o f the financial system” and “to avoid economic 
and competitive distortions” (HMT, 2004).
86 Moreover, while outside the scope o f the present research, there is very likely a dynamic nature to 
the deterrent nature o f  the SARs regime, in that offenders may learn o f the regime’s inaccurate
(continued)
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A limited data-collection exercise exploring external hits was carried out by 
the London Regional Asset Recovery Team (LRART) on behalf of this author as part 
of a larger study on the use and management o f SARs by law enforcement agencies 
(LEAs) in the UK (Fleming, 2005). The present chapter replicates and expands on 
this previous work using a larger sample (of importance not least because the small 
LRART sample was from a crime-heavy London borough). The present chapter also 
explores the extent to which external database hits are associated with various internal 
SAR characteristics (e.g. frequency with which someone is previously reported upon; 
type/amount of transaction; reporting sector from which the SAR originates).
The chapter is structured as follows: a background section sets forth the issues; 
details of the data are provided; the findings are presented, along with any policy 
implications; and a conclusion section summarises and suggests directions for future 
research.
6.1. Background
The SARs regime is the primary component o f the UK’s anti-money 
laundering (AML) policy package. As noted above, the regime— and the AML 
package generally— is designed to prevent money laundering (and the predicate 
acquisitive crimes) and to sanction such activity after the fact. Indeed, the SARs 
regime is designed to prevent offenders from hiding the proceeds o f crime, and in this 
regard is critical to the functioning o f asset recovery as a crime-reduction policy. If 
offenders can easily squirrel away criminal proceeds, then the threat o f confiscation is 
hollow (i.e. there is little or no deterrent effect).
As noted earlier, the crime-fighting success o f the SARs regime is a function 
o f three things: 1) offenders’ ability to creatively hide assets from view (or at least to 
make otherwise suspicious activity seem legitimate); 2) the reporting sector’s ability 
to spot suspicion when confronted with it; and 3) LEAs’ ability to make 
efficient/effective use of the SARs provided by the reporting sector. The present 
chapter is concerned with the second of these, the reporting sector’s ability to 
accurately target suspicious activity (i.e. to report signal, not noise).
targeting over time ( if  that is the case), subsequently becoming less and less deterred as time
(continued)
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The targeting accuracy subject has received little empirical treatment in the 
research community—largely because the quality of existing data has been poor. 
Gaining an understanding of the ability of the reporting sector to target suspicion 
requires systematic information on the use of SARs (including on the scenario on 
which the SAR was filed, whether or not the SAR was examined in any way by law 
enforcement, whether or not through investigation or hits on various indicative 
databases it appeared to relate to criminality, etc.). Herein lies the rub: very little 
systematic information exists on the use of SARs in crime reduction, a fact which has 
not escaped notice in previous studies (see, for example, Fleming, 2005; KPMG, 
2003; Gold and Levi, 1994). Each study sought to indicate, using a variety of 
means— all hamstrung by the paucity o f usable data/information on the subject—the 
relationship between SARs and various criminal justice outcomes, such as 
investigations, prosecutions, and convictions.87 The present chapter expands on one 
such approach, that taken in Fleming (2005) to explore the incidence of external 
database hits as a proxy for targeting success. In that study, a sample of 200 
nonconsent SARs all associated with a crime-heavy London borough (and all dating 
from 2004), was searched against three external databases. These databases included 
the MPS Crime Reporting Information System (CRIS), PNC, and the MPS Criminal 
Intelligence system (CRIMINT) Levels 1 and 2 (Level 2 represents a higher-level of 
possible criminality). Some 46.5 percent of the sample had hits on CRIMINT Level 
1; 29.5 percent had hits on CRIMINT Level 2; 20.5 percent had hits on PNC; and 8.5 
percent had hits on CRIS. The CRIMINT hit-rate is striking—not least because only 
exact names and addresses were searched, excluding aliases and fuzzy matches—and 
would suggest a degree of targeting accuracy.
6.2. Data
The analyses below are based on a sample o f 1,196 SARs received by three 
police forces—one large urban and two smaller, more rural forces—between end-
progresses.
87 This assumes a relationship between outcomes and efficacy, o f course.
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2005-beginning-2006.88 While not strictly a random sample, the SARs were selected 
solely on the basis of timing (i.e. the fact that they were received during the 
November-February timeframe).89 Note that Elmer, the SARs database, is available 
to LEAs nationwide in a remotely accessible, web-enabled online format. SARs are 
not strictly designated as appropriate for particular LEAs, so in truth the SARs were 
not “received” by the three police forces, but rather were pulled off the system 
because the post-codes of the individuals or companies described in the SARs fell 
within the force boundaries of the three forces. Table 6.1 presents the number of 
SARs from each force. Note also that while the SARs matched the force areas by 
postcode, upon closer inspection, certain o f the SARs really fell to agencies like what 
is now Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) for action (perhaps because of 
some text in the reason for suspicion). These “misallocated” SARs were not included 
in the analyses. Excluding these, the sample contains some 839 SARs.
Table 6.1. Number o f SARs Used in the Analyses by LEA
Large urban 
LEA Smaller LEA 1 Smaller LEA 2 Total
Original sample 400 152 644 1,196
“Misallocated” 25 43 289 357
Percent “misallocated” 6.3% 28.3% 44.9% 29.8%
Used in the subsequent analyses 375 109 355 839
Source: Participating LEAs. Note that one o f  the smaller LEAs conducted the research over a longer period o f  
time, thereby capturing a larger subsample o f  SARs. The large urban LEA was ultimately unable to provide the 
level o f  assistance prom ised ex ante, with a resulting smaller subsample o f  SARs. Note also that the large urban 
LEA interpreted the misallocated concept to mean simply those SARs which despite a postcode match to the force  
area really belonged to a neighbouring force (but those SARs which might be more the province o f  Her M ajesty’s 
Revenue and Customs or Department fo r Work and Pensions were not excluded from  the analyses).
The 839 SARs in the sample were checked one-by-one against the Police 
National Computer (PNC) and force intelligence system (or systems) for the three 
forces involved; matches (i.e. “hits”) between each SAR and the databases were 
recorded. PNC contains information on convicted offenders. Force intelligence 
systems typically contain information on suspected crimes, criminals, and other items
88 The present sample was smaller than anticipated when the research was launched. This is because 
one o f the police forces (the large urban LEA) was ultimately unable to provide the level o f assistance 
originally promised ex ante.
89 There may be a seasonal component in the filing o f SARs by reporting entities, though no research 
exists on the subject.
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of police interest (including victims o f crime). Matches were generally based on 
names, though addresses were sometimes used for the force intelligence searches. 
Fuzzy search capabilities were broadly not employed (though one force noted that 
fuzzy search capabilities did play a small part in force intelligence matching). 
Information was also provided by the three participating forces on previous SARs: 
participants indicated whether or not (and how many) previous SARs had been 
received on the same individual or company which had been filed by the same 
reporting entity, and also whether or not/how many previous SARs had been filed by 
different reporting entities. And the three forces indicated whether or not the reason 
for suspicion (an open-ended text field o f each SAR) suggested on its own that true 
criminal activity was behind the filing of the SAR. Lastly, police data were 
complemented by information from NCIS. This information included the reporting 
sector (e.g. bank, lawyer, accountant) and transaction amount (if any) in GBP o f the 
suspicious activity for each SAR in the sample.
Note that the data-collection methodology employed by the three police 
forces— manually checking SARs one-by-one against various databases and Elmer 
itself—is almost certainly not the most efficient or effective means of leveraging 
SARs in the fight against crime. The author is grateful to the three forces for 
accommodating this one-by-one data request. The most efficient and effective use of 
SARs very likely draws on the ability of SARs to indicate criminal networks and 
highly active criminals. The one-by-one method is commonly used, however 
(Fleming, 2005); this should change with the introduction of national minimum work 
standards or some similar form of guidance to LEAs, and with the introduction of 
more advanced analytical tools. The publication o f the Lander Review of the SARs 
Regime in April 2006 noted that SOCA plans on investing heavily in analytical tools 
(though this doesn’t appear to have happened yet).
The 839 SARs were originally filed by a range of reporting entities, with 75 
percent emanating from banks/building societies; 3.9 percent from accountants; and
3.7 percent from the legal profession (see Table 6.2). Like all SARs, these 839 were 
the result of manual and automated procedures for identifying suspicious activity. 
SARs resulting from manual procedures will have been generated by counter-staff 
and other customer-facing employees who will have determined, for whatever
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reason(s), that the customer activity seemed in some way suspicious. Back-office 
staff may also have uncovered suspicions in the course of their daily business. 
Training programs for employees will have helped all staff to get a sense of the 
legislative requirements and entity-specific policies/procedures for the reporting of 
suspicious activity. Automated transaction-monitoring systems will also have 
triggered the filing o f SARs. Such systems are commonly used in larger financial 
services firms (particularly banks/building societies) to flag up anomalous behaviour. 
Importantly, some filtering occurs in the process: reporting entities will often review 
SARs prior to submitting them to NCIS/SOCA, and those outwardly innocent (e.g. 
SARs which are the product o f automated transaction monitoring, but perhaps which 
represent an as yet un-tweaked and overzealous system) are dropped. The results o f 
such filtering in terms o f targeting have not been studied (here or elsewhere), and 
obviously some filtering may drop SARs representing signal whilst keeping some 
representing noise.
Table 6.2. Reporting Sector for the SARs in the Sample
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid Accountant 33 3.9 3.9 3.9
Bank 536 63.9 63.9 67.8
Building society 93 11.1 11.1 78.9
Legal profession 31 3.7 3.7 82.6
Other 146 17.4 17.4 100.0
Total 839 100.0 100.0
Source: Participating LEAs; NCIS.
6.3. Findings
So do the SARs filed by reporting entities more closely resemble signal, or 
rather noise? And are there any relationships between the signal and various SAR 
characteristics (in terms o f database hits)? This section gets to the heart of the matter 
(or at least as far as possible with proxies). It begins with a discussion o f the hits (i.e. 
matches) in the sample against external databases, namely PNC and force 
intelligence. In the event, hits against these databases are assumed to be proxies for 
successful targeting o f suspicion. Obviously, these are not ideal indicators. For one 
thing, not all hits will confirm that true criminal activity was indeed behind the 
suspicion. No information was provided by the forces on the seriousness/significance
110
Chapter 6. Regulated Sector Targeting o f Suspicious Activity: Signal or Noise
of the hits (that is, forces were not asked to do describe each hit, as this would have 
implied a much greater drain on resources to conduct the research). Many hits may 
have resulted from motoring offences, for example, that any number o f otherwise 
innocent people may have committed (though perhaps otherwise minor criminal 
behaviour might indicate a broader pattern of serious criminality). Further, some hits 
may have resulted from links to databases not as offenders but as victims, or simply 
because o f address matches. And, o f course, one or more SARs with no outward links 
to sources o f information like PNC and force intelligence may indeed refer to criminal 
activity— so the “noise” may not be noise at all. One theoretical benefit o f SARs is 
their ability to alert the authorities to previously unknown criminality (including that 
relating to previously unknown criminals). The analysis of the reason for suspicion 
(below) has sought to explore the potential for this to happen. But no perfect 
indicators exist, and as proxies these should go some way to indicating targeting 
accuracy or lack thereof.
Some 20.7 percent o f the sample had hits on PNC, and 27.4 percent had hits 
on the respective force intelligence system (see Table 6.3).90 Note that 66 SARs were 
deemed unsearchable on PNC by one force because they contained no date of birth 
and/or represented a corporate entity. Further, one o f the smaller forces noted that a 
small, unspecified number o f hits on the force intelligence system could be the result 
of the force’s practice o f logging the existence o f previous SARs on the same subject 
onto the intelligence system. So the rate o f force intelligence hits may contain minor 
double counting.
In any case, if  hits on either PNC or force intelligence are considered 
indicative of overall targeting success, then some 35.6 percent o f the sample 
represents signal, not noise (that is, this 35.6 percent had a hit on either or both PNC 
and force intelligence). This rises to 36.9 percent when ignoring the 66 SARs 
considered by one force to be unsearchable on PNC; o f this 36.9 percent, 11.8 percent 
had hits on both PNC and force intelligence. Though there is no set percentage which
90 One o f  the two smaller forces conducted searches on a second intelligence system, this for the work 
o f the financial investigation unit (FIU). The findings are not usable, however, as hits arise 
consistently (not just occasionally) because previous SARs have been logged onto this FIU intelligence 
system.
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indicates solid performance on SARs targeting, having more than one-third of the 
sample with hits on police systems seems impressive. After all, these checks 
represent nothing more than simple data-matching, not advanced analytics (so even if 
slight double counting exists for one force, this still seems notable).91
Table 6.3. Hits on PNC and Force Intelligence
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
PNC
Valid No hit 613 73.1 79.3 79.3
Hit 160 19.1 20.7 100.0
Total 773 92.1 100.0
Missing No DoB 38 4.5
Company 28 3.3
Total 66 7.9
Total 839 100.0
Force intelligence
Valid No hit 609 72.6 72.6 72.6
Hit 230 21A 27.4 100.0
Total 839 100.0 100.0
Signal: PNC  or force intelligence hit (signal)
Valid No hits 540 64.4 64.4 64.4
One or more hits 299 35.6 35.6 100.0
Total 839 100.0 100.0
Signal: PNC  or force intelligence hit (excluding the 66 SARs for which no PNC  was possible)
Valid No hits 488 58.2 63.1 63.1
Hits on one o f the two 194 23.1 25.1 88.2
Hits on both 91 10.8 11.8 100.0
Total 773 92.1 100.0
Missing No DoB or company 66 7.9
Total 839 100.0
Source: Participating LEAs.
As noted above, the participating forces also read each SAR’s reason for 
suspicion to see whether or not the text suggested on its own that the SAR was linked 
to criminality. While this gets squarely into the realm o f subjectivity, the data imply 
that 34.6 percent of the SARs seemed to be suggestive o f criminality (see Table 6.4). 
If, as above, hits on either PNC or force intelligence— or, now, a strongly suggestive
91 O f course, while perhaps indicative o f the fact that banks and others are finding more signal than 
noise, that these reporting entities are finding individuals already known in some way to law 
enforcement might also call into question the value-add o f SARs.
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reason for suspicion— are indicative of overall targeting success, then some 56.7 
percent of the sample represents signal as opposed to noise. This rises to 57.7 percent 
when ignoring the 66 SARs considered by one force to be unsearchable on PNC; of 
this 57.7 percent, 14 percent had hits on two of the three indicators (PNC, force 
intelligence, and reason for suspicion); and 6.2 percent had hits on all three. That 
more than 56 percent o f the sample appears to resemble signal is striking. This figure 
should be interpreted cautiously, however, due to the subjectivity of the understanding 
of the reason for suspicion absent further criminal investigation; participants in the 
data collection may have used an inappropriately low bar for deciding that the reason 
for suspicion was linked to criminality.
Table 6.4. Reason for Suspicion
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Reason for suspicion suggests criminality
Valid No 549 65.4 65.4 65.4
Yes 290 34.6 34.6 100.0
Total 839 100.0 100.0
Signal: PNC  or force intelligence hit or suggestive reason for suspicion (signal)
Valid No hits 363 43.3 43.3 43.3
One or more hits 476 56.7 56.7 100.0
Total 839 100.0 100.0
Signal: PNC or force intelligence hit or suggestive reason (excluding the 66 SARs without PNC)
Valid No hits 327 39.0 42.3 42.3
Hits on one o f the three 290 34.6 37.5 79.8
Hits on two o f  the three 108 12.9 14.0 93.8
Hits on all three 48 5.7 6.2 100.0
Total 773 92.1 100.0
Missing No DoB or company 66 7.9
Total 839 100.0
Source: Participating LEAs.
The 839 SARs were checked against Elmer for the presence of previous
SARs. Nearly 39 percent (325 o f the 839) appeared to be “first-time” SARs, while
61.3 percent (514 o f the 839) were related to previous SARs (see Table 6.5). Some
49.7 percent (417 SARs) related to previous SARs from the same reporting entity; 
13.2 percent (111 SARs) related to previous SARs from different reporting entities. 
There was overlap between the two; 1.7 percent of the sample had previous SARs
from both the same and different reporting entities (not shown in the table).
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Participating forces also provided the number of previous SARs linked to each o f the 
SARs in the sample, ranging from zero to 60 SARs from the same reporter, and from 
zero to 139 SARs from a different reporter.
Table 6.5. Previous SARs
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Overall
Valid First-time SARs 325 38.7 38.7 38.7
Relating to 514 61.3 61.3 100.0
previous SARs 
Total 839 100.0 100.0
Previous SARs from same reporting entitv
No previous SARs from 422 50.3 50.3 50.3
same reporter 
One or more previous 417 49.7 49.7 100.0
SARs from same 
reporter
Total 839 100.0 100.0
Previous SARs from different reporting entitv
No previous SARs 728 86.8 86.8 86.8
from different 
reporter
One or more previous 111 13.2 13.2 100.0
SARs from 
different reporter 
Total 839 100.0 100.0
Source: Participating LEAs.
Table 6.6. Number o f Previous SARs Linked to Each SAR in the Sample
Std.
N  (SARs) Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation Median
Previous SARs, 839 0 60 1.05 3.359 .00
same reporter 
Previous SARs, 839 0 139 .99 6.957 .00
different reporter
Source: Participating LEAs.
SARs often contain information on transaction amounts, of course. In fact, 
one SAR may often contain information on numerous suspect transactions (a course 
of suspicious activity). Some 524 o f the 839 SARs in the sample (62.5 percent)
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contained information on amounts (not all SARs include information on amounts).92 
Suspicious amounts were aggregated for each SAR; these ranged from 0 GBP to 
13,200,000 GBP. The 13 million GBP figure is an outlier; the next highest amount is 
some 990,673 GBP. Excluding the large outlier, the mean and median amounts are 
36,189 GBP and 10,000 GBP, respectively (see Table 6.7).
Table 6.7. SAR Amounts
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Median
523 0 990,673 36,189 85,974 10,000
Source: Participating LEAs; NCIS. An outlier o f  13,200,000 GBP was excluded.
To this point, the analysis has set forth the characteristics of the sample, 
information which is indicative of, among other things, accuracy in SARs targeting. 
But what o f relationships between SARs characteristics and targeting accuracy?
These are discussed below.
Table 6.8 explores differences in the percentage of SARs with hits on the 
various systems/indicators by characteristics including LEA, reporting sector, and 
whether or not previous SARs had been filed. Differences by LEA in the percentage 
o f SARs with hits or with a suggestive reason for suspicion are likely due to the 
vagaries o f the data, differences in interpretation of the subjective reason for suspicion 
test, and perhaps to different systems (as the depth/coverage o f force intelligence 
systems varies between forces). We would expect to see differences in hit rates by 
reporting sector— and we do. After all, different financial services are provided by 
the various sectors, and the proximity o f reporting entities to potential criminal action 
likely varies by sector as well. Lastly, previous SARs are commonly thought by law 
enforcement to be indicative o f criminality, and if our proxies are correct, we might 
have expected ex ante to see SARs which related to previous SARs having higher hit 
rates. This is not the case with the present data: hit rates appear higher for most hit 
types for those SARs which are “first-time” SARs.
92 Differences in means and nonparametric tests reveal no differences in PNC and force intelligence hit 
rates for those SARs with transaction amounts and those without.
93 These differences may also be down to differing rates o f crime. This was not explored.
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Table 6.8. Percentage o f SARs with Hits on PNC, Force Intelligence, and a 
Suggestive Reason for Suspicion
Percentage with hits/suggestive reason for suspicion
Signal (either Signal with
Force PNC or force Reason for reason for
PNC_______ intelligence intelligence)_____ suspicion______ suspicion
Bv LEA
Large urban 16.8% 21.9% 30.4% 20.5% 46.4%
Smaller I 29.4% 19.3% 33.9% 18.3% 46.8%
Smaller 2 21.4% 35.8% 41.7% 54.4% 70.7%
Total 20.7% 27.4% 35.6% 34.6% 56.7%
Bv reporting sector
Accountant 13.3% 9.1% 18.2% 57.6% 57.6%
Bank 20.9% 25.4% 34.9% 31.5% 54.5%
Building society 21.7% 33.3% 39.8% 28.0% 59.1%
Legal profession 19.4% 51.6% 58.1% 61.3% 80.6%
Other 21.1% 30.1% 34.9% 39.0% 58.2%
Total 20.7% 27.4% 35.6% 34.6% 56.7%
Bv with previous SARs
No previous SARs 21.8% 33.2% 40.9% 40.3% 62.5%
With previous SARs 19.9% 23.7% 32.3% 30.9% 53.1%
Total 20.7% 27.4% 35.6% 34.6% 56.7%
Source: Participating LEAs; NCIS. Between-group differences in means (due to the manner in which 
the data were coded, means represent the percentage o f  SARs with hits) are significant fo r all o f  the 
LEA comparisons; fo r  a ll o f  the reporting sector comparisons save fo r  that o f  PNC and signal with 
reason for suspicion; and fo r  all previous SARs comparisons save fo r  PNC.
Table 6.9 presents mean and median SAR amounts by whether or not there 
hits on PNC and/or force intelligence, a suggestive reason for suspicion, and previous 
SARs. We might expect to see lower amounts in SARs truly related to crime as 
offenders seek to keep transactions psychologically below some perceived threshold 
(though what this would be remains unclear), in a failed attempt to fly below the 
radar. Lower amounts are in fact associated with hits on PNC/etc., but nearly all 
differences in means are not statistically significant. This is likely the case in part 
because some reporters file SARs which contain aggregated reports of several/many 
transactions, while others will file SARs which relate to individual transactions. That 
is, the patterns, if  any exist, may be getting lost in the manner in which SARs are 
filed. Further, for some things, it may be the course o f activity that is suspicious, 
while for others it may be one-off transactions that trigger suspicion. These may or 
may not be related to amounts.
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Table 6.9. Mean and Median SAR Amounts by Hits on Systems and Previous SARs
SAR amount
Mean (£) N (SARs) Std. Dev. (£) Median (£)
PNC
No hit £40,071.66 378 94,618.201 10,878.00
Hit £27,798.81 110 62,633.697 8,120.00
Total £37,305.24 488 88,514.669 10,340.00
Force intelligence 
No hit 38,066.61 373 93,181.535 9,644.00
Hit 31,521.56 150 64,701.320 11,505.50
Total 36,189.44 523 85,973.539 10,000.00
Signal (either PNC or force intelligence)
No hits 39,098.21 331 96,586.994 9,527.00
One or more hits 31,174.84 192 63,580.855 11,600.00
Total 36,189.44 523 85,973.539 10,000.00
Suggestive reason for suspicion
No 30,231.92 349 60,806.691 10,940.00
Yes 48,138.73 174 121,035.783 8,103.00
Total 36,189.44 523 85,973.539 10,000.00
Signal with reason fo r  suspicion 
No hits 30,919.92 226 63,323.969 10,302.50
One or more hits 40,199.25 297 99,747.191 10,000.00
Total 36,189.44 523 85,973.539 10,000.00
Bv previous SARs 
No previous SARs 40,305.00 210 105,457.642 8,076.50
Previous SARs 33,428.21 313 69,982.566 11,000.00
Total 36,189.44 523 85,973.539 10,000.00
Source: Participating LEAs; NCIS. Between-group differences in means are only significant for  
suggestive reason for suspicion (p<0.05). No differences are significant with the Kruskal-Wallis and 
median tests.
Table 6.10 presents correlations between the variables of interest. It seems 
reasonable to assume that hits on PNC, force intelligence, and a suggestive reason for 
suspicion might all be associated in some way. All are indicators in their own right of 
criminal activity, or at least a past history o f criminal activity. That said, each 
captures a slightly different concept (and to a different depth), and the overlap 
between them amongst criminals might not be perfect. For example, PNC contains 
information on convicted criminals, who might turn away from crime, or who might 
leam how to be better criminals (either way resulting in lower hit rates, though they 
might also be known to force intelligence). In the event, most of the action is with
117
Chapter 6. Regulated Sector Targeting o f Suspicious Activity: Signal or Noise
force intelligence, which is positively correlated with PNC (correlation coefficient of 
0.329, p<0.01); with a suggestive reason for suspicion (correlation coefficient o f 
0.093, p<0.01); and with previous SARs from a different reporting entity (correlation 
coefficient o f 0.077, p<0.05); and negatively correlated with previous SARs from the 
same reporting entity (correlation coefficient of -0.140, p<0.01). The strength of 
association is not overwhelming, even for force intelligence with PNC, however.
Given that offenders will want to avoid the gaze of law enforcement, it seems 
safe to assume that they might seek to avoid the gaze o f the regulated sector as well. 
To do so, we might expect offenders serious about money laundering to spread their 
laundering activity across a range o f different reporting entities, rather than using only 
one entity.94 This is supported by the data: having previous SARs from the same 
reporter is negatively correlated with having previous SARs from a different reporter 
(correlation coefficient o f -0.264, p<0.01). Though the association is not terribly 
strong, this suggests that the more previous SARs we see from the same entity, the 
fewer SARs w e’re likely to see from different previous reporting entities. 
Unfortunately, no specifics were gathered on whether or not the previous SARs from 
different reporting entities were themselves from one other reporting entity, or rather 
a multitude o f entities (when there were multiple such previous SARs).
Lastly, correlations between SAR amounts are neither significant nor strong 
for any of the variables, save for PNC and previous SARs from different reporters 
(both significant at the p<0.05 level, though neither correlation is strong). As noted 
above, it is possible to read too much into findings related to SAR amounts, as there 
are several reasons why they may not be too telling, at least in the manner in which 
they exist in the data.
94 Though this is probably only the case for launderers who have no sufficiently believable reason for 
their activity
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Table 6.10. Nonparametric Correlations (Spearman’s rho) Between Variables of Interest
P N C
F o r c e
in t e l l i g e n c e R e a s o n  s u g g e s t s
P r e v i o u s  S A R s ,  
s a m e  r e p o r t e r
P r e v i o u s  S A R s .  
d i f f e r e n t  r e p o r t e r S A R  a m o u n t
P N C C o r r e l a t i o n  C o e f f i c i e n t 1 . 3 2 9 ( * * ) 0 .0 5 5 - 0 .0 4 0 .0 4 8 - . 0 8 9 0
S ig .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) 0 0 . 1 2 4 0 . 2 6 4 0 .1 8 3 0 .0 5
N 7 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 3 4 8 8
F o r c e  i n t e l l i g e n c e C o r r e l a t i o n  C o e f f i c i e n t . 3 2 9 ( * * ) 1 . 0 9 3 ( 0 - . 1 4 0 ( 0 . 0 7 7 0 - 0 .0 0 4
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) 0 0 .0 0 7 0 0 .0 2 5 0 .9 2 4
N 7 7 3 8 3 9 8 3 9 8 3 9 8 3 9 5 2 3
R e a s o n  s u g g e s t s C o r r e l a t i o n  C o e f f i c i e n t 0 . 0 5 5 . 0 9 3 ( 0 1 - .0 7 0 ( * ) 0 .0 1 6 - 0 .0 5 2
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) 0 . 1 2 4 0 .0 0 7 0 . 0 4 2 0  6 4 1 0 .2 3 4
N 7 7 3 8 3 9 8 3 9 8 3 9 8 3 9 5 2 3
P r c v .  S A R s ,  s a m e  r e p o r t e r C o r r e l a t i o n  C o e f f i c i e n t - 0 .0 4 - . 1 4 0 ( 0 - . 0 7 0 0 1 - . 2 6 4 ( 0 0 .0 3 5
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i ! e d ) 0 . 2 6 4 0 0 .0 4 2 0 0 .4 2 1
N 7 7 3 8 3 9 8 3 9 8 3 9 8 3 9 5 2 3
P r c v .  S A R s .  d i f f .  r e p o r t e r C o r r e l a t i o n  C o e f f i c i e n t 0 . 0 4 8 ,0 7 7 { * ) 0 . 0 1 6 - . 2 6 4 ( 0 1 , 0 9 9 (* )
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) 0 . 1 8 3 0 .0 2 5 0 .6 4 1 0 0 .0 2 3
N 7 7 3 8 3 9 8 3 9 8 3 9 8 3 9 5 2 3
S A R  a m o u n t C o r r e l a t i o n  C o e f f i c i e n t - .0 8 9 ( « ) - 0 .0 0 4 - 0 .0 5 2 0 .0 3 5 ,0 9 9 ( * ) 1
S i g .  ( 2 - t a i l e d ) 0 .0 5 0 . 9 2 4 0 . 2 3 4 0 .4 2 1 0 .0 2 3
N 4 8 8 5 2 3 5 2 3 5 2 3 5 2 3 5 2 3
Source: Participating forces: NCIS. Note: "C orrela tion  is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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6.4. Conclusion
This chapter has presented an analysis of regulated sector entities’ accuracy in 
recognizing and reporting on suspicious activity, using hits on various law 
enforcement databases as proxies for success. The chapter also explored the extent to 
which external database hits were associated with various internal SAR 
characteristics. Most notably, some 20.7 percent of a sample o f SARs provided by 
three police forces had hits on PNC, and 27.4 percent had hits on the respective force 
intelligence system. If hits on either PNC or force intelligence are considered 
indicative o f overall targeting success, then some 35.6 percent of the sample 
represents signal, not noise. Though there is no clear hit rate which defines success, 
this may be suggestive o f moderate-to-solid performance in targeting on the part of 
the regulated sector. After all, these checks represent nothing more than simple data- 
matching, not advanced analytics; it is reasonable to assume that more advanced work 
would reveal higher success rates, at least using these proxies for targeting accuracy 
(i.e. the “noise” may not be noise at all). O f course, these findings may be more 
indicative o f the fact that some SAR filers appear to find and report signal—because 
their systems and staff see only that activity which is very obviously suspicious (note 
Levi and Maguire (2004): “most., .identified laundering is fairly basic”).
Taking the more optimistic view (i.e. that w e’re seeing OK targeting 
performance on the part o f SAR filers), it may be the case that there is some potential 
for the SARs regime to affect the criminality of those offenders undeterred by its very 
existence. O f course, this depends on the ability of law enforcement to turn the 
financial intelligence provided by SAR filers into appropriate action (explored in the 
next chapter)— which, without seeking to ruin the suspense, does not appear to be the 
case. And we cannot escape from the fact that even if  SAR filers are reporting signal, 
not noise, that signal may represent the activity of the criminals who aren’t very 
talented (i.e. the amateur offenders), who, it seems reasonable to posit, may not 
represent those most harmful offenders of greatest interest to society.
As with all such studies, there are calls for future research. Another proxy for 
targeting accuracy might approach the issue from another angle. A random sample of 
convictions could be checked against the Elmer database to see whether or not SARs 
had been filed against the convicted offenders (and whether or not hit rates differed by
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crime type). These findings might then serve to bolster (or not) the findings o f the 
present chapter. As it happens, the Joint Assets Recovery Database (JARD), which 
records all confiscation orders and cash seizures/forfeitures in the UK, has been 
modified to capture similar information (namely whether one or more SARs had been 
filed on the offender in question). Assuming this field is used by FIs— which is not 
necessarily going to be the case, sadly, given how FIs have failed to fully embrace 
JARD—just such an analysis could be conducted quite easily in the coming months.
Reporting entities filter their internal alerts (which are generated by staff and 
automated transaction monitoring systems), such that fewer SARs are sent than 
internal alerts generated. Filtering occurs in an environment in which it seems that 
“there are probably too many alerts, and these can’t all be truly suspicious”— but this 
unspoken assertion has not been tested in any capacity. Future research should 
examine those alerts which never become SARs (compared to alerts which are indeed 
filed) to explore the extent to which the filtering process may represent a misguided 
disposal o f signal, not noise— with implications for the impact of the SARs regime on 
the undeterred.
But perhaps the most interesting question— though one which may go 
unanswered due to civil liberties constraints— is whether or not reporting entities 
would have a greater likelihood o f finding truly suspicious activity by simply filing 
SARs on a random sample o f their customer base. It seems unlikely that this would 
be the case, but certainly some customers with links to criminality will be flagged up 
with random selection— so the question becomes what is the marginal benefit o f 
looking for suspicious activity over simple random selection. Then it would be 
possible to begin to consider the marginal benefits and costs of a SARs regime over 
and above an undoubtedly lower cost random regime.
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Chapter 7. Law Enforcement Agency Use of SARs95
As noted, SARs alert law enforcement that certain customer activity is in some 
way suspicious and might indicate money laundering or terrorist financing (and thus 
criminal and/or terrorist activity. The SARs regime, which has been in place since 
legislation was introduced in 1986, has undergone significant legislative modification: 
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) and the Money Laundering Regulations 
2003 redefined the offence of money laundering and captured a broader range of 
activity within the business o f the regulated sector. The number o f reports received 
has grown considerably in the past several years; some 56,000 were received in 2002, 
nearly 95,000 in 2003, and more than 154,000 in 2004. Regulated sector compliance 
with the regime is mandatory.
But the extent to which SARs are actually used by law enforcement (and the 
value of SARs to law enforcement) has not been entirely clear. A July 2003 KPMG 
report commissioned by NCIS revealed significant shortcomings with the regime and 
suggested 21 recommendations to carry it forward. While many recommendations 
have been taken on board by appropriate agencies, unease with reporting requirements 
has been registered by the regulated sector, primarily because law enforcement 
agencies (LEAs) continue to have poor management information on how SARs are 
actually used. A mid-2004 position piece o f the Association o f Chief Police Officers 
of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland (ACPO) put it this way: “As the 
requirements o f POCA come into force in respect o f Suspicious Activity Reporting, 
there is increasing concern from those industry sectors required to report, that the 
reports are not actioned by police and other law enforcement agencies, such that they 
question the need for the requirement as it currently stands.. .they seek some 
reassurance from law enforcement on the use o f the information they are providing” 
(Aldridge, 2004).
This chapter presents an examination o f the use and management of SARs by 
LEAs in the UK.96 It is structured as follows: after this introduction, a background
95 Much o f this chapter appeared in Fleming (2005). The author wishes to thank ACPO and the Home 
Office for research support in that endeavor. This chapter focuses on the state o f affairs prior to June 
2005— though the thrust o f  the findings— that SARs are vastly underutilized by law enforcement 
remains valid.
122
Chapter 7. Law Enforcement Agency Use o f  SARs
section presents an overview of the regime, the scope of the problem, and the 
methodology o f the research; the theoretical underpinnings of SARs are discussed, 
including their role in crime reduction in the context o f intelligence; the findings are 
presented; and a conclusion brings things to a close.
7.1. Background
7.1.1. SARs from Disclosure to LEAs: An Overview97
As set forth in POCA, SARs are filed by entities in the regulated sector when 
they have knowledge or suspicion of money laundering activity (or have reasonable 
grounds to know or suspect such activity).98 Money laundering activity is set forth in 
Sections 327, 328, and 329 o f POCA; it includes the concealing, arranging, and 
acquisition (acquisition, use, and possession) o f criminal property. The regulated 
sector includes banks/building societies, accountants, lawyers, estate agents, casinos, 
money service bureaux, and dealers in high-value goods. Failure by a regulated 
sector entity to disclose suspected money laundering activity (through a SAR) of 
which it is aware is itself a crime. A SAR captures information which includes 
subject details (i.e. information regarding the subject(s) o f the disclosure, be it an 
individual or legal entity), transaction details with account information, and the reason 
for disclosure (i.e. for suspicion). SARs are also filed to secure law enforcement 
consent on future activity which may constitute a prohibited act (e.g. the transfer of 
funds suspected o f being criminal property). O f the 154,536 SARs received by NCIS 
in 2004, nearly ten percent were consent SARs (this chapter will refer to nonconsent
96 Note that the concept o f law enforcement used in this chapter is a broad one, and includes the law 
enforcement arms o f  various non-police organisations (e.g. Department o f  Work and Pensions). Note 
also that Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise (HMCE) and Inland Revenue (IR) became Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) on 18 April 2005. This research refers to HMCE and IR as separate 
entities as appropriate (e.g. with historical uses o f  SARs). Similarly, NCIS and other agencies were 
combined to create SOCA in April 2006; NCIS is referred to throughout this chapter, as the 
organisation existed at the time the research was conducted.
97 Much has been written on the regime over the years. For historical perspectives and process-related 
information, see, for example, KPMG (2003), P1U (2000), and/or Gold and Levi (1994), though 
because o f  the rate o f change, even KPMG is to some extent dated. HMT (2004) provides a broad 
summary o f  the UK’s AML strategy. The Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG)
Guidance Notes provide a comprehensive summary o f the regime, though with an industry focus.
98 SARs are distinct from the threshold-based reports employed in a number o f overseas jurisdictions. 
The term SAR is not used in POCA. POCA requires businesses in the regulated sector to make a 
disclosure; this disclosure is commonly known as a SAR.
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and consent SARs throughout). Banks/building societies file more than 75 percent o f 
nonconsent SARs; the legal profession accounts for more than 80 percent of consent 
SARs, though this will likely fall with the Bowman v. Fels judgm ent." See Figures 
7.1 and 7.2, below, for information on receipts o f SARs by NCIS.
As noted in the previous chapter, SARs are filed as a result o f suspicions 
generated by regulated entity staff (e.g. clerks, back office staff) and automated 
transaction monitoring systems. Not all suspicions are ultimately reported: most 
alerts internal to regulated sector entities are examined and filtered prior to sending to 
NCIS. No research has yet examined this filtering process, and it is most certainly 
likely that filtering is imperfect (such that SARs ultimately representing criminal 
activity may be dropped as noise).
100SARs are sent electronically (via internet or fax) or in hard copy to NCIS. 
Once received, SARs are input into Elmer, the SARs database, and may undergo 
cursory analysis (analysis of individual SARs has evolved over time).101 But while 
NCIS may develop intelligence packages and products, it does not itself make arrests. 
As such, SARs and other forms o f criminal intelligence, not discussed here, are sent 
from NCIS to LEAs for action. Note that an important distinction is drawn for the 
purposes o f this chapter between the words allocate and disseminate: SARs are 
automatically allocated (i.e. assigned) to an appropriate LEA by the Elmer system; 
SARs are disseminated when they are actually sent to LEAs for action. All SARs are 
allocated, but not all SARs are disseminated, at least at present. The manner in which 
SARs are disseminated to LEAs (including what has been done to those SARs sent,
99 According to the Law Society, the Bowman v. Fels ruling “makes clear that legal professional 
privilege places solicitors under a primary duty to the court and their client, exempting them from 
making money laundering reports when acting in litigation” (Law Society, 2005). The decision had no 
impact on professional privilege (or lack thereof, as it happens) for accountants, auditors, and tax 
advisors. For more on the impact o f  this decision, see Fisher, 2006.
100 At present, there are no prescribed forms on which SARs must be sent to NCIS. NCIS encourages 
filers to use either the Standard Disclosure Report Form or the Limited Intelligence Value Report 
Form, both available at http://www.ncis.co.uk/disclosure.asp. Further, there is no prescribed manner in 
which filers must report, though reporting entities are encouraged to use bulk submission or the 
money.web extranet.
101 At the time the research was carried out, not all SARs were input on Elmer, though NCIS was 
moving to rectify this. As at March 2005, some 15,000 SARs were awaiting input; as at May 2005, 
this was reduced to some 3,000 SARs. Mandatory electronic reporting and prescribed forms would 
lighten resource demands to some extent.
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and what percentage o f the total is sent out) has changed significantly since 
publication of the KPMG report. The process can be divided into four distinct 
periods: pre-July 2003 (pre-KPMG); July 2003-June 2004; June 2004-Elmer rollout in 
May 2005; post-rollout.102
102 Changes in the dissemination process carry implications for the present chapter. The research 
examines both historical information (i.e. the extent o f recent use and management o f  SARs and 
deficiencies in management information) and the manner in which the Elmer rollout may affect LEA 
activity.
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Figure 1. Annual and Monthly SARs Receipts by NCIS
A n i m a l  R e c e i p t s .  1 9 8 7 - 2 0 0 4
1 6 0 , 0 0 0
1 4 0 , 0 0 0
120,000
100,000
8 0 , 0 0 0
6 0 , 0 0 0
4 0 , 0 0 0
20,000
1 9 8 7  1 9 8 8  1 9 8 9  1 9 9 0  1 9 9 1  1 9 9 2  1 9 9 3  1 9 9 4  1 9 9 5  1 9 9 6  1 9 9 7  1 9 9 8  1 9 9 9  2 0 0 0  2 0 0 1  2 0 0 2  2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4
M o n t h l y  R e c e i p t s ,  J a n u a r y  2 0 0 3 - D c c c m b c r  2 0 0 4
20,000
■  N o n c o n s c n t  S A R s  ■  C o n s e n t  S A R s
1 7 , 5 0 0
1 5 , 0 0 0
J a n -  M a r  M a y  J u l  S e p  N o v  J a n -  M a r  M a y  J u l  S e p  N o v  
0 3  0 4
Source: NCIS. Based on receipts from January-April 2005, total 2005 annual receipts should be on 
the order o f  165,000.
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Figure 2. SARs Receipts by NCIS by Sector
N o n c o n s c n t  S A R s  R e c e i v e d  b y  S e c t o r .  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 3 - D c c c m b c r  2 0 0 4  ( n  ! 7 1 . 8 7 0 )  
O t h e r
A c c o u n t a n c y  p r o f e s s i o n
5 %
L e g a l  p r o f e s s i o n  
4 %
B a n k s  b u i l d i n g  s o c i e t i e s  
7 6 %
C o n s e n t  S A R s  R e c e i v e d  b y  S e c t o r ,  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 3 - D c c c m b c r  2 0 0 4  ( n = 1 7 . 3 0 2 )
L e g a l  p r o f e s s i o n  
8 1 % A c c o u n t a n c y  p r o f e s s i o n  
2%
O t h e r
8%
B a n k s / b u i l d i n g  s o c i e t i e s
9 %
Source: NCIS. Note that no sectoral breakdowns are available prior to September 2003. Percentage 
receipts by sector are broadly stable over time. The legal profession's share o f  consent SARs should 
fall due to the Bowman v. Fels ruling o f  March 2005.
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* Pre-July 2003: Prior to the release o f the KPMG report in July 2003, all SARs 
upon receipt were searched against the Alert database (the NCIS database of level 
3 targets, now known as Elementary) and Elmer itself. If there were database hits, 
the SAR was allocated and disseminated to the interested LEA as recorded on 
Alert/Elmer. If  there were no hits, the SAR was allocated and disseminated to the 
relevant LEA by postcode. Additionally, staff from organisations including 
HMCE, IR, and the Terrorist Finance Team (TFT) sited at NCIS actively combed 
the Elmer database for work appropriate to their respective organisations (and to 
the National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit o f Special Branch, NTFIU, in 
the case o f the TFT). All SARs were disseminated. SARs were sent out via email 
in “LEA packs” which contained the SAR, comma separated variable format of 
the SAR data (CSV format can be easily pulled into a variety of database and 
spreadsheet applications, like Microsoft Excel), a feedback form, and information 
on links to previous SARs (including previous SAR numbers and to whom/when 
they were disseminated). SARs needing immediate action (as judged by the Duty 
Desk) were fast-tracked to the relevant LEA; non-fast-track SARs were processed 
with lower priority. There were often delays in the dissemination o f non-fast- 
track SARs o f  several months if  not more (KPMG, 2003).103
■ July 2003-June 2004: Following the release of the KPMG report and until June 
2004, all SARs were individually assessed on a qualitative basis and according to 
the intelligence requirements o f LEAs and NCIS itself. SARs assessed to be of 
interest were disseminated to the relevant LEA by postcode as per intelligence 
requirements; those which did not, through assessment, meet dissemination 
criteria were retained on-site (i.e. kept in the Elmer database, but not 
disseminated). The SARs assessed as fit for dissemination were searched against 
Alert and Elmer, and, occasionally, a search would be conducted on the Police 
National Computer (PNC) or HMCE’s Cedric (now known as Centaur). As with 
the pre-KPMG period, staff from various agencies continued to work onsite; fast-
103 At the time o f  its assessment o f the UK’s AML regime in 2002, the IMF found evidence o f  NCIS 
processing/analysis taking three months (IMF, 2003). Participants in Operation Kinloss, a May 2002- 
March 2003 Home Office-funded project intended to explore the benefit o f employing ring-fenced 
SARs personnel, found evidence o f  SARs taking more than one year from disclosure to receipt by an 
LEA (Hicks, 2003).
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track SARs were given higher priority in processing; and SARs were sent out via 
the LEA packs. Delays in the processing o f non-fast-track SARs persisted.
■ From June 2004 to the Elmer rollout (end-May 2005): With little fanfare— and 
with no apparent consultation with LEAs—NCIS significantly reduced the 
volume of dissemination o f SARs to LEAs in June 2004. Staff from IR and TFT, 
(but no longer HMCE) still comb the database for their organisations, and three 
LEAs (Cheshire Constabulary, Merseyside Police, and the Metropolitan Police 
Service) receive semi-regular CD-ROMs with unprocessed, unevaluated raw 
SARs data. LEAs are encouraged to submit Elmer search requests (these have 
been available since well before KPMG, but their use has become all the more 
relevant). Those SARs which are indeed disseminated have likely been identified 
by IR or TFT; have been highlighted for further scrutiny through daily target and 
keyword searches o f the database; may support a specific law enforcement 
initiative like Operation Payback (which is a catch-all for publicised LEA efforts 
designed to mainstream asset recovery and financial investigation into policing; 
Operation Payback represents the national concept, and also specific, 
local/regional blitzes o f asset recovery); or are the result o f NCIS analyses (e.g. 
searches for the most-disclosed-upon individuals) and/or product development. 
The disseminated SARs are still searched against Elementary, and links to other 
SARs are still identified (though this may not happen in all cases: support to 
Operation Payback and/or lists of the most-disclosed upon individuals may go out 
as lists o f names/addresses). To explain the change in procedure, NCIS states that 
“the previous practice o f wholesale allocation o f single SARs, on a reactive basis, 
has been replaced with the delivery o f intelligence assessments, prioritised 
subjects lists and targeted SARs” (NCIS, 2005), and that “the reactive, one by one 
allocation process risked not revealing the most capable and most prolific of 
money laundering suspects and not highlighting patterns and typologies” (NCIS, 
2004).
■ Post-rollout: As at 27 May 2005, LEAs have remote read-only, semi-searchable 
online access to the Elmer database.104 Elmer is delivered via the money.web
104 Eight LEAs (Avon and Somerset Constabulary, City o f London Police, Her Majesty’s Customs and
Excise, Hertfordshire, Inland Revenue, Metropolitan Police Service, Scottish Drug Enforcement
(continued)
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extranet. All SARs are accessible to all registered users nationwide (with the 
exception o f SARs in certain categories, including SARs dealing with terrorism). 
LEAs are entirely responsible for selecting the SARs they wish to view and work 
on. SARs are not searched against any external databases or Elmer itself for links 
to previous SARs (as LEAs do this themselves). LEAs wishing to search 
Elementary need to lodge a search request with their regional NCIS office as per 
long-standing established Elementary search protocols. SARs are available to 
print or download; feedback is provided online. NCIS states that it will continue 
to provide LEAs with various intelligence products and certain database queries.
■ Consent SARs are disseminated differently. From March 2003-March 2004, all 
consents were disseminated to law enforcement for action. From March 2004 
through to the present, if the consent SAR meets any o f a number o f criteria (e.g. 
property or subject leaving the UK; property is being converted to 
cash/equivalent, leaving the UK audit trail; the activity is fraud-related; the subject 
is flagged)— the consent is disseminated via fax to the appropriate LEA for action; 
if not, NCIS handles the consent in-house. Either way, NCIS conducts (and 
conducted prior to March 2004) various database checks prior to dissemination to 
LEAs or to the in-house approval/denial o f consent. At present, NCIS handles 
roughly 65 percent o f consents in-house, disseminating the remaining 35 percent 
to LEAs for action. Upon conclusion of the process (with consent being either 
granted or denied, or assumed if seven working days pass with no word), the 
consent SAR is input onto the Elmer database. The rollout of the Elmer database 
is not expected to affect consent procedures.
7.1.2. Scope of the Problem
But what happens to SARs once they are in the hands o f LEAs? To what 
extent are SARs used by law enforcement? Do SARs play a role in the conviction of 
offenders and/or follow-on confiscations, or—despite the participation of the 
regulated sector— do they sit unused in office files or databases? In the event, very
Agency, Thames Valley Police) piloted the remote Elmer system in a month-long test period beginning 
24 February 2005. Rollout occurred in late-May 2005. The piloting and rollout had originally been 
scheduled for autumn 2004, but were pushed back due to IT and legal issues.
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little is known about LEA use and management of SARs in the UK (and, indeed, in 
many countries). This is the motivation for the present study.
This is not to say that no sources discuss SARs and law enforcement. There 
are some general examples o f LEA use of SARs (e.g. country-non-specific examples 
discussed in the FATF’s annual typologies exercise, or the Egmont Group’s 2000 
FIUs in Action publication). Specific to the UK, passing mention is made of SARs in 
various Money Laundering News and Proceeds of Crime Update newsletters put out 
by the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) and in the 2004 Payback Time report o f Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). The Performance and Innovation 
Unit of the Cabinet Office (PIU) discusses the AML regime in detail in its influential 
2000 Recovering the Proceeds o f Crime report, though it focuses primarily on the 
roles of NCIS and the FSA. Occasional isolated internal reviews of the use and 
management o f SARs by specific units have been carried out by a handful o f LEAs 
(e.g. Dickin, 2001; Hicks, 2003).
The most comprehensive analyses o f the use and management of SARs by 
LEAs are carried out by Gold and Levi (1994) and KPMG (2003). Gold and Levi 
(1994) present an examination o f the SARs regime in the early 1990s (and their study 
raises many issues which remain salient today, including the problems being 
addressed by the present research). Among other things, they look at a sample of 
1,106 disclosures (referred to as FINLOGS at the time) to ascertain their contribution 
to criminal justice outcomes. Using a feedback/classification scheme previously 
employed by NCIS, they find that 1.4 percent o f the sample were classified as “drug 
positive” or “crime positive” (i.e. involved an arrest); “this appears to be a poor total 
yield...”, they comment.105 They make a series o f recommendations for financial 
institutions, NCIS, law enforcement, interagency communication and cooperation, 
regulators, and government. Most relevant to the present research: they recommend 
that the processes for the provision o f  feedback to the regulated entities are reviewed
105 Gold and Levi also mention the categories o f “drug suspect”, “crime suspect”, and “UNIDENT”. 
The “suspect” categories refer to disclosures in which the subject was a suspect (likely identified in 
various database checks), while the latter refers to those cases “where officers feel instinctively that the 
transactions were linked to criminality but are a long way from even having evidence to satisfy 
themselves”. The suspect categories represent 3.6 percent o f the sample, while the UNIDENT 
represents 15.6 percent.
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and potentially retooled; that NCIS becomes more proactive and successful in 
obtaining information on the progress o f investigations; that forces should agree and 
develop a reasonably uniform policy with respect to acting upon and reporting back 
on disclosures; that more consideration should be given to protecting a certain amount 
of officer time from the intrusion o f  an excessive or uncontrolled amount of reactive 
work; and that government devotes sufficient funding to both reactive and proactive 
units to pursue disclosures.
KPMG (2003), the study widely credited with bringing about considerable 
change in the UK SARs regime, track a sample of 600 SARs from cradle-to-grave, in 
addition to other analyses.106 They find that eleven percent o f the 600 SARs 
contributed to a criminal justice outcome or were still being worked on; this 
represents some 34 percent o f the 193 SARs in the sample for which outcomes were 
known. Further, KPMG makes 21 recommendations for improving the regime, seven 
o f which are directed at LEAs. These include: the merging o f financial investigation 
units on a regional basis (for smaller LEAs); the use o f the ARA Centre of Excellence 
to develop guidance and training on use o f SARs; LEA access to and use of Elmer 
terminals; the monitoring of LEA results and establishment of new service level 
agreements; the setting of LEA objectives by the Home Office which impact upon the 
use of SARs; the use o f information available through Elmer to advertise successes of 
the regime; and the use o f successes derived from the regime to support and assist 
resource allocation decisions.
But virtually no systematic information on LEA use (and management) of 
SARs is available for the UK. According to the PIU, “no records are kept o f the 
quality of disclosures in the UK or the extent to which they have assisted law 
enforcement in prosecuting either money laundering or predicate offences” (PIU, 
2000). Indeed, a large and growing list o f commentators has highlighted the issue 
over the years, including Gold and Levi (1994), PIU (2000), International Monetary
106 As part o f the 2003 report, KJPMG also carried out an intensive survey o f  the users o f SARs, 
including on several o f  the issues relevant to the present research. Specific survey findings were not 
published, and contributed only generally to the final KPMG report. KPMG very generously provided 
its survey data to the author o f this thesis.
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Fund (2003), KPMG (2003), Transparency International (2003), Aldridge (2004), and 
HMIC (2004).107
A lack of systematic information on the use of SARs precludes any serious 
analysis of the efficacy of the AML regime in the UK and elsewhere. Admittedly, no 
perfect indicators exist which would allow for straightforward evaluation of the 
efficacy any AML regime. Reuter and Truman (2004) discuss various potential 
performance measures—but then note their associated and often crippling 
shortcomings; they do, however, get some mileage from “intermediate measures of 
performance such as the number o f SARs, prosecutions, convictions and 
incarcerations, seizures, forfeitures”. Recommendation 32 o f the FATF’s 40 
Recommendations (2003 revision) calls for similar information:108
Countries should ensure that their competent authorities can review the 
effectiveness o f their systems to combat money laundering and terrorist financing 
systems by maintaining comprehensive statistics on matters relevant to the 
effectiveness and efficiency o f such systems. This should include statistics on the 
STR [SAR] received and disseminated; on money laundering and terrorist 
financing investigations, prosecutions and convictions; on property frozen, seized 
and confiscated; and on mutual legal assistance or other international requests for 
co-operation (FATF, 2003).
Further, the lack o f systematic information on LEA use and management 
affects more than an inability to empirically analyse the efficacy o f the regime. It also 
prevents the regulated sector from better targeting disclosures, and it chips away at the 
desire for industry to cooperate with reporting requirements. Both are critical. The 
imprecise targeting o f  disclosures implies that industry may not be finding the 
offenders or terrorists o f most concern— and that industry resources are not being put 
to their most efficient use— while a loose targeting o f disclosures (and perhaps an 
inappropriately low bar for suspicion) has the potential to swamp or at least clog the
107 This lack o f  understanding does not appear to be exclusive to the UK. International experiences are 
discussed later in the present chapter.
108 The present research does not represent an empirical analysis o f  the efficacy o f the regime. It is, 
however, a requisite step in that direction, exploring the current availability o f intermediate measures, 
among other things.
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system with too many SARs. An uncooperative industry has the potential to 
effectively shut down the system (e.g. by lobbying Parliament for change in the 
legislation; by collectively refusing to disclose on various grounds, pushing the issue 
into the courts; or by intentionally employing the very lowest bar for suspicion— 
though doing so within the letter o f the law— thus swamping the system).109 Lastly, 
compliance officers/money laundering reporting officers need information to bring to 
their boards to justify AML expenditures.
7.1.3. Theory: SARs from Information to Intelligence to Outcomes— and
Measuring SARs’ Use
The theoretical support for AML regimes in general and for SARs in particular 
is covered by a number o f existing sources. Most cite the ability of a SARs regime to 
deter and displace money laundering and predicate offences; to facilitate the detection 
and sanctioning of such crimes after the fact; and to disrupt such crimes in progress 
(see, for example, KPMG, 2003; Reuter and Truman, 2004; Gold and Levi, 1994; 
HMT, 2004).'10
What is little discussed, however, is how SARs should work on a day-to-day 
basis to prevent criminal and terrorist activity, and— in particular—to sanction such 
activity after the fact. SARs are often discussed in the context o f intelligence. The 
role o f SARs as intelligence— or perhaps more accurately, as information which may 
or may not become intelligence, an important distinction—is often subtle. This 
section explores the journey from information to intelligence to outcomes; the section 
guides and informs subsequent analysis.
What is intelligence? There are few agreed-upon definitions o f criminal 
and/or national security intelligence (a least in the public domain), though the point is
109 A number o f sources share similar thoughts on the importance o f feedback; see, for example, FATF, 
(2003), KPMG (2003), PIU (2000), FATF (1998), and Gold and Levi (1994). In particular, note 
Recommendation 25 of the FATF’s 40 Recommendations:
The competent authorities should establish guidelines, and provide feedback which will assist 
financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions in applying national 
measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and in particular, in detecting and 
reporting suspicious transactions (FATF, 2003).
1 i0 To these are often added “to protect the integrity o f the financial system” and “to avoid economic 
and competitive distortions” (HMT, 2004).
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clear enough.111 Simply put, intelligence is “the considered and analysed product o f 
systematic information gathering” (ACPO, 2001); “intelligence is evaluated 
information collected by various techniques for a defined purpose” (Higgins, 2004). 
Intelligence may be used for strategic and/or tactical (sometimes known as 
operational) purposes. Strategic intelligence refers to “an assessment o f targeted 
crime patterns, crime trends, criminal organizations, and/or unlawful commodity 
transactions for purposes o f planning, decision making, and resource allocation”; 
tactical intelligence is “evaluated information on which immediate enforcement action 
can be based; intelligence activity focused specifically on developing an active case” 
(Criminal Intelligence Training Coordination Strategy Working Group, 2004). In the 
UK, criminal intelligence (and increasingly policing) is guided by the National 
Intelligence Model (NIM). The NIM is a standardisation o f strategic and tactical 
intelligence approaches and products.112
Are SARs themselves actually intelligence, whether tactical or strategic? As it 
happens, SARs as received are broadly not intelligence, not without further 
evaluation. The idea is as follows: “Upon discovering out-of-the-ordinary behaviour, 
the solver [i.e. intelligence analyst, crime analyst, investigator] looks for supporting 
data marking the observed signals as a true phenomenon and not just noise” 
(Hollywood et al, 2004). That is, initial searches o f existing sources o f information, 
including various intelligence databases or Elmer itself (to check for links with other 
SARs)— coupled with the reason for suspicion—serve to filter out the noise, and to 
contextualise the information.113 The process of evaluating “raw” SARs—through
111 For a discussion o f the merits o f  various definitions o f intelligence (including mention o f the 
distinction between information and intelligence), see Warner (2002).
112 The NIM divides criminality into three categories: level one for local issues; level two for cross- 
border issues; and level three for serious and organised crime (national and international). Policing and 
intelligence are guided by strategic and tactical tasking and coordinating meetings, all in support o f  the 
control strategy (which sets forth the intelligence, prevention, and enforcement priorities o f  the LEA). 
Four key intelligence products support strategic and tactical tasking and coordinating: strategic 
assessments, tactical assessments, target profiles, and problem profiles. For more information on the 
NIM, see, for example, NCIS (2000), Flood (2004), and Christopher (2004).
113 This is not to suggest that the information-to-intelligence process works perfectly: in cross-checking 
SARs, a certain percentage will be wrongly dismissed as useless information (i.e. false negatives), 
destined not in the near-term to become actionable intelligence; some which should have been 
dismissed will clear the hurdle to intelligence (false positives). As SARs sit on Elmer, however, even 
SARs which appear useless in the near-term may at some point suggest criminal behaviour, perhaps 
when linked to several other SARs over the course o f several years.
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what are sometimes referred to as “initial checks”— is what transforms “suspicion- 
based information”, as one NCIS staff member put it, into intelligence (and thus 
begins attrition).114 The information evaluation does not necessarily need to be an 
involved process requiring considerable staff resources: the most efficient manner of 
at least some initial evaluation likely lies in the automated, electronic cross-checking 
of various databases (e.g. PNC) and, importantly, Elmer itself.115 SARs evaluated to 
be indicative o f truly suspicious behaviour may then be prioritised and further 
developed into usable intelligence. Intelligence development will generally entail 
deeper information cross-checking (from various sources o f information) and 
analysis.
Investigation is distinct from information evaluation/intelligence development, 
though the line is a fuzzy one. By and large— and for the purposes o f this chapter— 
investigation implies evidence-gathering. Investigation will accordingly require the 
use o f various court orders (e.g. production orders, search and seizure warrants) and 
perhaps operational or even specialist teams (e.g. surveillance teams, firearms teams). 
Operational teams may be required because 1) staff evaluating information and 
developing intelligence packages will not always have the proper accreditation to 
apply for court orders; and 2) the responsibility for intelligence development may 
have been separated from investigation, such that different parties carry out different 
functions within an LEA. Financial investigation unit (FIU) staff have historically 
been responsible for the receipt, evaluation, and development of SARs.116 They have 
also been responsible for the investigation o f proactive SARs-based cases which fall
1,4 There may be disagreement over the wording here: as received, SARs may be considered by some 
to be intelligence (in fact, SARs may or may not be classified as intelligence simply for policy reasons: 
items classified as intelligence must be handled and distributed according to certain guidelines). The 
critical point does not, however, depend on semantics: if  SARs as received are information, then they 
need to be somehow evaluated and to become intelligence; if  they are considered intelligence as 
received, they still need to undergo the same evaluation/development that turns them from intelligence 
to actionable intelligence.
115 KPMG (2003) encouraged NCIS to carry out automated searches o f Elmer, PNC, Cedric, and Alert 
for the prioritisation o f SARs to LEAs. Thus far, there is no facility at NCIS to allow for such 
automated database checks.
116 Note that the acronym FIU refers in the present chapter to a financial investigation unit, as opposed 
to a financial intelligence unit; the latter typically refers to the national-level organisation within a 
jurisdiction which receives, analyses, and disseminates SARs (and potentially threshold-based reports). 
NCIS is the national financial intelligence unit o f the UK.
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into the financial investigator (FI) remit, such as confiscation, money laundering. 
Proactive SARs-based jobs outside of FIU remits (e.g. operations relating to class A 
drugs), however, require assignment to operational teams for investigation through the 
tasking and coordinating process. Whether SARs-based cases are actually assigned to 
operational teams will depend on the power o f the intelligence, the availability of 
operational resources, and the current priorities of the LEA.
Should the simple receipt o f SARs by NCIS/LEAs then consistently lead 
directly to full-on investigations and arrests? The simple answer appears to be no, 
with important caveats.117 This is for two related reasons. First, as noted above, 
SARs must be turned from information to intelligence (either by NCIS or LEAs, 
automatically or manually) prior to launching investigations. This weeding out 
(though not deleting) of noise is important not least because defensive reporting or 
mistaken suspicion on the part of filers may lead to a virtual mountain of information, 
some o f which may be o f limited value.118 Second, law enforcement in the UK, as 
elsewhere, operates in a resource-constrained environment.119 The deployment of 
investigative operational teams to fully investigate each and every SAR as received is 
almost certainly not the best use o f limited resources.120 This is the case not least 
because SARs may become useful as they accumulate (one SAR may or may not 
suggest true criminality, but multiple SARs over time may indeed suggest an ongoing
117 This section discusses SARs in general; consent SARs may in fact lead more directly to certain 
outcomes than their nonconsent brethren, not least because o f the need for timely action by 
NCIS/LEAs.
118 Defensive reporting may be defined as the reporting by industry o f each and every transaction with 
even the barest hint o f suspicion. While defensive reporting is within the letter o f the law (indeed, the 
practice exists to comply with the law), it very likely leads to false positives. The possibility remains 
that there may even be instances o f  what could be called offensive reporting, disclosures o f activity in 
effort to deceive and/or clog the system. Also, the Bichard Inquiry flagged up misunderstandings 
surrounding the concept o f  “weeding out” o f seemingly useless information/intelligence (Bichard, 
2004). In the present chapter, weeding out implies the separating o f wheat from chaff, though not the 
permanent deleting o f  the chaff.
119 That law enforcement operates with constrained resources is one o f  the drivers behind the 
intelligence-led policing movement (see, for example, the demand gap discussed by Flood, 2004).
120 In fact, it is also the case that it is likely inefficient to fully investigate each and every SAR which is 
defined as actionable intelligence; some activity, while illegal, may simply not be worrisome enough to 
warrant the use o f scarce policing resources (more formally, the marginal cost o f 
prevention/enforcement for the crime in question may be greater than the marginal benefit o f 
preventing/enforcing the law with regard to that particular crime, bearing in mind that there are very 
likely dynamic aspects to the scenario).
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course of crime with one or more offenders— calling for law enforcement attention). 
That is, in an environment of limited resources, unless a SAR clearly indicates serious 
criminality, it may be difficult for managers to approve the deployment o f teams who 
may require costly surveillance support (and who will most certainly need to spend 
time in court obtaining production orders and the like) on the basis of a single SAR 
which represents nothing more than suspicion (Gold and Levi (1994) come to similar 
conclusions).
But herein lie the important caveats: SARs will in some cases clearly suggest 
the most serious of criminality, and (and/or) require little if  any further intelligence 
development or law enforcement investigation. Even in a resource-constrained 
environment— or perhaps particularly in a resource-constrained environment— it 
would seem foolish to ignore such “hot” intelligence. In other words, while it may be 
the case that relatively few should be directly actioned, it seems wrong on the face of 
it to dismiss the potential for SARs’ direct contribution. It is important that 
mechanisms are in place to identify such SARs (or trends in SARs which together 
indicate criminality).121 Moreover, while the simple receipt of SARs may not on 
balance consistently lead directly to investigations, receipt should consistently lead to 
the kind o f information evaluation—by NCIS or LEAs or perhaps both (with different 
sources o f information), perhaps electronically— which separates wheat from chaff, 
potentially generating intelligence to be used for new and existing investigations. 
Also, many SARs relate to targets of existing law enforcement operations or 
confiscations. Their receipt will not then lead to new investigations, but may directly 
play a crucial role in assisting existing ones with new information. Finally, the use of 
SARs in guiding the investigation and possible arrest/conviction of offenders is a 
tactical use; SARs may also be employed strategically, with less visible and less 
immediate outcomes.
121 Gold and Levi (1994) suggested that reporting entities highlight those activities/transactions which 
seem highly likely to be suggestive o f money laundering (in contrast to the current approach o f  limited 
value intelligence reports).
122 The rollout o f Elmer will put the onus largely on LEAs in the tactical intelligence development 
arena.
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Some limited disagreement exists on maximising the benefit o f SARs. There 
are occasional suggestions that SARs should not all be examined/evaluated upon 
receipt (by either NCIS or LEAs); rather, the appropriate use of the data is in the 
interrogation o f the database itself with specific queries (e.g. have SARs been made 
against this target? or who are the most prolific money launderers?). This suggests 
that the two methods— evaluate SARs as received v. interrogate the database— are 
mutually exclusive, which they’re not. It seems logical that both methods should be 
employed: to ignore the former is to ignore the potential for SARs to indicate 
intelligence on previously unknown criminal/terrorist activity, which may be 
imminent; to ignore the latter is to assume that critically important patterns will be 
apparent as and when SARS are received, which they likely won’t. This is not to say 
that SARs as received must be fully investigated one-by-one (on the contrary, as 
noted above), but rather that they should at least undergo some sort o f prompt initial 
evaluation (perhaps electronically, with keywords or various data-mining techniques, 
many of which could be automated) to capture the hot intelligence and to assist in
i 2^
workload prioritisation, in addition to database interrogation.
Once intelligence, however, SARs can and in many cases should lead directly 
to proactive investigations or should contribute to ongoing investigations, all with 
various criminal justice outcomes. In this regard, there are a number of tactical and 
strategic uses to which SARs may be put. Perhaps the most critical point to bear in 
mind is that the all-crimes nature o f the legislation implies that the regime is designed 
to be used in the prevention and enforcement o f a far wider range o f crimes than 
financial crime and money laundering alone. SARs may be useful in identifying the 
criminality, assets, or methods of a burglar or car thief just as much as drug dealer, 
VAT fraudster, or, indeed, stereotypical money launderer (and it may be the case that 
the personal details, like telephone numbers and addresses, are more important to law 
enforcement officers than the suspicious activity itself). Tactical and strategic uses of 
SARs are presented in Table 7.1.
123 Notes NCIS: “the law enforcement environment is, however, a fast moving one in which matters 
requiring urgent attention are frequently likely to come to notice. Whilst it remains essential that the 
sense o f direction be maintained, a fast track procedure for actioning urgent intelligence is necessary” 
(NCIS, 2000).
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Table 7.1. Uses of SARs in an Intelligence Context
Use type______________________________________ Use___________________________________
Tactical To identify previously unknown criminal(s)/terrorist(s)
To identify the previously unknown criminal/terrorist activity o f  a known criminal/terrorist 
To corroborate known criminal/terrorist activity 
To identify criminal/terrorist networks
To enhance existing criminal/terrorist investigations (e.g. with new avenues for 
investigation)
To identify/locate assets for cash seizure/forfeiture, restraint/confiscation, and/or Hansard 
valuation (on unpaid tax, carried out by Inland Revenue)
To assist in confiscation order enforcement (and, potentially, fine enforcement)
To prevent dissipation o f  assets and/or to disrupt current criminality/terrorist funding (e.g.
through consent SARs)
To identify patterns o f  high- or low-volume reporting for regulated entity self-assessment 
or regulatory/LEA follow-up 
To identify the potential duplicity o f regulated entities 
Strategic To contribute to strategic assessments (e.g. for the annual UK Threat Assessment exercise) 
To identify the main threats, risks, patterns, and emerging trends in money
laundering/financial crime, including identifying typologies to provide better 
understanding o f the problem
____________To satisfy international commitments________________________________________________
Sources: Various, including MLRTF (2004a), FinCEN (1999), Levi (1996).
Intelligence is typically discussed in the context o f an intelligence cycle (see, 
for example, CIA, 2002; Ratcliffe, 2004), whose steps, in order, include planning, 
collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination. What makes the process a cycle is 
the feedback loop that links the last phase, dissemination, to the next planning phase. 
With intelligence derived from SARs, as with other intelligence, it is critical that this 
loop is closed with feedback from the consumer o f the intelligence to the decision­
makers in planning and collection. That is, the LEA users o f SARs should provide 
feedback on the value o f the SARs-based intelligence; the uses to which it was put, 
such as those described above; and its impact on crime-reduction. This feedback (the 
feedback suggested by the FATF in its recommendation 32, discussed above) should 
be provided to NCIS and ultimately to industry (sanitised). It should allow for better 
(i.e. more precise, more meaningful, and perhaps as a result, fewer) SARs in future 
disclosures. Feedback should be given by LEAs to NCIS whenever SARs are 
examined, even when a SAR seems unrelated to crime. This may allow for better 
industry targeting o f truly suspicious behaviour. Feedback is a powerful tool for 
improving the efficiency of the regime in its entirety.
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It would be wrong to assume that the provision of feedback is straightforward, 
however. First o f all, truly meaningful feedback may require the input of a number of 
people, including the initial users of SARs (in information evaluation/intelligence 
development), any investigative teams, and potentially the CPS/courts. It may be the 
case that whilst initial SARs users were positive on the importance o f SARs (perhaps 
in identifying a previously unknown criminal), the resulting case was difficult to sell 
to operational teams (perhaps because other priorities were facing the LEA at the 
time, driving the control strategy in a different direction). While a consent SAR may 
quickly and directly lead to an outcome like cash seizure, this is probably the 
exception not the norm. Considerable time may pass between the initial viewing o f a 
SAR and the final outcomes o f conviction/confiscation. Complex excise cases (e.g. 
VAT fraud, MTIC fraud) can take years simply to get to court, let alone run their 
course.124 By that time, the users o f the relevant SARs, if  SARs were responsible 
early on for initiating the investigation, may have moved on to new positions, or may 
have left the LEA entirely. Even those SARs initially assessed as unconnected to 
crime may turn out months or years later to link to other SARs, suggesting a hitherto 
unseen course of criminality— and requiring new feedback. Human nature may be 
relevant as well: investigators may wish to take the credit for successful operations, 
when ultimately it was the intelligence that saved the day. Lastly, while feedback 
should not be time-consuming (once policies and procedures are ironed out, the actual 
feedback itself may require only minutes or even seconds), comments received in this 
research suggest a perception on the part o f LEAs that time spent providing feedback 
is time diverted from actual crime-fighting. This is not the case, though LEAs may 
need to be given certain feedback incentives to compensate for this belief.
Finally, interpreting and analysing the feedback, particularly in gauging the 
efficacy of the regime, is itself complicated. The FATF and others all rightly call for 
some feedback/intermediate measures of the use o f SARs. After all, such measures 
(which are based primarily on an understanding o f how LEAs use SARs, most 
efficiently won through some sort o f feedback mechanism), are critical for 
understanding the contribution that an AML regime makes to the reduction of
124 Along these lines, note that the Inland Revenue use o f SARs is naturally historic: SARs are o f less 
importance to investigations unless the relevant tax forms have been returned to IR.
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crime/terrorism. But this doesn’t imply that such measures are easily understood.125 
Uses of SARs are not mutually exclusive: one or many SARs, for example, may 
indicate unknown criminality and prevent dissipation of assets for the same offender. 
Or many SARs together will be used to illustrate the pattern of offending of a lone 
individual. As an example, assume that the regulated sector files 100 SARs in a year. 
Feedback may suggest that these 100 result in one conviction, but it may be the case 
that 10 or even 50 o f the SARs played a role in that conviction. It might be 
misleading, then, to look at the number o f convictions resulting from SARs (one 
conviction secured as the result o f 100 SARs filed), though perhaps less misleading to 
look at the number o f SARs which contributed to a conviction (10 percent of the 100 
SARs filed contributed to a conviction).126 O f course, many SARs will be received 
relating to people already under investigation; an indicator such as SARs launching 
proactive investigations must then look at SARs launching proactive investigations as 
a percentage o f SARs received relating to people not already under investigation, not 
all SARs received. And what is the basis for performance assessment? Is the 
hypothetical 10-percent-of-the-100-SARs-filed example indicative of a successful 
regime, or one in need of work? Should such feedback be interpreted as indicative of 
the failure o f SARs to reduce crime, or o f limitations in the functioning of the regime
1 27itself (e.g. SARs when disseminated were too old to be of significant use)? Lastly, 
feedback and intermediate measures suffer from one inescapable but crucial 
weakness: they cannot capture the unknowable counterfactual (i.e. what would have 
happened in the absence o f the regime). SARs most certainly deter money laundering 
and predicate criminality/terrorism— but the level o f deterrence is very difficult to 
determine empirically.
125 This is also pointed out by the MLRTF in its Second Report to Ministers. HM1C (2004) suggests 
that simple measures like the percentage o f SARs leading to investigations are misleading, though no 
specific alternatives are offered.
126 Timing is also a complicating factor: because no immediate investigation/conviction doesn’t imply 
that no investigation/conviction will ever take place, it might be most appropriate to consider the 
number o f  SARs contributing to a conviction as a percentage o f  the SARs filed in the previous year (or 
even the year before that), not least because the number o f  SARs filed per annum has been increasing. 
Finally, the interpretation o f feedback on SARs contributing to convictions should be mindful o f the 
fact that once in the courts, cases may fail due to outside factors unrelated to SARs (the same goes for 
prosecutions, confiscations, and the like).
127 Gold and Levi (1994) usefully differentiate between implementation failure and theory failure.
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What are the implications for the regime and the research? All of the above is 
simply to suggest not that indicators are fatally flawed, but that interpretations of 
statistics on the use o f SARs are proxies for the truth, and must be mindful of the 
details o f what is being measured. This should be considered later in the present 
chapter when interpreting findings. Moreover, knowing what can reasonably be 
expected o f SARs from information to intelligence to outcomes helps to analyse what 
is done in practice.
7.2. Data
The findings below are based on data gathered through LEAs throughout the 
UK on their use and management o f SARs. Information is drawn from a survey of 
LEAs; formal site visits with selected LEAs; discussions with a broad swath of the 
LEA SARs community; and data provided by NCIS, HMIC, and KPMG. For the 
survey o f LEAs, responses were received from 49 o f the 50 LEAs in the primary 
SARs user community (NTFIU declined to respond to the survey for security reasons, 
so it would be fair to say that the response rate was 100 percent). Site visits were 
carried out with City o f London Police, Devon & Cornwall Constabulary, Her 
Majesty’s Customs and Excise, Inland Revenue, Metropolitan Police Service,
National Crime Squad, Norfolk Constabulary, NTFIU, Scottish Drug Enforcement 
Agency (informed also by a visit with Strathclyde Police), and West Midlands Police.
Note that LEA data on the uses o f SARs are disappointingly limited. True, the 
LEA survey explored very precise concepts— including those aforementioned 
concepts called for by the FATF (through recommendation 32)— in order to 
understand both the information maintained and the broader information management 
practices o f LEAs.128 Even for those LEAs with strong record-keeping tendencies, it 
was expected that many concepts would be too specific. Further, responding to 
surveys is not the core responsibility o f LEAs. As such, only information which was 
readily available was requested. A number of LEAs indicated that they could dig
128 The outcome queries concentrated on those concepts commonly referred to by the FATF (Reuter 
and Truman’s “intermediate measures”). Certain concepts were not included, though not for lack of 
interest; these included queries on the use o f  production orders, arrests, and the number o f SARs 
received on the same subject. Fewer concepts were recorded with consents, as they are generally 
regarded as more quick-and-dirty than nonconsents and are often treated somewhat differently (several 
of the nonconsent concepts may have been applicable, however).
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through their records by hand to provide some of the information (but didn’t); this is 
discussed below. Table 7.2 sets forth the number of LEAs providing a numerical 
response—as opposed to saying not readily available— for each variable captured in 
the LEA survey on nonconsent and consent SARs (out of a total o f 49 LEAs). All 
things considered, however, a considerable—and discouraging—number of data 
points for both nonconsent and consent outcomes were classified by LEAs as not 
readily available.529 The most difficult variables to come by appear to be number of 
nonconsents relating to an existing recorded crime and number o f nonconsents 
resulting in a crime being recorded. These questions relate specifically to Home 
Office crime recording rules, and were suggested by one of the LEAs piloting the 
survey. It may be the case that these concepts are far too specific, or perhaps too 
complicated, for most LEAs with their very limited record-keeping abilities.130
129 In fact, 63.3 percent o f the total number o f nonconsent data points and 56.3 percent o f the total 
number o f consent data points in the survey were classified as not readily available by the 49 LEAs.
130 O f those LEAs providing limited or no information, the vast majority cited limited IT capacity, 
followed by lack o f  resources (particularly clerical support). Most LEAs use Word or spreadsheet 
applications to manage the SARs process in terms o f  tracking officers’ workloads (and sometimes the 
status o f initial checks), but no information is captured on outcomes (see page 158 for more on LEA IT 
solutions). A small number o f LEAs could not separate nonconsent and consent figures, as they used 
common IT approaches with no consent identifier. On a positive note, several LEAs had begun new 
record-keeping procedures (with new IT) in the last year; they could not provide statistics on outcomes 
yet, but hope to do so in the future. There already does seem to be an improvement in the 2004 data. 
This may be due to more managerial interest in financial investigation. It’s not that the outcomes data 
were impossible to assemble: for the LEAs with limited or no information on outcomes, most stated 
that the information was indeed available, just not in an easily obtainable format (though eight o f the 49 
LEAs indicated that the specific missing variables were really not known at all). Difficulty with 
outcomes information appears to have been expressed by the units whose remit is limited to 
intelligence development: as all packages are sent elsewhere in the organisation for action, these units 
are dependent on others (perhaps nationwide) for feedback. Six LEAs claimed that statistics were not 
readily available for any o f  the variables, including the number o f SARs received from NCIS for each 
year.
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Table 7.2. Annual Nonconsent and Consent Outcomes Metadata, 2003-2004
Variable
Number and percent o f  the 49 LEAs 
for which information was available
2003 2004
Nonconsent SARs
Total number o f  nonconsent SARs received 31 63.3% 36 73.5%
Number o f  nonconsents undergoing initial checks 30 61.2% 32 65.3%
Number o f  nonconsents investigated beyond initial checks 17 34.7% 22 44.9%
Number o f  nonconsents launching a proactive investigation 16 32.7% 18 36.7%
Number o f  nonconsents relating to an existing recorded crime 10 20.4% 14 28.6%
Number o f  nonconsents resulting in a crime being recorded 10 20.4% 13 26.5%
Number o f nonconsents contributing to a prosecution 13 26.5% 18 36.7%
Number o f  nonconsents contributing to a conviction 13 26.5% 15 30.6%
Number o f nonconsents contributing to a cash seizure 18 36.7% 21 42.9%
Number o f nonconsents contributing to a cash forfeiture 17 34.7% 19 38.8%
Number o f  nonconsents contributing to a restraint 15 30.6% 19 38.8%
Number o f  nonconsents contributing to a confiscation 13 26.5% 15 30.6%
Amount o f cash seized through nonconsents (GBP) 18 36.7% 19 38.8%
Amount o f  cash forfeited through nonconsents (GBP) 17 34.7% 18 36.7%
Amounts restrained through nonconsents (GBP) 14 28.6% 16 32.7%
Amounts confiscated through nonconsents (GBP) 13 26.5% 14 28.6%
Consents SARs
Total number o f  consent SARs received 24 49.0% 33 67.3%
Number o f  consents granted 21 42.9% 29 59.2%
Number o f  consents refused 23 46.9% 32 65.3%
Number o f  consents contributing to a prosecution 18 36.7% 26 53.1%
Number o f  consents contributing to a conviction 16 32.7% 24 49.0%
Number o f  consents contributing to a cash seizure 16 32.7% 26 53.1%
Number o f  consents contributing to a cash forfeiture 16 32.7% 23 46.9%
Number o f  consents contributing to a restraint 16 32.7% 23 46.9%
Number o f  consents contributing to a confiscation 16 32.7% 20 40.8%
Amount o f  cash seized through consents (GBP) 18 36.7% 24 49.0%
Amount o f  cash forfeited through consents (GBP) 16 32.7% 19 38.8%
Amounts restrained through consents (GBP) 18 36.7% 22 44.9%
Amounts confiscated through consents (GBP) 16 32.7% 22 44.9%
Source: Survey o f  LEAs. N -4 9  LEAs overall. Not a ll data points come from  the same LEAs. For example, an LEA may 
have stated that the number o f  nonconsent SARs received was not readily available, but may then have providedfigures 
fo r  the number o f nonconsents launching a proactive investigation (perhaps because this was zero, and was thus easily 
knowable). Fewer concepts were recorded with consents, as they are generally regarded as more quick-and-dirty than 
nonconsents and are often treated somewhat differently. Lastly, the Inland Revenue has powers others do not, including 
Hansard valuations and Avoidance (fraud work opened under IR code o f  Practice 8); these are not captured above, 
though SARs contribute to such work.
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LEAs were asked in the survey whether they could easily track the progress of 
a SAR from the date of receipt to eventual outcome, such as prosecutions/convictions. 
Forty of the 49 LEAs noted that they could easily track the progress of SARs to 
outcomes, yet this does not appear to be the case (somewhat surprisingly, the ability 
to easily track outcomes appears uncorrelated with the actual provision of outcomes 
statistics, above). It is difficult to imagine that there are LEAs which keep no 
management information whatsoever, not even the number o f SARs received from 
NCIS. This may all be suggestive of a disdain for record-keeping— a short-sighted 
position, given that it’s very difficult to argue for more resources (or to criticise facets 
of the regime) without proof of the problem. This may also be suggestive o f a lack of 
clerical resources and/or limited IT fluency (most LEAs who indicated they could 
track SARs from cradle to grave described some sort of IT solution; can these IT 
platforms really not provide aggregate statistics at all?).
7.3. Findings
So how do law enforcement agencies in the UK use and manage SARs? Do 
SARs appear under-utilised? How adequate are LEA statistics on use? Is feedback 
ever given? While recognising that the sections to some extent overlap, findings 
specific to the UK are presented in sections on the users of SARs; management of 
SARs (processes); uses of SARs (outcomes); feedback to NCI S/industry; and the 
system in flux.
Users o f SARs
The LEA SAR user community is broad. It comprises 50 primary user 
organisations: the 43 territorial police forces o f England and Wales; the Police Service 
of Northern Ireland (PSNI); the Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency (SDEA), which 
since end-2002 has been the SARs conduit for the eight Scottish territorial police 
forces and the SDEA itself; and a number of national LEAs, including the Department 
of Work and Pensions (DWP), Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise (HMCE), Inland 
Revenue (IR), National Crime Squad (NCS), and the National Terrorist Financial 
Investigation Unit (NTFIU). This research will focus on 49 primary users; much
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NTFIU use and management information is too sensitive for publication.131 For 
completeness, note that the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) employs SARs in its 
work, though generally by requesting them from NCIS. The Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) occasionally receives SARs relating to regulatory matters. NCIS 
itself is also a user of SARs: NCIS divisions may utilize SARs in other NCIS work 
(e.g. on drug trafficking), and the NCIS SFI uses SARs in tactical and strategic 
intelligence product development. Primary users are presented in Table 7.3, which 
illustrates SARs allocated and disseminated to the 49 LEAs in 2003 and 2004.132
131 Very little information on the work o f the NTFIU is available in the public domain, though see 
HMT (2002).
132 SARs are occasionally sent to the law enforcement or equivalent sections o f a number o f other 
organisations, including the British Transport Police, Department o f Trade and Industry, Ministry of 
Defence Police, and the Serious Fraud Office. The five Regional Asset Recovery Teams set up in 
England and Wales in 2003 and 2004 employ SARs through search requests, but do not otherwise 
actively receive SARs from NCIS. These organisations were not included in the research proper. 
SARs may also be sent to national financial intelligence units in foreign jurisdictions, usually at their 
behest.
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Table 7.3. Primary Users of SARs (with 2003-2004 Annual Allocations and
Disseminations)
2003 2004
LEA Allocations
Total
disseminations Allocations
Total
disseminations
Avon & Somerset 
Constabulary 1,337 527 1,867 204
Bedfordshire Police 866 280 1,389 120
Cambridgeshire Constabulary 735 303 1,159 165
Cheshire Constabulary 713 236 1,279 158
City o f  London Police 503 366 695 269
Cleveland Police 399 204 595 77
Cumbria Constabulary 317 165 392 82
Derbyshire Constabulaiy 706 324 1,043 110
Devon & Cornwall Constab. 971 439 1,597 161
Dorset Police 700 294 1,202 100
Durham Constabulary 376 151 510 90
DWP 330 103 889 1,147
Dyfed Powys Police 328 93 650 73
Essex Police 1,502 568 2,145 237
Gloucestershire Constabulary 403 232 582 78
Greater Manchester Police 3,078 1,070 5,050 520
Gwent Police 330 105 586 64
Hampshire Constabulary 1,508 505 2,156 195
Hertfordshire Constabulary 1,106 455 1,632 138
HMCE 13,357 28,663 6,398 10,573
Humberside Police 604 267 968 99
Inland Revenue 5,406 4,127 9,126 9,662
Kent Police 1,413 713 2,042 276
Lancashire Constabulary 1,658 599 2,756 302
Leicestershire Constabulary 1,136 579 1,681 203
Lincolnshire Police 363 162 643 124
Merseyside Police 1,154 1,003 1,789 260
Metropolitan Police Service 27,093 11,229 39,150 3,846
NCS 443 498 372 379
Norfolk Constabulary 586 231 925 131
North Wales Police 381 107 680 55
North Yorkshire Police 372 188 627 115
Northamptonshire Police 556 231 844 88
Northumbria Police 1,096 437 1,545 150
Nottinghamshire Police 1,057 441 1,519 145
PSNI 3,210 1,070 4,125 1,473
SDEA 3,369 2,216 4,472 751
South Wales Police 912 619 1,311 174
South Yorkshire Police 1,223 592 1,809 244
Staffordshire Police 829 296 1,287 159
Suffolk Constabulary 578 203 732 90
Surrey Police 2,068 550 3,151 263
Sussex Police 1,526 546 2,223 223
Thames Valley Police 2,843 983 4,666 326
Warwickshire Police 336 114 548 51
West Mercia Constabulary 1,017 293 1,653 185
West Midlands Police 3,862 1,595 5,985 666
West Yorkshire Police 2,489 951 3,709 398
Wiltshire Constabulary 532 175 979 70
Source: NCIS. Total disseminations include LEA-bound consents and SARs which have been copied to more than
one LEA (this explains why HMCE, fo r  example, has more SARs disseminated than were originally allocated). 
Total disseminations exclude SARs related to terrorism and various other sensitive issues; SARs destined fo r  
overseas jurisdictions; SARs sent out in bulk backlog-clearing exercises (see footnote 139); and SARs sent to NCIS 
units other than SFI. NTFIU allocations and disseminations are classified. SARs may also be allocated and 
disseminated to certain specialised users, who are not presented here. NCIS SFI is also a user o f  SARs. SARs are 
occasionally disseminated directly to various Scottish forces (as a result o f  specific search requests or flagged  
targets); these have been included with the SDEA figures.
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Unit types: Units which deal with SARs vary in size and composition. Three 
models prevail: 1) the FIU with shared SARs responsibility; 2) the ring-fenced SARs 
development unit within an FIU; 3) and the financial intelligence development unit 
(FIDU). FIUs are the traditional users of SARs.133 The FIU with shared SARs 
responsibility refers to the FIU found in many police forces which deals with all 
things POCA, including cash seizure, confiscation, and SARs. All staff deal with 
SARs as and when they can. Because SARs work is not protected, however, other 
FIU priorities (e.g. confiscations, cash seizures) may overwhelm the time available for 
SARs development. The upside o f the shared-responsibility approach is that staff 
evaluating/developing SARs can and do also carry out the investigation of certain 
SARs packages. The second approach, the ring-fenced SARs development unit 
model, refers to what is a subunit o f the FIU with a specific remit to deal with SARs 
(and financial intelligence development). SARs development may be handled by one 
FI (often a retired police officer rehired as a civilian accredited FI) or sometimes a 
researcher or clerk or indeed sometimes a team thereof. The benefit of this type of 
unit is that resources are fully devoted to evaluating and subsequently developing 
SARs into intelligence packages for use by the wider FIU or to be sent to tasking and 
coordinating to become full-blown investigations. The workload o f this unit-within- 
a-unit model typically is restricted only to information evaluation/intelligence 
development; no investigation is carried out. Despite the name, staff are not always 
ring-fenced, and may occasionally be called to perform other duties, but the concept is 
one o f a separation o f responsibilities. The last model is the FIDU, which is 
responsible solely for evaluating information and developing intelligence packages 
(not investigating), like the ring-fenced model, but is larger—and independent of the 
FIU. FIDUs are typically found in larger LEAs, like the MPS and SDEA. FIDU 
work is to some extent more analytically advanced than with the smaller ring-fenced 
model. Not surprisingly, there is some limited evidence which suggests that the 
FIDU/ring-fenced models are more efficient than the shared-responsibility model, as
133 Several police LEAs have Economic Crime Units, which for all intents and purposes resemble FIUs 
(these Economic Crime Units may house FIUs and Fraud Squads). For the purposes o f this chapter, 
Economic Crime Units will be considered as FIUs. Also, for two national LEAs, SARs are initially 
sent to a central unit simply as a point o f receipt, from which SARs are sent to FIUs in the appropriate 
regional offices for evaluation/development/investigation. These organisations have been classified as 
using the FIU with shared SARs responsibility model.
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SARs cannot simply fall through the cracks (Hicks, 2003). Twenty-eight LEAs 
appear to employ the shared-responsibility model; 18 LEAs use the ring-fenced 
approach; and three LEAs have FI DU s.
Resource levels: The 49 LEAs were asked about the overall levels o f full-time 
equivalent (FTE) staffing o f their units, and the number o f FTE staff dedicated to 
SARs duties (i.e. evaluation/development, not investigation, which will happen with a 
wider community o f staff LEA-wide). LEAs identified a total of 520.5 overall FTE 
staff, o f which 80 were dedicated to SARs. The overall figure is a lower-bound 
estimate of the number o f overall staff, as two LEAs provided no information in this 
regard (one o f which is a national organisation with at least 50 relevant staff); several 
LEAs also have staff in the field (outside of headquarters units or, in the case of the 
SDEA, in the Scottish territorial forces) who will perform relevant duties. Similarly, 
the latter figure on SARs-dedicated staff is itself an underestimate. As noted above, 
most LEAs employ the shared-responsibility approach to dealing with SARs. Sadly, 
no indication was given concerning the percentage of overall staff dedicated to SARs- 
related activities. Assuming 15 percent of work-time is dedicated to SARs in these 
units (as does KMPG (2003), guided by HMCE), this implies that the total level o f 
SARs-dedicated staff is 119 nationwide (80 from above + 39 from the shared- 
responsibility un its)134 Assuming 25 percent of work-time is dedicated to SARs 
(which may have been the case prior to the June 2004 slowdown of nonconsent 
dissemination), this implies that the total level o f SARs-dedicated staff nationwide is 
145. All o f this is relatively consistent with KPMG (2003), which identified some 
500 overall staff and 157 SARs-dedicated staff nationwide.
That said, ARA maintains statistics on the number of course attendees for its 
courses (though it has no firm count o f the number of FIs performing FI duties, as 
some may have been trained but then relocated to other tasks). As at December 2004, 
these included 762 for the initial FI course; 348 for the confiscation course; and 151 
for the money laundering course. Undoubtedly there is overlap between the 
attendees, but this is certainly suggestive o f at least 762 FIs nationwide, a good 
number o f whom will deal with SARs. Further, NCIS has trained approximately 250
134 Gold and Levi (1994) also suggest that FIs spend roughly 15 percent o f their time on SARs.
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LEA personnel on use o f the Elmer database to support the rollout. Many o f these 
250 also hold the responsibility o f  further training personnel back in their LEAs, 
suggesting that the these estimates o f FTE SARs-dedicated personnel may be low
Resource levels remain little changed since 2002 (10 LEAs identified SARs- 
specific increases o f 19 staff—though eight LEAs provided no information in this 
regard). This is particularly disappointing considering the 176 percent growth in 
SARs reporting by the regulated sector between 2002 and 2004 (though there was 
little associated growth in dissemination from NCIS). In the event, a small number of 
LEAs hired staff in 2004 specifically to deal with SARs. Because NCIS significantly 
reduced the dissemination o f nonconsent SARs in June 2004 (with no consultation 
with LEAs), some of these new staff were subsequently pulled to other duties.135 
These few LEAs hope that they will be able to pull the new staff back to SARs-related 
work when Elmer is rolled out. Many LEAs noted that they intend in the future to 
hire new personnel to deal with Elmer, who are not included here.
FIB v. FIU: Lastly, an ACPO position has emerged from the ACPO Proceeds 
o f Crime Working Group concerning the responsibility for SARs and the Elmer 
database when rolled out to police forces (this is not relevant for non-police agencies, 
o f course). Though the policy appears not to be set in stone, forces are encouraged to 
give much responsibility on SARs, through Elmer, to force intelligence bureaux 
(FIBs). The idea is that SARs will be mainstreamed by giving Elmer to FIBs, who 
should have a finger on the broader pulse o f criminality in the area than FIUs—and 
who may thus make broader use o f SARs. An informal survey of FIBs conducted on 
behalf o f the author by the ACPO Lead on Intelligence Issues suggests that FIBs are 
not necessarily opposed to the concept, though with certain caveats. FIBs did feel that 
access to Elmer would be o f use. But FIBs didn’t seem to want sole responsibility for 
SARs (comments suggested that resource constraints would prevent FIBs from 
evaluating SARs upon receipt).136 So if both FIBs and FIUs will be dealing with 
SARs, it is critical that steps are taken to prevent any duplication o f effort.
135 These few LEAs could have tasked new staff to more proactively/aggressively engage with NCIS 
on SARs-related work; it’s unclear why this didn’t happen.
136 And FIBs would presumably have no interest in becoming involved with the consent process.
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Conversations with the current police users of SARs suggest opposition to the FIB 
policy. This is likely in part due to a parochial desire to protect FIU turf—but certain 
issues deserve consideration. There seems to be some fear that broadening the user 
base to FIBs might be a threat to quality control: will FIB personnel recognise the 
often complex varieties of financial crime (like certain frauds)? More importantly, 
there is a worry that FIB personnel won’t follow through on the critical issues 
surrounding the confidentiality o f SARs (including consistent application for Public 
Interest Immunity). And most FIUs already coordinate to some extent with FIBs: 
more than 90 percent of the LEAs appear to log some or all SARs received on force 
intelligence systems. While an excellent step toward the mainstreaming of 
SARs/Elmer, the FIB policy needs further consideration/modification with input from 
both FIs and intelligence officers.
Management o f SARs (Processes)
What, then, happens to SARs upon receipt by the LEAs? As noted in Chapter 
III, SARs may be evaluated upon receipt (and subsequently developed/investigated if 
appropriate); SARs may also be subjected to deeper interrogation/analysis of the who 
are the most prolific offenders sort. On the former—which seems to be the approach 
employed by most LEAs— SARs are dealt with in three main stages: information 
evaluation, intelligence development, and investigation (see pages 135-140 for 
background information on the progression o f SARs from information to intelligence 
to outcomes; note that the three stages are an heuristic device of the author, and are 
not necessarily referred to by name by LEAs in their daily work). Not surprisingly, 
workflow is fairly uniform across LEAs, though the depth o f work varies, as does the 
percentage of SARs subject to various stages of the process. The nonconsent process 
is described first, followed by consents.
Nonconsent process: Upon receipt, SARs are typically logged onto the unit’s 
internal database and thus begins information evaluation. The information evaluation 
stage is used to separate wheat from chaff. This is done through basic database 
checks and a reading of the SAR itself (particularly the reason for suspicion). The 
majority (nearly 75 percent) of the LEAs reported that all SARs received undergo 
initial database checks. Databases checked commonly include PNC and other 
national sources of information (e.g. Companies House, Land Registry) as well as
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local intelligence systems, including that of the unit itself (with previously received 
SARs).137 LEAs stated that SARs received on known nominals, relating to ongoing 
investigations, or with other positive database hits are generally progressed to 
intelligence development. SARs without any hits are typically retained for 
intelligence only (feedback will often be sent to NCIS at this point).138 A few LEAs 
specifically noted that the text of the SARs themselves would be sufficient to generate 
further activity. Several LEAs reported that they simply did not have the resources to 
give SARs much more than a cursory read, if that— let alone carry out database 
checks. Similarly, a few others noted that everything was dependent on the daily 
workload: a heavy workload on the day of receipt implied few SARs were evaluated 
(this seemed to be the norm for these LEAs). Those LEAs who don’t subject SARs to 
any initial checks (evaluation) will clearly miss SARs received on current targets (i.e. 
subjects of ongoing investigations) and perhaps imminent criminal activity. The 
rollout of Elmer will have implications for information evaluation; this is discussed is 
greater detail below (see page 173). In short, LEAs will need to find methods of 
evaluating SARs which don’t command undue levels o f resources; Phase II o f the 
Elmer rollout will likely go some way to alleviating resource issues with advanced 
analytical capabilities.
The SARs which through information evaluation warrant further work are 
developed into intelligence packages. The intelligence development stage o f the 
process includes firmer identification o f SAR subjects and associates, banks accounts, 
assets held, and the source o f funds (and analysis thereof). Reporting institutions are 
usually contacted (or may have been contacted in information evaluation, above).
Any SARs relating to ongoing investigations are typically forwarded to the relevant 
unit within the LEA. LEAs noted that priority is often given in this stage to 
developing packages relating to current performance indicators, mostly confiscations 
and cash seizures, or larger force/national priorities. A small number of LEAs 
reported using systems/checklists/matrices to prioritise those SARs for
137 National LEAs— particularly HMCE and Inland Revenue— appear to have broader sources o f  
information at their disposal.
138 SARs retained for intelligence only include SARs received with no apparent suspicion.
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evaluation/intelligence development based on set criteria. Such prioritisation systems 
will presumably be a necessity with the rollout of Elmer.
Intelligence development ends at the need for evidence gathering— where 
investigation begins—through various court orders and the like. Intelligence 
packages which require proactive investigation are sent to NIM tasking and 
coordinating for potential assignment to operational teams (surveillance teams, 
serious and organised crime teams, drugs teams, etc.). Intelligence packages for 
money laundering teams—packages put together by these same teams— seem to be 
handled in the FIU without going to the broader tasking and coordinating forum. 
SARs-based work vies for resources with other work brought to tasking and 
coordinating. The majority o f LEAs suggested that less than ten percent o f jobs (i.e. 
cases) in their units based on SARs required allocation to operational teams/outside 
units. This seems low; there are some indications that the question was understood to 
read what percentage of jobs are actually assigned to (i.e. taken on by) operational 
teams, not what percent would need operational assistance.
Consent process: The consent process is slightly different. NCIS will have 
carried out some initial checks on national databases by the time a consent is sent to 
LEAs; the LEAs will typically run local database checks (e.g. local force intelligence 
databases). Consent will then be either granted or denied, depending on the results of 
checks. In some cases, consent will be granted to tee off a proactive cash seizure. 
Most LEAs (nearly 85 percent o f the 49) reported that they prioritise consents over 
nonconsents, and LEAs appear to believe that consents must all be acted upon. This 
is in contrast to comments received by NCIS which suggest that LEAs have the 
choice to work on consents or not; they can either give immediate consent or let seven 
working days pass with no action (in which case consent is assumed). The choice 
would fall with the LEA, presumably driven by resource constraints. And on resource 
constraints: LEAs were asked what percentage of the unit’s resources were consumed 
dealing with consents. Nearly 90 percent of the 49 LEAs stated that consents 
consume 20 percent or less of the unit’s resources. O f course, many LEAs will have 
considerable amounts o f other work to do (particularly those units employing the FIU 
with shared SARs responsibility model), so this percentage may be sufficiently high
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to be disruptive. This number may be less meaningful given the June 2004 reduction 
in nonconsent SARs, as LEAs may have more available time to action consents.
Interrogating the information/intelligence: One thing is to evaluate/develop 
SARs as received; another is to interrogate the information/intelligence. In the 
absence of access to Elmer (i.e. prior to rollout), interrogation occurs by turning to 
internal LEA databases which house information on those SARs disseminated by 
NCIS to the LEA and/or by sending search requests to NCIS to search Elmer in its 
entirety. And two main types of interrogation exist: 1) questions on known targets, 
like does this current operational target have any SARs filed against him/her?; and 2) 
questions which let the data speak for themselves, like who is the most-disclosed upon 
individual in the boundaries of the LEA?. LEAs were asked the following question: 
for those investigations which have not been launched by the receipt of one or more 
SARs, do you ever turn to SARs (i.e. your SARs database or files, or force 
intelligence if  SARs are loaded there) as a source of information/intelligence? Nearly 
90 percent of LEAs reported that they would turn to SARs in this manner. But there 
was only limited evidence of LEAs using SARs for advanced analytical work, and 
very few LEAs appear to interrogate SARs with the who is the most-disclosed upon 
type of questions. LEAs do not yet seem to have tuned in to this analytical approach. 
On search requests: the 49 LEAs filed 1,418 search requests in 2003 and 2,210 in 
2004, for a total o f 3,628 search requests filed in the two years together (the vast 
majority o f which were filed by HMCE, Inland Revenue, and the MPS). It is difficult 
to say if  this represents an under- or over-reliance on the search request mechanism. 
There was a noticeable increase of search requests filed as a percentage o f SARs 
disseminated to the 49 LEAs beginning in June of 2004, at which point NCIS reduced 
the number o f  nonconsent SARs disseminated for action. Interestingly, this seems to 
be the result o f a decrease in disseminations, not an increase in search requests (one 
would have imagined an increase in search requests to compensate for the reduction 
in disseminated nonconsent SARs). A number of LEAs suggested that because the 
search request process was laborious and too time-consuming, it was little-used. 
Clearly, the rollout of Elmer will greatly assist in information/intelligence 
interrogation and largely obviate the need for search requests.
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Automation: Perhaps not surprisingly (though disappointing nonetheless), 
only four LEAs reported that any part o f the information evaluation/intelligence 
development process is automated. Automation in this case refers to automated 
database checks (i.e. checking one or more names or addresses against multiple 
databases at once). While allowing for automation likely has significant up-front 
costs, it also likely has considerable savings through massive efficiency gains on the 
back-end. It seems legitimate that at least national database checks should be 
automated, such as PNC and HMCE’s Cedric/Centaur (KPMG called for this in its 
2003 report). Hits could be highlighted in Elmer when rolled out (though this would 
take some time, perhaps several years, to develop). This reinforces calls made in 
Bichard (2004) for national IT development along the lines of Scotland (with its 
Scottish Intelligence Database; the SDEA was one o f the respondents noting 
automation in its SARs processes.
Information Technology: The IT approaches used by most LEAs to manage 
SARs are extremely limited. The majority of LEAs employ Microsoft Word and/or 
Microsoft Excel to track allocation o f a received SAR to the responsible staff member 
(who will evaluate the information). A limited number o f LEAs use true case 
management systems. Alternatively, a very small number o f LEAs do little but print 
and file hardcopies. Elmer will not be o f much use in terms of work-load/case 
management, as Elmer is not a case management system. There may be a need for a 
standard case management approach for SARs (and broader LEA work). LEAs were 
also asked if  they could easily cross-reference a SAR against other SARs with their 
current systems/approaches. More than 80 percent responded in the affirmative. But 
it seems very unlikely that those LEAs using Word/Excel/hardcopies are maximising 
the investigative benefits o f SARs, as it appears improbable that SARs can be 
efficiently interrogated/analysed in this fashion.
Force intelligence: The vast majority o f LEAs indicated that SARs are 
entered on wider force intelligence systems (national systems for the national LEAs). 
Just under two-thirds of the 49 LEAs log only those SARs which undergo intelligence 
development (i.e. those clearing the information evaluation hurdle) on force 
intelligence systems. As noted, these will include SARs relating to known nominals, 
to ongoing investigations, or with other positive database hits. Nearly one-third of
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LEAs appear to log all SARs received. To protect the confidentiality of the 
information, most LEAs only place interest markers on force intelligence systems. 
These inform other LEA staff only that intelligence is held on the individual in 
question; interested parties must contact the FIU/FIDU for further information. While 
unconfirmed, there do seem to be a few examples of complete unsanitised SARs 
being placed on force intelligence systems. Once on FIB systems, these SARs may 
have been used without the knowledge (and associated feedback) of the initial SARs 
recipient. On the impact of the Elmer rollout: while having Elmer in FIBs will clearly 
increase SARs’ contribution to force intelligence work, in the absence o f truly 
interconnected IT systems, FIBs may still wish to somehow (e.g. subject names) load 
SARs onto FIB systems to allow for bulk searching and cross-checking.
Guidance/training/advice: LEAs receive only limited guidance from external 
sources on SARs processes and procedures. NCIS provides guidance on the 
confidentiality and sensitivity of SARs in both its training for the Elmer rollout and in 
work released through ACPO (this subject is o f critical importance). ARA, which has 
the statutory responsibility under POCA for the training and accreditation o f financial 
investigators, discusses SARs— though not in great detail— in its training courses for 
FIs (advanced courses, like the money laundering course, go into far greater depth). 
LEAs were asked about guidance; most reported that they received little or no 
guidance/training/advice. This seems to imply that existing NCIS/ACPO/ARA input 
is insufficient. A fair number of LEAs suggested that they would like more in-depth 
guidance on how to get the most out of SARs, including with turning confidential 
information into usable intelligence, data mining, best practice, and minimum work 
required. Several LEAs noted an obvious but oft-forgotten point that due to resource 
limitations, training must be very relevant to daily lives. Several LEAs expressed the 
desire for guidance to be handed down from ACPO and/or the Home Office on what 
exactly they should be doing with SARs and how SARs should be used. Additional 
comments received suggested that LEA staff were not sufficiently prepared for 
consent and all that that civil decision implies (though they now appear to have things 
under control).
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Uses o f SARs (Outcomes)
O f the 249,244 SARs received in 2003 and 2004, 101,567 (40.8 percent) were 
disseminated to the 49 primary LEA users for action. These include LEA-bound 
consents and SARs which have been copied to (i.e. sent to) more than one LEA, 
perhaps because it was unclear i f  a SAR related to one location or another, or one type 
o f criminality or another. These exclude, however, SARs related to terrorism and 
various other sensitive issues; SARs destined for overseas jurisdictions; SARs sent 
out in bulk backlog-clearing exercises (like the 2003 KPMG recommendation to clear 
the 2002/2003 backlog of SARs by sending them to LEAs on CD-ROMs); and SARs 
sent to NCIS units other than SFI.139 O f the 101,567 SARs disseminated to the 49 
primary users in 2003-2004, some 72,375 SARs were original disseminations (71.3 
percent of the 101,567—which represents some 29 percent of the SARs received by 
NCIS in 2004-2004), while 29,192 SARs were copied-to disseminations (29.7 percent 
o f the 101,567— which represents some 12 percent of the SARs received by NCIS in 
2003-2004; see Table 7.4, see also Table 7.3, page 148, for information on allocations 
and disseminations of SARs by LEA). The majority of copied-to disseminations were 
sent to HMCE, MPS, and Inland Revenue (representing some 55.3, 14.3, and 11.4 
percent of 2003-2004 copied-to disseminations, respectively).
139 CD-ROMs were sent to LEAs in the KMPG backlog-clearing exercise. Further, after the June 2004 
reduction o f nonconsent disseminations, three LEAs— Cheshire Constabulary, Merseyside Police, and 
the MPS— took NCIS up on its offer to send semi-regular CDs containing those nonconsent SARs 
relevant to LEAs (curiously, other LEAs did not request this o f  NCIS). SARs sent out in this manner 
were not included in the statistics provided to the author by NCIS on SARs disseminations. Ignoring 
these particular SARs might render certain calculations inaccurate. But there are mitigating factors 
which suggest that this is less o f  a worry—at least with calculations. Not all LEAs even opened the 
KPMG CD. Some did not for resource reasons, or were simply uninterested (sadly); others could not, 
reporting that the CDs were provided in a computing format that was incompatible with their systems. 
And on the subject o f  the CDs sent to the three LEAs after June 2004, it appears that some o f  the 
information was sent to these LEAs not in calendar year 2004, but in 2005. Along these lines, the 
number o f  total SARs disseminated to the 49 LEAs in 2003 is probably more on the order o f 80,000- 
100,000 (some o f  which will have been 2002 SARs), with 40,000-45,000 SARs disseminated in 2004. 
Because this could not be validated, calculations involving total disseminations will slightly over- or 
under-estimate the true situation (depending on the type o f calculation). This is only an issue with 
tables/figures specifically drawing on NCIS-provided disseminations, not the information from LEAs.
158
Chapter 7. Law Enforcement Agency Use o f SARs
Table 7.4. Annual Receipts and Disseminations o f SARs by NCIS to LEAs, 2003-
2004
Variable 2003 2004 Total
SARs received by NCIS 94,708 154,536 249,244
SARs allocated to the 49 primary users 91 f i l l 133,133 230,810
Total SARs disseminated to the 49 primary users 66,098 35,469 101,567
Original disseminations 45,129 27,246 72,375
Copied-to disseminations 20,969 8,223 29,192
Source: NCIS. Disseminations exclude SARs related to terrorism and various other sensitive issues; 
SARs destined fo r  overseas jurisdictions; SARs sent out in bulk backlog-clearing exercises (see 
footnote 139); and SARs sent to NCIS units other than SFI. The figure for 2003 allocations is slightly 
larger than the 2003 SARs received by NCIS; NCIS theorises that this is due to backlogged SARs being 
entered since the 2003 receipt figure was published. The figure fo r  2004 allocations slightly under­
represents the number allocated to the 49 primary users, likely because while recorded as received, a 
backlog o f  SARs had not been entered into the system (and could not thus be automatically allocated to 
an LEA). SARs allocated to the 49 LEAs should not equal SARs received, though; some SARs will 
“belong ” to LEAs other than these 49.
Outcomes— Q uantitative data: So how were the SARs used in the fight 
against crime? Quantitative and qualitative data are used to triangulate findings. So 
how were the disseminated SARs used by the LEAs? Several important caveats must 
be considered when interpreting these data. First of all, many LEAs provided little or 
no data, so the results do not represent the situation in its entirety; these figures clearly 
underestimate the true SARs-related outcomes. Critically, a number of LEAs 
providing no data on certain variables discussed examples of SARs-related successes 
o f often considerable magnitude. A number of LEAs do appear to be doing good and 
often excellent work with SARs, at least according to one-off examples given to the 
author or anecdotal information and the perceptions o f various respected people 
within the regime. Some examples are contained in Appendix 1; others are of interest 
but remain sub judice  (and out o f the public domain); and still others are of interest 
but relate to cases in which the use o f one or more SARs has not been made public. 
Regardless, not all data points here come from the same LEAs. For example, an LEA 
may have stated that the number of nonconsent SARs received was not readily 
available, but may then have provided figures for the number of nonconsents 
launching a proactive investigation (perhaps because this was zero, and was thus 
easily knowable). Many LEAs provided information on seizures, but could not 
provide information on forfeitures (the same goes for prosecutions/convictions and for 
restraints/confiscations—though funds need not be restrained prior to confiscation). 
Internal consistency is sometimes lacking: for example, for several LEAs, the number
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of consents granted plus consents refused does not add up to the number of consents 
received- On external consistency, some LEAs reported receiving more SARs than 
NCIS reported disseminating to them, though this is very likely explained by search 
requests and bulk disseminations. Data were not validated. In any case, figures 
received may not be representative of the broader population o f all 49 LEAs.
Furthermore, as noted above, there are no perfect measures of outcomes (see 
pages 141-142). To reiterate, when interpreting the outcomes figures it is important 
to consider the following: uses of SARs are not mutually exclusive; many SARs 
together will be used to illustrate the pattern of offending of a lone individual; many 
SARs will be received relating to people already under investigation; and outcomes 
measures cannot illustrate the extent o f the deterrent effect of the regime. No 
allowances have been made here for time: SARs disseminated in one period may be 
put to use several months or even years later. Because there is only limited 
understanding of the extent to which this occurs, it seems prudent to simply 
present/compare 2003 outcomes with 2003 disseminations and 2004 outcomes with 
2004 disseminations.
What do these data imply when viewed in their totality, as in Table 7.5? The 
problem is that they may not imply much in this aggregate format—at least not in 
illustrating the attrition o f SARs from receipt to outcomes—because so many 
different concepts contain data provided by different LEAs. Comparisons drawn here 
are suggestive o f comparisons between apples and oranges (i.e. they’re meaningless). 
The safest points to discuss may concern the amounts recovered through nonconsents 
and consents. There are still more responding LEAs on certain variables than others, 
but these data do seem to suggest that perhaps consent SARs are more efficient than 
nonconsents in terms of asset recovery. A number of LEAs currently hold a very 
favourable view o f consents, and see them having the greatest impact. This should 
come as no surprise: consents represent current information on pending money 
movements. These LEAs discussed some high-profile uses of consents, some of 
which are not captured in the data. O f course, as with everything here, one or two 
spectacular cash seizures or confiscations can skew the results dramatically.
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Table 7.5. Annual Nonconsent and Consent Outcomes, 2003-2004
2003 2004
Variable N Sum Mean N Sunt Mean
Nonconsent SA Rs
Number o f nonconscnt SARs received 31 36,372 1,173.3 36 32,567 904.6
Number o f nonconsents undergoing in itia l checks 30 19,414 647.1 32 20,155 629.8
No. o f nonconsents inv estig a ted  beyond  in itia l checks 17 7,951 467.7 22 8,855 402.5
No. of nonconscnts lau n ch in g  a p ro ac tiv e  investigation 16 297 18.6 18 774 43.0
No. o f nonensnts re la tin g  to  an  ex isting  re co rd ed  c rim e 10 29 2.9 14 402 28.7
No. o f nonconscnts re su ltin g  in a  c rim e  be ing  re c o rd e d 10 26 2.6 13 31 2.4
Number o f nonconscnts contributing to a pro secu tio n 13 57 4.4 18 229 12.7
Number o f nonconscnts contributing to a conviction 13 26 2.0 15 28 1.9
Number o f nonconscnts contributing to a cash  se izu re 18 33 1.8 21 32 1.5
Number o f nonconscnts contributing to a cash  fo rfe itu re 17 30 1.8 19 26 1.4
Number of nonconscnts contributing to a re s tra in t 15 29 1.9 19 31 1.6
Number o f nonconscnts contributing to a confisca tion 13 28 2.2 15 30 2.0
Amount o f cash seized through nonconscnts (GBP) 18 £435,445 £24,191 19 £106,145 £5,587
Amount o f cash fo rfe ited  through nonconsents (GBP) 17 £215,145 £12,656 18 £28,145 £1,564
Amounts re s tra in e d  through nonconscnts (GBP) 14 £4,760,000 £340,000 16 £4,561,000 £285,063
Amounts con fisca ted  through nonconsents (GBP) 13 £182,000 £14,000 14 £- £-
Consents SA Rs
Number o f consent SARs received 24 3,457 144.0 33 4,854 147.1
Number o f consents g ra n te d 21 2,162 103.0 29 3,467 119.6
Number of consents re fu sed 23 84 3.7 32 416 13.0
Number o f consents contributing to a p ro secu tio n 18 I 0.1 26 16 0.6
Number o f consents contributing to a conviction 16 - - 24 8 0.3
Number o f  consents contributing to a cash  se izu re 16 3 0.2 26 17 0.7
Number o f consents contributing to a cash  fo rfe itu re 16 3 0.2 23 2 0.1
Number o f consents contributing to a re s tra in t 16 4 0.3 23 26 1.1
Number o f consents contributing to a confiscation 16 1 0.1 20 6 0.3
Amount o f cash seized through consents (GBP) 18 £5,931,247 £329,514 24 £1,734,586 £72,274
Amount o f cash fo rfe ited  through consents (GBP) 16 £20,000 £1,250 19 £30,000 £1,579
Amounts re s tra in e d  through consents (GBP) 18 £4,690,000 £260,556 22 £15,575,900 £707,995
Amounts co n fisca ted  through consents (GBP) 16 £35,000 £2,188 22 £4,808,801 £218,582
Source: Survey o f  LEAs. The N columns provide variable-specific numbers o f  respondents (out o f  49 total respondents). 
Figures should be interpreted with great care: not alt LEAs provided quantitative data, and not all data points come 
from  the same LEAs. For example, an LEA may have stated that the number o f nonconsent SARs received was not 
readily available, but may then have providedfigures fo r  the number o f nonconsents launching a proactive investigation 
(perhaps because this was zero, and was thus easily knowable). Moreover, many LEAs provided information on seizures, 
but could not provide information on forfeitures (the same goes fo r  prosecutions/convictions and fo r  
restraints/confiscations—though funds need not be restrained prior to confiscation). Fewer concepts were recorded with 
consents, as they are generally regarded as more quick-and-dirty than nonconsents and are often treated somewhat 
differently. Lastly, the Inland Revenue has powers others do not, including Hansard valuations and Avoidance (fraud 
work opened under IR code o f  Practice 8); these are not captured above, though SARs contribute to such work. Data were 
not validated.
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Things become somewhat clearer and less tentative, however, when looking 
only at those LEAs who provided data for all of the major concepts (allowing like- 
with-like comparisons, notably those relating to receipts and outcomes). These 
findings may certainly not be representative of the broader population of 49 LEAs, 
but at least the contribution o f SARs to various outcomes can more or less be 
followed. Unfortunately, only seven LEAs— all smaller territorial police forces from 
England & Wales— provided data on all o f the outcomes captured in the survey. 
Further, there is some evidence o f double counting within recovery figures, which 
could not be confirmed. Total values for concepts like number of SARs relating to a 
prosecution and/or cash seizure and/or restraint (for nonconsents + consents) are very 
low (at six, zero, and two, respectively, all from 845 SARs received; not shown).
Along these analytical lines, Table 7.6 presents information on nonconsent 
investigative processes for the 14 LEAs (comprising territorial police and two 
national LEAs) who provide figures for all o f the relevant variables (though this is not 
to suggest that a one-by-one approach to SARs development is the best use of 
resources; there is indeed a place for deeper information interrogation). While likely 
not necessarily representative o f the larger population o f the 49 LEAs, it is interesting 
to follow the attrition o f SARs through the process. The vast majority of SARs 
appear to undergo initial checks (i.e. information evaluation). A smaller percentage 
of the SARs received is investigated beyond initial checks (i.e. intelligence 
development). And a considerably smaller percentage o f SARs received launch a 
proactive investigation (though this has nothing to do with those SARs relating to 
ongoing investigations). These percentages are captured in two different ways: in 
aggregate percentages (such that nonconsent SARs undergoing initial checks as a 
percentage o f SARs received in the overall column equals 10,794/12,016; and in the 
LEA mean column, the percentage is first calculated by LEA, and then the mean 
percentage is taken). Either way, and bearing in mind all of the caveats on 
information interpretation, nonconsent SARs launching a proactive investigation as a 
percentage o f nonconsents received seems fairly low. This should come as no 
surprise: many LEAs appear to only work-up SARs relating to ongoing investigations, 
so few resources seem to be used in developing proactive cases.
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Table 6. Annual Nonconsent Investigative Processes for 14 LEAs, 2004
Variable
Number o f  
SARs (Total for  
the 14 LEAs)
As a percentage 
o f  SARs 
received 
(overall)
As a percentage 
o f  SARs 
received 
(LEA mean)
Nonconsent SARs allocated 27,185
Nonconsent SARs disseminated 12,788
Nonconsent SARs received 12,016 100.0% 100.0%
Nonconsent SARs undergoing initial checks 10,794 89.8% 92.0%
Nonconsents investigated beyond initial checks 8,030 66.8% 25.7%
Nonconsents launching a proactive investigation 763 6.3% 6.7%
Sources: NCIS (for allocations and disseminations); and survey o f  LEAs. N~ 14 LEAs (who provide figures 
fo r  all o f  the data points). The 14 LEAs include territorial police and two national LEAs. Nonconsent SARs 
undergoing initial checks as a percentage o f  SARs received in the overall column is computed as 
10,794/12,016; and in the LEA mean column, the percentage is first calculated by LEA, and then the mean 
percentage is taken.
A separate analysis was undertaken to explore the percentage of overall 2004 
cash seizures and confiscations which relate to SARs, as reported by 12 and 11 LEAs 
(all territorial police forces) responding to cash seizure and confiscation queries, 
respectively (see Table 7.7). Again, these findings may in no way be generalisable to 
the broader population o f 49 LEAs. On average, 1.6 percent of cash seizures and 3.5 
percent of confiscations appear to be SARs-related, at least for these 12 and 11 LEAs.
The maximum percentages are 11.5 percent and 38.6 percent for SARs-related cash 
seizures and confiscations, respectively. Perhaps these are more indicative of the 
levels that could be expected with more zealous use of SARs. Two data points were 
excluded from the cash seizure and confiscation comparisons (one from each), as they 
related to SARs-related activity o f greater than 100 percent—an impossibility. Note 
that 2004 confiscation data are for the 2004/05 fiscal year; these data are used as 
proxies for the calendar year data. Further, only 10 months o f data have been used 
(April 2004-January 2005). The point is not to establish exactly the percentage of 
each relating to SARs, but rather just to get an indication of the scale.
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Table 7.7. Annual SARs-Related Cash Seizures and Confiscations as a Percentage of 
Cash Seizures and Confiscations, 2004
Variable
N
(LEAs) Minimum Maximum Mean
SttL
Deviation
SARs-related cash seizures as a percentage 
of cash seizures by LEA
12 0.0% 11.5% 1.63% 3.5048
SARs-related confiscations as a percentage 
of confiscations by LEA
11 0.0% 38.6% 3.51% 11.6529
Sources: Survey o f  LEAs; and JARD (provided by the Home Office). Overall cash seizure data relate 
only to LEAs in England & Wales. Overall confiscation data relate to LEAs in England & Wales and 
PSNI. Confiscation data are fo r  the 2004/05fiscal year, and include only April 2004-January 2005); 
they are used as a proxy fo r  the 2004 calendar year data. The LEAs include territorial police.
That so few LEAs provided data on certain specific concepts certainly implies 
that more than half of the LEAs are not represented in much of the debate. It is very 
possible that these LEAs would change the thrust of the story—and some LEAs 
appear to be doing good work with SARs. But bearing in mind the limitations on data 
interpretation, some tentative conclusions may be drawn. The over-arching and 
unsurprising conclusion is that for those few LEAs providing data, SARs appear to be 
considerably under-utilised. SARs deter some money laundering—but it is not the 
case that all offenders engaging in money laundering activity are or will ever be 
completely deterred by the SARs regime. As such, SARs should indeed lead to 
criminal justice outcomes. It is likely difficult to know good performance when one 
sees it: there is a theoretical maximum on the number/percentage of SARs 
contributing to X or Y criminal justice outcome, o f course, because many SARs will 
relate to innocent people, many to people not worth pursuing, and many to the same 
individuals (who may fall in the innocent/not worth it categories). So it may be the 
case that excellent performance on, say, SARs launching proactive investigations as a 
percentage of SARs received is 40 or 50 percent or even (far) less. But that doesn’t 
imply that it should be too difficult to know weak performance when one sees it. And 
look: for the 14 LEAs providing data (from Table 7.6), nonconsent SARs launching a 
proactive investigation represent only some six or seven percent of nonconsents 
received? For the 11 LEAs providing data (from Table 7.7), the mean percentage of 
SARs-related confiscations as a percentage o f confiscations by LEAs is 3.5 percent? 
For the 26 LEAs providing 2004 data (from Table 7.5), only 17 consent SARs 
contributed to a cash seizure? For the 15 LEAs providing 2004 data (again from
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Table 5), only 30 nonconsent SARs contributed to a confiscation? Even bearing in 
mind all o f the relevant caveats, these figures seem suboptimal.
O f course, it could be the case that the SARs examined by the handful of 
LEAs providing data (and specifically for those providing data for Tables 7.6 and 7.7) 
showed little promise. That is, perhaps it’s not that SARs were under-utilised, but 
rather that the SARs were largely unrelated to crime. But analyses of SARs targeting 
by the reporting sector suggest otherwise (see the previous chapter and Fleming, 
2005).
Outcomes— Qualitative data: The outcomes data provided to varying 
degrees by the 49 LEAs are incomplete, of course, so on this basis alone it isn’t 
appropriate to claim that SARs are broadly under-utilised by LEAs nationwide. But 
the LEAs themselves concur: by their own admission, 38 of the 49 LEAs—more than 
77 percent— stated that SARs were under-utilised in their unit. O f those stating that 
the utilisation o f SARs in their unit was just right, several suggested that this was 
because any increase in SARs-related work would strain resources too tightly (and 
that resources were already under pressure). The fact that SARs are under-utilised 
was further confirmed by conversations with knowledgeable members of the law 
enforcement community and in site visits (not to imply that all site visit participants 
are under-performing).
The question then becomes why: why are SARs under-utilised by LEAs? 
LEAs were asked if the uses to which SARs were put—and thus outcomes—were 
limited in their units by various factors. Only two LEAs suggested here that the uses 
to which SARs were put were not limited at ail (in contrast to the twenty-something 
percent of LEAs saying that SARs use was just right in the preceding question). Of 
the remaining 47 units, nearly 90 percent reported that the uses to which SARs were 
put were constrained by resource limitations in their unit. Rarely will organisations 
forego the opportunity to ask for more resources when given it. In this case such 
claims appear appropriate. A large number of comments received suggested that 
limitations on SARs-development resources prevented LEAs from working up targets 
unless they were known nominals. Several LEAs reported that all they could do was 
search for SARs relating to existing investigations— and that SARs just weren’t 
getting the attention they deserved. Some LEAs rationally noted that they found it
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difficult to justify allocating scarce resources on the back of only one piece of 
information. This is not to argue for a massive increase in SARs-related resources for 
each LEA. One of the responding LEAs probably gets it right with the following 
statement:
It's all a matter of degree. Unlimited additional resources would maximise their 
potential but we need to concentrate on improving things first. How about better 
systems and a moderate increase in resources, matched by a realisation that 
judicious selection o f a significant SAR, followed by adequate attention to and 
interest in it might actually create a worthwhile result.
LEAs went on to cite further reasons why the uses to which SARs were put 
were limited. These included: difficulties in selling SARs-based jobs to operational 
teams (32 percent); no clear suspicion contained in SARs (32 percent); IT systems in 
their units (19 percent); the fact that LEAs were getting fewer nonconsent SARs from 
NCIS since June 2004 (15 percent); and the fact that SARs upon receipt were several 
months old (9 percent). These were not mutually exclusive, such that LEAs could 
select any o f the reasons that applied to them (the latter two were identified by the 
LEAs in open-text fields).
It’s no secret that LEAs seem to work on things that are measured, and ignore 
things that are not. No performance indicators of any value on SARs were identified 
anywhere. Some LEAs noted that they monitor SARs received from NCIS, though it 
is hard to imagine that this is useful for anything other than a work-load barometer (as 
opposed to a true performance monitor). Uses might be increased with appropriate 
performance indicators.
Finally, LEAs were asked for recommendations on improving the use and 
management of SARs. Their comments all reinforced thoughts set out above and 
discussed over the many preceding pages. LEAs suggested that sufficient resources 
be devoted to SARs; better IT solutions for case management and SARs analysis 
(including data mining tools and perhaps national IT solutions for the handling of 
intelligence); and full access to timely SARs from NCIS. LEAs also noted the need 
for LEA managers to continue to work toward the mainstreaming of POCA and 
financial investigation. And lastly, LEAs called for more education/training of the
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regulated sector, to ensure that little noise accompanied the SARs signal (i.e. to ensure 
that only SARs based on true suspicion were filed, not defensive or misguided 
reports).
NCIS uses of SARs: After years spent primarily inputting, 
processing/analysing, and disseminating SARs, NCIS SFI has entered the 
intelligence-development arena. SARs are used to generate or contribute to various 
tactical and strategic intelligence products within SFI.140 While some are self-tasked, 
most SFI products are driven by national strategies—as set forth in the NCIS Service 
Plan—established by the Concerted Inter-Agency Criminal Finances Action Group 
(CICFA), the Concerted Inter-Agency Drugs Action Group (CIDA), the REFLEX 
Group (on illegal immigration and human trafficking), and the national firearms 
strategy. Current SFI work products range from problem profiles to current 
intelligence assessments (CIAs) to baseline assessments to target/nominal profiles, all 
of which contribute to the store o f knowledge on money laundering.141 While 
sensitive (products cannot be discussed in detail here), such products may examine 
how particular sectors are used to launder criminal proceeds, may identify emerging 
trends, and may suggest targets for tactical activity. Products are generally sent to 
FIBs and FIUs, though distribution lists are not fixed. Many of these products are 
sanitised and forwarded to industry. SFI also uses SARs to support Operation 
Payback initiatives in various regions, primarily with quick-and-dirty (yet useful) 
target lists and subject-of-interest lists. SARs are used in strategic research on various 
aspects o f the regime (one such project focuses on consent SARS and their efficacy). 
Perhaps most interesting o f all is some tactical work SFI is running on some 
significant targets. This type o f work often involves 20-40 suspects in criminal 
networks, with sometimes hundreds or even thousands of SARs (informed by other
140 SARs are disseminated to NCIS units outside SFI; according to SFI, more than 34,000 SARs were 
disseminated to non-SFI units in 2003-2004 (o f which some 800+ represent original disseminations, 
with the rest as copied-to disseminations). This research did not contact non-SFI units to explore how 
these SARs were used.
141 Problem profiles identify specific areas or issues requiring operational attention or policy 
development; current intelligence assessments describe newly identified traits in criminal activity or 
assessments o f  current impacts against previously identified areas; target profiles identify specific 
individuals or entities for law enforcement attention; and baseline assessments capture baseline 
information on identified issues (NCIS, no date).
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sources of intelligence, of course).142 Lastly, SFI plays a significant role in 
international work, through foreign financial intelligence unit requests for 
information, with the FATF, and in representing the UK in the Egmont Group. SARs 
may contribute to these international responsibilities.
A relevant question is this: are LEAs using the tactical and strategic products 
drafted by NCIS? LEAs were asked if  they received such products and if  they 
prioritised them. Most LEAs reported that they had received few if  any SARs-based 
products from NCIS (the LEAs who did receive such products suggested that these 
were indeed prioritised in some way). To some extent this is a distribution issue: 
many such intelligence products will be released on a need-to-know basis. The 
majority of the products relate to national serious organised crime priorities, which 
will have little to do with most territorial LEAs. That said, those certain products 
intended for wider distribution to improve LEAs’ AML capabilities do not appear to 
be getting to the troops in the trenches. Some LEAs felt this might be due to their 
own managers who received the products but did little with them. A general vibe was 
put out by many o f the LEAs, though one perhaps biased by pre-existing enmity 
towards NCIS, that NCIS was/is answering questions nobody asked with its 
intelligence products (though the majority of these do seem to have been tasked by 
CICFA). If nothing else, this does all seem to be suggestive of the need for better 
communication between NCIS and LEAs.
Feedback from LEAs to ISCIS/Industry
Feedback from LEAs to NCIS: NCIS maintains systems and protocols for 
receiving SARs-specific feedback from LEAs. Disseminated SARs are each 
accompanied by a feedback form through which LEAs can provide information on the 
usefulness o f the SAR and the purpose, if  any, to which it was put. The form also 
provides the opportunity to supply details o f any outcomes and to pass on anything 
learned from the use o f the SAR (e.g. modus operandi of the offender) for potential
142 The number o f SARs used in intelligence products represents an interesting piece o f management 
information which begins to shed some light on the use made o f SARs. Unfortunately, NCIS keeps no 
record o f  the number o f SARs used in the drafting o f its products. Excluding the tactical work based 
on the many hundreds o f SARs, most products appear to be based on limited numbers o f SARs. 
Intelligence products do, o f  course, also draw from other NCIS databases/products and open-source 
information.
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use in typologies. Information captured in the SAR feedback form is described in 
Table 7.8. Notable in the design of this form is that despite its depth (and perhaps 
over-zealous length), several important concepts are lacking, and there is an 
incomplete overlap with those concepts called for by the FATF (e.g. there is no 
mention of restraint/confiscation). Also, there is no easy way to capture the fact that 
the SAR in question links to previous SARs in some manner (NCIS will no longer 
capture links to previous SARs with the Elmer rollout, as LEAs will be able to 
conduct searches yielding this information). LEAs are encouraged to send feedback 
forms back to NCIS electronically (via the money.web extranet or secure email), 
though hardcopy feedback is accepted. Additional short forms are used for consent 
SARs: Document A records the consent decision (along with the reasoning behind the 
approval or denial o f consent); Document B is completed by LEAs only in the case 
that consent is denied, and after 31 days have passed, describing the details o f the 
investigation and any subsequent court orders applied for.
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Table 7.8. SAR Feedback Form
Section/question Answer choices
1. Initial assessment. Please select Suitable (go to section 2)
one o f  the following After evaluation deemed unsuitable (go to section 8) 
Insufficient data supplied (go to section 8)
Requires allocation to another force area (go to section 8)
2. Source contacted. Disclosing [Check box]
institution has been contacted
3. Current status. Please select one Awaiting evaluation (no action initiated)
o f the following Under active investigation or evaluation 
Complete (enter results in part 4)
4. Result/current progress. Please Disclosed transactions identified as proceeds o f crime
select at least one o f the following Other proceeds o f crime identified as a result o f investigation or 
evaluation
Direct arrest (please give details in section 8)
Assist arrest—other persons arrested (please give details in 
section 8)
Realisable assets identified and value o f assets 
No connection to crime at this time but still suspicious 
Funds not linked to criminality (please give details in sect. 8) 
Cannot progress because confidentiality will be broken 
Linked to an ongoing enquiry
5. Final assessment. Please select Existing intelligence enhanced (info on local database
one o f the following supplemented)
New intelligence (new record created on local database—no 
existing current record)
After evaluation suggested reallocation to another government 
department (please specify a more appropriate investigator in 
sect. 8)
Charged/summoned
Convicted
6. Modus operandi [Open-ended answer field]
7. Relevant investigation material. [Check box]
New nominals, companies, 
transactions, addresses or 
information records added by 
search request
8. Comments. Please include [Open-ended answer field]
intelligence evaluation where 
appropriate
Source: NCIS. This form  is to be completed fo r  all SARs; two additional short forms should be filled  
out fo r  consent SARs.
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Neither incentives nor sanctions are used to persuade LEAs to send feedback. 
NCIS staff suggested that there were no specific guidelines for LEAs regarding 
feedback provision, at least that they were aware of. LEAs are strongly encouraged to 
provide feedback to NCIS and reminders are given in various fora, such as the 
quarterly meeting o f the national FIWG or through occasional visits by the SFI 
Collections team. The system was historically set up to chase feedback from LEAs at 
various intervals (via periodic emails); this facility has not been used for several 
years, as LEAs found it to be a cause o f consternation as opposed to a useful 
reminder.
NCIS received 29,135 feedback forms from the 49 primary LEAs in 2003- 
2004, representing some 28.7 percent of the 101,567 SARs disseminated to these 
LEAs in the same period.143 This is 40.3 percent of the 72,375 original 
disseminations (it is unclear whether the query providing feedback information 
captured feedback on the same SAR (perhaps filed by two organisations looking at 
the original and copied-to SARs). Also, it may be most appropriate to view feedback 
forms with a lag (viewing April forms received as a percentage of January SARs, for 
example), though this makes little difference to the 2003-2004 aggregate percentage 
(April 2003-December 2004). Moreover, the pattern o f feedback received seems to 
track disseminations in the same month (suggesting to some extent that substance of 
the feedback will likely contain little on outcomes). Interestingly, despite suggestions 
to the contrary, a good number o f LEAs provide feedback on a regular basis; 14 of the 
49 LEAs provided feedback on more than 50 percent o f the SARs disseminated to 
them in 2004. LEAs also almost universally supplied Document A recording the 
consent decision o f all consents disseminated; 49 Document B forms were received 
between January and December 2004 (NCIS did not maintain this information prior to 
January 2004). Bearing in mind that Document B forms are only supplied to NCIS 
when consent is denied, a small number o f Document B receipts was to be expected 
(though this figure o f 49 forms does appear suboptimal). Feedback figures are 
presented in Table 7.9.
!43 The SARs disseminated to the 49 LEAs is likely an underestimate because it doesn’t include bulk 
disseminations. See footnote 139 for more information.
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Table 7.9. Annual Feedback Sent from LEAs to NCIS, 2003-2004
Variable 2003 2004 Total
Feedback forms received by NCIS 18,849 10,286 29,135
Total SARs disseminated to the 49 primary users 66,098 35,469 101,567
Feedback as a percentage o f these total disseminations 28.5% 29.0% 28.7%
Original SARs disseminated to the 49 primary users 
Feedback as a percentage o f  these original
45,129 27,246 72,375
disseminations 41.8% 37.8% 40.3%
Source: NCIS. Disseminated SARs exclude SARs related to terrorism and various other sensitive 
issues; SARs destined fo r  overseas jurisdictions; SARs sent out in bulk backlog-clearing exercises (see 
footnote 139); and SARs sent to NCIS units other than SFI. Total SARs includes original 
disseminations plus copied-to disseminations.
Disappointingly, NCIS seems to have done little with LEA feedback since 
end-2002/early-2003. NCIS states that feedback received may be used in the drafting 
of intelligence products/typologies which are disseminated to LEAs and occasionally 
to industry (often via money .web). But the use of feedback for intelligence products 
is an ad hoc use, and comments received indicate that feedback may play only a 
limited role in this regard. No systematic analyses based solely on feedback appear to 
have been carried out to understand the larger picture, at least not in the past few 
years. After all, feedback provides useful management information on the use of 
SARs (a count o f feedback received might imply on its own that those SARs were 
looked at in some way—up to 40 percent of the original disseminations in this case) 
and their pros and cons. To be fair, feedback received is not always informative, and 
may say nothing more than “under active investigation or evaluation”, an extremely 
broad category. A cynical view is that LEAs are just providing meaningless feedback 
to cover their backs (so as to suggest that SARs are being used, when they’re not). 
Since NCIS appears to have carried out little systematic analysis on the feedback 
received, however, it is not possible to confirm or deny the cynicism. That no 
systematic analyses have been carried out likely affects the future provision of 
feedback by LEAs (who might think “if  nothing is ever done with information 
provided, why provide it in the first place?”). More importantly, such systematic 
analyses repeated at regular (e.g. quarterly) intervals could provide evidence o f the 
use— or not— o f SARs by LEAs; if  SARs appear to be under-utilised, LEA managers 
could take immediate steps to improve LEA performance.
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The System in Flux
Finally, the SARs regime is in a state o f flux, and has been for some time now. 
This is largely the result o f actions taken by NCIS to improve the functioning o f the 
regime in the long-run. Some factors are worth noting in passing, as they may have 
had an impact (and may continue to have an impact) on LEA use and management of 
SARs.
NCIS: The E lm er rollout: The rollout of the Elmer database on 27 May 2005 
is the most positive change within NCIS and the SARs regime. The Elmer rollout 
will fundamentally change the way LEAs deal with SARs, as the rollout will put 
access to nearly live data at LEA fingertips. Phase II of the rollout (to be delivered in 
early 2006) should bring advanced data mining capabilities and numerous other 
significant enhancements to the system. These include the ability to send automatic 
notification o f SARs received on selected criteria to relevant LEAs and NCIS/SOCA 
internally, the ability to bulk download SARs, and enhanced searching on free text 
data. It seems reasonable that LEAs will be able to launch more proactive 
investigations with such “young” SARs. And LEAs will be in a position to carry out 
far more advanced analytical work than at present, at least if  they’re trained on the 
system enhancements. But it also places the onus on the use of SARs squarely on 
LEA shoulders. The SARs-related workload, at least with regard to information 
evaluation, for each LEA may become overwhelming, as 1) all SARs will be available 
for viewing by LEAs (save for those related to certain sensitive issues); 2) NCIS will 
not highlight links to previous SARs; and 3) LEAs will be responsible for all of the 
various relevant database searches in information evaluation/intelligence 
development. Resource constraints may prevent certain LEAs from evaluating all of 
the SARs within their remit/territory. To illustrate, using 2004 as a guide, Table 7.10, 
below, presents SARs allocated to each LEA, the LEA percentage o f the total number 
o f SARs allocated, the number o f SARs allocated per workday (assuming 250 
workdays per year), and the number of SARs disseminated per workday. Given 
comments received on resource constraints with the current SARs workload (which 
hitherto has been disseminations, not total allocations— which Elmer will emulate), it 
seems likely that LEAs will feel even more burdened than in the past. Critically, 
LEAs— particularly the MPS—will need to devise ways to find those SARs which 
represent a priority. There is most certainly a call for the automation o f at least some
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initial information evaluation, including introducing features within Elmer 
highlighting links to previous SARs. The one-by-one manual evaluation of SARs 
upon receipt may forcibly become a thing of the past. This is not necessarily an 
undesirable development, but there will clearly be a need for tools which enable the 
efficient and effective electronic evaluation o f SARs (e.g. keyword 
searching/advanced data mining). Phase II of the rollout will hopefully assist in this 
regard. Further, because fewer nonconsent SARs have been disseminated by NCIS 
since June 2004, LEAs will be facing something akin to a full year’s “backlog” of 
SARs when the database is rolled out. Should these be evaluated (at least in the sense 
that they’re actively looked at one-by-one— they will obviously be very useful in 
searches o f the system and other database interrogation)?144 Regarding feedback, 
with the rollout of Elmer, LEAs will be able to easily provide feedback directly to 
NCIS by pointing-and-clicking their way through an online version of the feedback 
form. This does not, however, obviate the need for some sort o f incentives to greatly 
increase LEA buy-in to the feedback process. In fact, NCIS will be in a position to 
monitor use o f Elmer, both as an indicator o f the use o f SARs, and as a means of 
encouraging LEAs to make regular use o f the database (under-performance could be 
reported to ACPO/LEA managers, who could thus encourage improvements as 
necessary). Also, should access to Elmer be granted to both FIUs and FIBs (FIBs 
being the ACPO proposal), there will need to be clear guidelines on which unit will 
do what, so as to prevent a waste o f scarce resources. Regardless of the FIU/FIB 
decision, LEAs will need to buy into the flagging/ownership of SARs, to prevent 
wasteful “blue-on-blue” duplication o f efforts. Given the paradigm shift in dealing 
with SARs represented by the rollout o f Elmer, there is a strong call for a future 
review o f the regime (including on outcomes), after at least a year of Elmer access by 
LEAs. The LEA aspects o f the regime will clearly undergo considerable change in 
that time, very likely for the better.
144 There is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that LEAs appear to be under the impression that they 
will be expected to work through the “backlog”.
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Table 7.10. Annual SARs and Workloads by LEA, 2004
LEA
2004 SARs 
allocated
LEA percentage 
o f  total allocated
2004 SARs 
allocated per 
workday 
(estimated)
2004 SARs 
disseminated per 
workday 
(estimated)
Avon & Somerset 
Constabulary 1,867 1.4% 7.5 0.8
Bedfordshire Police 1,389 1.0% 5.6 0.5
Cambridgeshire Constabulary 1,159 0.9% 4.6 0.7
Cheshire Constabulary 1,279 1.0% 5.1 0.6
City o f London Police 695 0.5% 2.8 1.1
Cleveland Police 595 0.4% 2.4 0.3
Cumbria Constabulary 392 0.3% 1.6 0.3
Derbyshire Constabulary 1,043 0.8% 4.2 0.4
Devon & Cornwall 
Constabulary 1,597 1.2% 6.4 0.6
Dorset Police 1,202 0.9% 4.8 0.4
Durham Constabulary 510 0.4% 2.0 0.4
DWP 889 0.7% 3.6 4.6
Dyfed Powys Police 650 0.5% 2.6 0.3
Essex Police 2,145 1.6% 8.6 0.9
Gloucestershire Constabulary 582 0.4% 2.3 0.3
Greater Manchester Police 5,050 3.8% 20.2 2.1
Gwent Police 586 0.4% 2.3 0.3
Hampshire Constabulary 2,156 1.6% 8.6 0.8
Hertfordshire Constabulary 1,632 1.2% 6.5 0.6
HMCE 6,398 4.8% 25.6 42.3
Humberside Police 968 0.7% 3.9 0.4
Inland Revenue 9,126 6.9% 36.5 38.6
Kent Police 2,042 1.5% 8.2 1.1
Lancashire Constabulary 2,756 2.1% 11.0 1.2
Leicestershire Constabulary 1,681 1.3% 6.7 0.8
Lincolnshire Police 643 0.5% 2.6 0.5
Merseyside Police 1,789 1.3% 7.2 1.0
Metropolitan Police Service 39,150 29.4% 156.6 15.4
NCS 372 0.3% 1.5 1.5
Norfolk Constabulary 925 0.7% 3.7 0.5
North Wales Police 680 0.5% 2.7 0.2
North Yorkshire Police 627 0.5% 2.5 0.5
Northamptonshire Police 844 0.6% 3.4 0.4
Northumbria Police 1,545 1.2% 6.2 0.6
Nottinghamshire Police 1,519 1.1% 6.1 0.6
PSNI 4,125 3.1% 16.5 5.9
SDEA 4,472 3.4% 17.9 3.0
South Wales Police 1,311 1.0% 5.2 0.7
South Yorkshire Police 1,809 1.4% 7.2 1.0
Staffordshire Police 1,287 1.0% 5.1 0.6
Suffolk Constabulary 732 0.5% 2.9 0.4
Surrey Police 3,151 2.4% 12.6 1.1
Sussex Police 2,223 1.7% 8.9 0.9
Thames Valley Police 4,666 3.5% 18.7 1.3
Warwickshire Police 548 0.4% 2.2 0.2
West Mercia Constabulary 1,653 1.2% 6.6 0.7
West Midlands Police 5,985 4.5% 23.9 2.7
West Yorkshire Police 3,709 2.8% 14.8 1.6
Wiltshire Constabulary 979 0.7% 3.9 0.3
Source: NCIS (for allocations and disseminations). 2004 disseminations, on which the 2004 SARs disseminated 
per workday column is based, are total disseminations (i.e. original + copied-to disseminations). The allocated/ 
disseminated per workday (estimated) columns assume 250 workdays p er year. SARs allocated/disseminated 
directly to various Scottish forces have been included with the SDEA figures.
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NCIS: The June 2004 reduction of nonconsent disseminations: In contrast 
to the positive direction o f the Elmer rollout is the unilateral decision taken by NCIS 
to significantly reduce the dissemination of nonconsent SARs after June 2004 (see 
page 129 for more detail on the change in procedures). And the issue is not historical 
in nature: with the Elmer database rolled out, LEAs will need to consider what to do 
with previously unseen nonconsents (these will be useful in searches and other 
analytical work based on information interrogation, but should these SARs be 
evaluated one-by-one, as queried above?). Regardless, there are three issues here: the 
implications o f the June 2004 decision for non-national LEAs (i.e. territorial forces in 
England & Wales and Northern Ireland, as well as the SDEA, as the point of contact 
for Scottish forces); the NCIS Service Plan and the aims of the regime; and the 
manner in which the decision was taken (which relates to ownership of the regime).
The main implication of the June 2004 reduction is that few nonconsent SARs 
have been disseminated to and thus evaluated by local law enforcement in almost a 
year. This would not have been worthy of comment had the Elmer rollout taken place 
in early autumn 2004 as originally planned. But it did not. As such, according to data 
provided by NCIS, between July 2004 and April 2005, some 135,633 SARs were 
received and 15,574 were disseminated; more than 90 percent of these will be 
nonconsents (see Figure 7.3, page 181). By these counts, 120,059 SARs have not 
been seen by LEAs since June 2004, though in actual fact this is an overstatement of 
the problem. These figures do not take into account the semi-regular bulk CD-based 
disseminations to Cheshire Constabulary, Merseyside Police, and the MPS. These 
may represent some 20,000-30,000 nonconsent SARs. So perhaps between 90,000- 
100,000 SARs will not have been seen by local law enforcement (not all SARs were 
disseminated to LEAs before the June 2004 reduction, so while this represents a 
significant change, it is not entirely unprecedented). While these SARs will indeed 
have undergone considerable keyword and other searches/analyses at NCIS, these 
searches and analyses have been focussed on national priorities as set forth in the 
NCIS Service Plan. NCIS will generally not have employed keywords relating to 
local targets (i.e. local force priorities, Level One and perhaps Level Two in the 
NIM). So the concern is that those un-disseminated SARs may hold some important 
local intelligence which could have prevented crime or at least assisted in its
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enforcement after-the-fact (though many SARs might be o f limited or no value, or 
relevant only to national issues).
To be fair, the present chapter has highlighted the fact that LEAs were broadly 
under-utilising SARs; more would not necessarily have improved things (the 
reduction in nonconsent disseminations may have insulated certain LEAs from 
criticism). Many LEAs had indicated to NCIS in an internal research effort o f the SFI 
Collections Unit that they were happy to let NCIS filter SARs (i.e. they were happy 
not to receive all SARs). Actually, filtering was originally recommended by KPMG 
because LEAs couldn’t cope with the volume of SARs they were receiving—but then 
NCIS was doing at least initial evaluations/examinations o f the SARs. And NCIS has 
suggested that it chose to significantly reduce nonconsent disseminations because 
LEAs were doing little with the SARs in the first place. Even after June 2004, many 
LEAs seemed either blissfully unaware that very few nonconsent SARs were coming 
their way, or knew but didn’t object (both discouraging thoughts). Conversations 
with LEAs suggest that some did welcome the slowdown because they viewed 
dealing with SARs as competing with other priorities like confiscation and cash 
seizure. NCIS did provide the LEAs with various workarounds (these were supposed 
to be temporary, as the Elmer rollout was initially scheduled for early autumn 2004). 
These include: LEAs were invited to come to NCIS to use Elmer onsite; LEAs could 
have filed search requests; NCIS was sending out various subject-of-interest and 
target lists, all based on SARs; and timely and actionable consent SARs were still 
being disseminated.
But comments received in the course of this research suggest that some LEAs 
found the workarounds unsuitable (and many of these LEAs represent the larger 
consumers o f SARs). In contrast with those LEAs happy to let NCIS filter SARs, 
some LEAs wanted to see all o f the SARs o f relevance to them— and this was told to 
NCIS before the reduction. And not all LEAs were doing little with their SARs; some 
LEAs appear to have been using SARs to a sufficient and sufficiently interesting 
extent. A small number of LEAs who might have been underperforming had actually 
hired staff specifically to deal with SARs, only to find the tap more or less turned off. 
Moreover, that LEAs were doing little with their SARs seems to be an issue for NCIS 
to sort out in conjunction with LEA ringmasters at ACPO and the Home Office, not
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unilaterally. On the work-arounds, very few LEAs seemed to be pleased with the 
offer to visit NCIS to use the data. LEAs could have filed search requests, but the 
process is commonly recognised as inefficient and slow (ironically, the results of 
search requests come through the system as SARs, so an LEA might receive a SAR 
saying that NCIS has no information to provide for a previously lodged search 
request). Further, there is some anecdotal evidence that NCIS was somewhat 
reluctant to conduct vast numbers of search requests to compensate for the lack of 
nonconsent SARs. After all, it seems that the decision to limit dissemination was 
inspired by a lack of resources in the first place, and spending untold hours 
conducting search requests is not drastically different from spending untold hours 
processing SARs.
In any case, NCIS SFI was not acting in bad faith, o f course. SFI was 
performing the duties and meeting the targets set forth in the NCIS Service Plan. This 
is the second o f the issues relevant to the significant reduction in nonconsent 
disseminations. Guided by the Service Plan, SFI has focussed on supporting national 
strategies (CICFA, CIDA, REFLEX, firearms), which is reasonable— and some of 
this work is very exciting. What is not as reasonable, however, is that this focus may 
have been partly at the expense o f local LEAs, who also have a role to play on SARs. 
What, then, are the overall aims o f the regime? Are they to combat national-level 
serious and organised crime, or are they to combat local priorities (Level 1 o f the 
NIM), or both? The regime appears to not have any governing mission statement 
which clarifies this in any way (or at least one agreed by all relevant parties). The 
Service Plan objectives seem to support the role o f SARs nearly exclusively in 
national-level crime-fighting, but perhaps only because the issue has never been fully 
raised and resolved. The Service Plan appears too narrowly focussed, failing to 
explicitly recognise the potential for SARs to contribute to local strategies (in this 
regard, the SARs regime represents an anomaly for NCIS, which otherwise focuses 
exclusively on national serious and organised crime). NCIS does, in fact, assist local 
law enforcement through the Elmer rollout. But this was largely not the case for one 
year o f the regime’s history. With different—and explicit— aims for the regime 
driving a different Service Plan, it’s unlikely that the reduction in nonconsents would 
have taken place in the way that it did. The aims o f the regime must be made explicit.
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Lastly, there may have been some considerable ramifications of the June 2004 
decision that deserved greater discussion and perhaps approval within and from the 
larger SARs community. This raises the third issue, the manner in which the decision 
was taken— and ownership. By all accounts, the communication on the decision was 
poor. Regional NCIS offices were not aware o f the June 2004 reduction until weeks 
or in some cases months later. LEAs were not informed. Industry was not informed. 
Some claims have been made that discussions around the issue were held in high- 
level meetings, like with CICFA and the MLRTF. If this is the case, meeting 
attendees don’t seem to have been fully aware of the implications o f the discussion. 
Clearly, the ramifications o f the June 2004 decision do not appear to have been fully 
thought through. Was the decision made with seemingly little forethought because of 
a perceived lack o f accountability? This may be the case because the regime has no 
owner. Such weighty decisions should probably take place with greater concern for 
all parties involved, guided by firm ownership.
HMRC and SOCA: Finally, two sizable mergers are worthy of attention in 
the criminal justice system. Inland Revenue and HMCE became Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs on 18 April 2005, and, of more direct relevance to the SARs 
regime, NCIS, the National Crime Squad, and certain investigative units of HMCE 
are merging to become the Serious Organised Crime Agency (expected in April 
2006). This implies that SARs will be disclosed to SOCA; NCIS will no longer exist. 
Details surrounding the impact o f the merger(s) on the regime have yet to be 
discussed. Two points are worth making on the SOCA setup; 1) it is essential that the 
regime— which should by no means only focused on the most serious o f offenders— 
does not get lost in the shuffle; and 2) critically, the formation of SOCA presents a 
rare window o f opportunity to right many of the wrongs o f the past in one fell swoop.
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Figure 3. Monthly Receipts and Disseminations o f  SARs by NCIS, 
January 2003-April 2005
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Source: NCIS. Disseminated SARs include LEA-bound consents but exclude SARs related to terrorism 
and various other sensitive issues; SARs destined for overseas jurisdictions; SARs sent out in bulk 
backlog-clearing exercises (see footnote 45); and SARs sent to NCIS units other than SFI. According 
to these figures, roughly 120,000 SARs were retained at NCIS between July 2004 and April 2005. But 
some 20,000-30,000 SARs will have been disseminated via CD-ROM to several LEAs, so the true 
number retained at NCIS is perhaps between 90,000-100,000. These will have been subject to national- 
level (but generally not local-level—and this is the issue) keyword searches/other analyses. As at June 
2005, retained SARs are available to LEAs via the rolled-out Elmer database.
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7.3.1. The Experiences of Overseas Jurisdictions
This research, as noted, is driven in large part by the desire o f regulated sector 
entities for systematic information/feedback, for reassurance that their efforts are 
rewarded by sufficient appropriate action on the part of law enforcement. O f course, 
such reassurance is not forthcoming at present, seemingly due at least as much to 
limitations in information management as to whether or not SARs are actually being 
used. A number o f recommendations for improvement(s) to the regime with regard to 
systematic information and feedback simply fall out of a deeper understanding of 
LEA protocols and policies. But another potential source of insight is the experience 
of overseas jurisdictions, who may have faced similar issues in their own countries.
As such, the research looked to a small number o f national financial intelligence units 
for their specific thoughts. Given the short timeframe of the study, efforts were 
focussed on three such units: the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
(AUSTRAC), the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the United States 
(FinCEN), and the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada 
(FINTRAC). Among other things, the three were asked whether they had faced such 
concerns o f industry, namely perceptions that little is being done with the reports 
provided and/or that perhaps SARs (or similar reports) are o f little crime-reduction 
value; and what solutions were implemented to address such concerns.145 
Conversations held with parties from outside these units and a search of the (limited) 
relevant literature rounded out the analysis. International findings are summarised 
below.
By way o f background, each o f the three national financial intelligence units is 
a stand-alone organisation. AUSTRAC sits under the Australian Attorney General’s 
Department, FinCEN sits under the US Department o f the Treasury, and FINTRAC 
sits under the Department of Finance Canada.146 Each unit is responsible for the
145 The research recognises that national financial intelligence units do not control the use made by 
LEAs o f financial information/intelligence and do not speak on their behalf. But they should be aware 
of the lay o f  the land. Time limitations prevented deeper research with foreign LEAs directly.
146 This section is not intended to provide a complete expose o f the roles and responsibilities o f each 
national financial intelligence unit. For detailed information, see each unit’s annual report: AUSTRAC 
(2004), FinCEN (2005), and FINTRAC (2004), all available online. For more on the various functions 
o f national financial intelligence units around the world, see IMF/WB (2004) and Thony (1996). Gold
(continued)
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receipt and analysis o f raw SARs and other financial transaction reports (FTRs; all 
three receive both suspicion- and threshold-based reports).147 Each unit states that all 
SARs are evaluated, though in the case o f FinCEN, this appears to happen in 
conjunction with law enforcement (through what are known as High-Intensity 
Financial Crime Areas, or HIFCAs). Unlike NCIS, each unit also has regulatory 
oversight o f its AML regime. This implies that while the units make use o f the 
information provided by the reporting entities, they also liaise directly with these 
entities with both carrots and sticks to ensure compliance with AML regulations (i.e. 
to ensure that the information provided is timely, accurate, and high-quality).148 None 
o f the units has an operational arm, so, like NCIS, SARs/FTRs and/or other 
intelligence products are sent to various LEAs for action. All units provide LEAs 
with enhanced tactical (and, increasingly, strategic) intelligence products, which are 
the results o f data-mining, cross-referencing other databases, and/or other analytical 
exercises. AUSTRAC and FinCEN (but not FINTRAC) provide select LEAs with 
remote electronic access to their raw data in arrangements governed by various legal 
gateways and MOUs; access levels may differ according to the security clearance 
levels of registered users. Search requests may also be filed by interested LEAs to 
AUSTRAC and FinCEN; search requests are prohibited under Canadian legislation, 
though LEAs may submit “voluntary information” alerting FINTRAC to their current 
operational priorities (FINTRAC may then make use o f voluntary information to tee 
off intelligence development).149 Statistics on the number of SARs/FTRs received by 
each unit, as well as by NCIS, are presented in Table 7.11, below.
and Levi (1994), KPMG (2003), and PIU (2000) also present some limited comparative international 
information, though not on the topics discussed here.
147 Note that each unit deals with suspicion-based reports (referred to by AUSTRAC, FinCEN, and 
FINTRAC as SUSTRs, SARs, and STRs, respectively) as well as various types o f threshold-based and 
other reports; suspicion-based reports and other financial transaction reports will be referred to as SARs 
and FTRs for the purposes o f  this section.
148 FinCEN does not actually conduct the compliance examinations; these are carried out by regulators 
o f the specific industries involved.
149 Legislation prohibits FINTRAC from disseminating the complete results o f its analyses to LEAs; 
rather, disclosures (as they’re known) contain the who, what, when, where, and little else. LEAs may 
gain access to full analyses via a court order requiring FINTRAC to produce relevant information, 
though this avenue has not been widely used.
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What, then, o f  the experiences o f the three financial intelligence units? Most 
importantly, each o f the units noted that systematic feedback on the LEA use o f SARs 
(and other FTRs) is lacking, as in the UK.150 In fact, each somehow acknowledges 
the issue and its importance in various publicly-available documents, such as annual 
reports and speech transcripts. Other public bodies have occasionally weighed in (e.g. 
Auditor General o f Canada, 2004). The limited provision o f systematic LEA 
feedback prevails for the traditional, perhaps universal, reasons discussed earlier in 
the present chapter (see page 141), including: operational priorities may preclude the 
reporting of feedback (or at least timely feedback); the period of time between the use 
of SARs/FTRs and case outcomes may be so large that details (or the importance of 
feedback) are forgotten; the initial users o f SARs/FTRs may differ from those 
ultimately responsible for the case outcomes (with little cross-talk between the 
groups); and limited IT systems and protocols may render the provision of feedback 
difficult or impossible.151
150 That little is known about the LEA use o f SARs and their threshold-based brethren comes as no 
surprise. While the literature is thin, o f the few and sometimes dated non-UK sources, most conclude 
that insufficient information exists on the actual use o f  SARs/etc. The most comprehensive analysis is 
that o f Reuter and Truman in their 2004 analysis o f the global AML regime. They focus heavily on the 
situation in the US, noting that “for the 6 V2 year period ending October 3, 2002, 940,000 SARs 
produced 70,000 direct referrals to federal law enforcement agencies, o f which almost half were to the 
FBI. Unfortunately, there is no information on how many resulted in or contributed to cases”. Another 
example is van Duyne and de Miranda (1999), who find for the Netherlands that “hardly anything is 
known [in their own research] as to what the follow-up measures o f  the police and prosecution might 
have been, owing to a lack o f  feedback from the ‘field’”.
151 Feedback from LEAs on the use made o f SARs may also be lacking because the information 
provided by financial intelligence units is infrequently used. Reuter and Truman (2004) found some 
evidence in the US that “the existing regulatory system and the information it generates is not well used 
in prosecutions”. The Auditor General o f  Canada highlighted the fact that the value to LEAs o f  
FINTRAC’s disclosures (containing only the “designated information” permitted by legislation) was 
limited by the lack o f detail and context in the disclosures themselves (Auditor General, 2004).
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Table 7.11. SARs/FTRs in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United
States
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Australia 7,068
SARs received
7,247 7,809 8,054 11,484
Canada - 3,772 17,358 14,794
United Kingdom 18,447 29,976 56,023 94,708 154,536
United States 163,184 204,915 281,373 506,948 639,884
Australia 369.0
SARs received p er  population millions
374.5 399.6 408.2 576.3
Canada 120.6 550.9 465.8
United Kingdom 314.3 509.1 948.4 1,598.4 2,599.9
United States 572.6 711.4 966.8 1,724.1 2,154.1
Australia
SARs received per unit o f  GDP (USS billions, current prices)
18.7 20.3 19.5 15.7 18.6
Canada - 5.1 19.9 14.9
United Kingdom 12.8 20.9 35.7 52.6 72.7
United States 16.6 20.2 26.8 46.1 54.5
Australia
FTRs received (aggregate figures fo r  all non-SARs reports)
7,052,190 7,815,416 8,937,426 9,501,485 10,768,039
Canada — „ 2,086,153 9,482,536
United Kingdom -- -- -- -
United States 13,416,587 12,996,620 13,105,206 13,286,257 13,751,730
Sources: AUSTRAC (2004), FinCEN (2004a; 2004 SARs figure estimated from January-June 2004 
data), FINTRAC (2004), and NCIS; IMF World Economic Outlook database, April 2005 revision (for 
GDP); IMF International Financial Statistics database (for population; 2004 figures estimated from  
2000-03). FINTRAC was operationally launched in 2001, so no data are available prior to 2002. 
Figures from  AUSTRAC and FINTRAC were provided in fiscal year format, such that 2004 data 
represent information fo r  2003-04. Also, AUSTRAC and FINTRAC officially refer to their SARs as 
SUSTRs and STRs, respectively. FTR figures fo r  A USTRAC include SCTRs, IFTIs, and lCTRs;for 
FinCEN figures include CTRs, CTR-Cs, and 8300s; and fo r  FINTRACfigures include LCTRs and 
EFTRs. The UK does not use FTRs.
This is not to imply that no feedback is ever received from LEAs, however. 
On the contrary, at least in Australia and the US, while levels o f systematic feedback 
appear to some extent suboptimal, both jurisdictions seem to fare somewhat better 
than the UK. (Canada’s system, launched in 2001, is so new that priorities were 
reasonably focussed on getting the system up and running, ensuring the smooth 
functioning of its electronic reporting systems through to the successful disclosure of 
information to LEAs. Improving the systematic understanding o f the use by law
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enforcement o f FINTRAC disclosures is now becoming a priority.152 Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that LEAs find the disclosures o f value.) Interestingly, in the 
MOUs agreed between AUSTRAC and its law enforcement partners allowing access 
to AUSTRAC information, AUSTRAC requires LEAs to provide feedback on a 
quarterly basis (including on the remote use o f databases). LEAs generally comply, 
according to AUSTRAC. AUSTRAC and FinCEN include brief feedback 
questionnaires with various intelligence packages they send out, though with 
admittedly imperfect response rates (e.g. FinCEN reports a 50 percent response rate). 
Relations with LEA partners appear strong. In this regard, AUSTRAC and FINTRAC 
have outposted liaison staff (AUSTRAC staff are outposted with LEAs; FINTRAC 
staff are outposted in FINTRAC regional offices), and FinCEN reports that most 
federal agencies have liaison staff of their own posted at FinCEN. Liaison staff 
provide channels for ad hoc feedback. Moreover, these liaison staff may have 
responsibilities which include the collection and provision o f feedback back to the 
financial intelligence unit (e.g. AUSTRAC staff may suggest procedures to increase 
the efficiency and effectiveness o f feedback, or they may follow-up with the partner 
agency to clarify information on investigations where they know that SARs/FTRs 
have been o f use). Liaison staff may also provide analytical training and support to 
partner agencies.
Encouraging the use of SARs/FTRs and encouraging feedback is a never- 
ending part o f the workload of each unit. All o f the units appear to maintain ongoing 
training programs for LEAs on the importance and potential o f financial intelligence, 
and the feedback issue is raised repeatedly. But beyond such routine activity, each 
unit is taking or has recently taken active steps to improve the systematic 
understanding o f the use of financial reports and intelligence. AUSTRAC, for 
example, employed a consultant to explore the limitations in feedback systems and to 
suggest improvements (e.g. through standardising feedback processes, through 
initiatives to educate LEAs on why feedback is needed, through the use of staff with 
direct responsibility for the provision o f feedback, through the use of case
152 FINTRAC potentially faces a less-daunting task: FINTRAC releases fewer than 200 o f its 
disclosures (which are not individual reports, but rather enhanced intelligence products) to LEAs per 
year. The average disclosure relates to three million Canadian dollars, with five individuals and three 
business involved, relating to some 57 transactions from three reporting entities (FINTRAC, 2004).
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management systems). FinCEN is awaiting the completion o f BSA Direct, its new 
information storage and delivery system (pulling together reporting entities, FinCEN, 
and LEAs). Among the many stated benefits of the system is an improvement o f 
feedback to industry.
Finally, and moreover, concerns that systematic feedback on the LEA use of 
SARs is lacking should be viewed in the context of information provided to the public 
directly by AUSTRAC, FinCEN, and FINTRAC on developments in their AML 
regimes. In stark contrast to the UK, the three units provide a wealth o f information 
to the public, primarily (and most efficiently) through their websites. All publish an 
annual report as well as various other documents, including transcripts o f speeches, 
guidelines and guidance notes, newsletters, biannual reviews, information circulars, 
and strategies for the future.153 AUSTRAC is the first of the units to launch an online 
e-leaming initiative to assist in the education/training of the regulated sector and 
public-at-large. Most publications discuss the use made of SARs/FTRs by LEAs, 
including statistics on trends and case examples. This information may be drawn 
from the internal monitoring of database access (e.g. through metadata on the 
numbers o f logins or searches), from the above-mentioned semi-regular feedback 
from LEAs, or from one-off conversations regarding specific cases (FinCEN, for 
example, reaches out informally to LEAs three times each year for case examples for 
the SAR Activity Review). Publications typically are designed with reporting entity 
input, and are often sent to select industry representatives/groups for comment/review 
prior to publication. Industry seems to hold the publicly available information of the 
three units in high regard. In fact, relations with industry in the three jurisdictions 
appear broadly healthy and positive. Each unit has a sizable outreach/liaison program 
with industry, not least given the regulatory functions that each must carry out. 
FINTRAC spent considerable time with reporting entities preparing for its operational 
launch in 2001. AUSTRAC, in particular, appears to have a strongly cooperative 
relationship with reporting entities, thought to be the result o f a long-standing focus 
on carrots— not sticks— in its regulatory approach, as well as continued emphasis on
153 NCIS SFI publishes no publicly available report (and the NCIS Annual Report mentions SARs in far 
too much generality to be o f use).
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training materials.154 Like the UK, Australia and the US maintain permanent advisory 
groups with government, law enforcement, and industry membership (AUSTRAC’s 
Provider Advisory Group and FinCEN’s Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group), which 
discuss AML policy and relevant issues, like policy design, feedback and 
publications.
In sum, while each o f the three units receives suboptimal amounts of feedback 
from LEAs on the use made of SARs/FTRs and related intelligence packages, 
performance relative to the UK in this regard appears superior. According to the 
units, whilst reporting entities had registered concerns that feedback could be 
improved, entities in general did not seem to feel that their reports were unused or of 
little value.155 In large part, this appears to be the result of 1) an abundance of 
publicly available information drawing on moderate amounts of feedback on the use 
of financial reports; and 2) good liaison between AUSTRAC, FinCEN, and 
FINTRAC and their law enforcement partners, and with industry itself; 3) efforts to 
obtain feedback from LEAs (e.g. through active feedback-gathering efforts on the part 
of liaison or other staff, through steps taken to streamline and improve feedback 
processes, and through ongoing training activities).
7.4. Conclusion
Despite calls for more information/feedback from industry, and despite the 
attention brought to the regime by KPMG and others, very little was known about the 
LEA use and management o f SARs in the UK. This chapter has attempted to fill the 
gap in existing knowledge, highlighting the often complex issues surrounding the 
LEA side of the UK’s AML regime. It has flagged up the fact that SARs appear to be 
under-utilised by most LEAs (though, of course, over-use would likely be socially
154 While in no way suggesting that sanctions should never be used in enforcing regulatory violations, 
there is an unavoidable downside (particularly when sanctions receive press coverage): an increase in 
defensive reporting. This appears to be an issue in the US, following highly visible actions taken 
against Riggs Bank and Amsouth Bank.
155 This is confirmed by industry comments received from various foreign sources which suggest that 
reporting entities do not feel that the information they provide is unused, but rather that 1) there is an 
imbalance between their efforts and those o f  government, including LEAs (not least given industry 
outlays on systems/training/staff); and 2) that the information is not used as effectively or efficiently as 
it could be (e.g. how are SARs prioritised?  and what sort o f advanced analysis/datamining is carried 
out?).
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inefficient, so the intent should not be to drive all law enforcement to the full use of 
SARs); systematic information maintained by LEAs on their use of SARs is limited 
and often o f poor quality; the information which is, in fact, maintained is under­
utilised by NCIS and subsequently by the larger policy community; communication 
and feedback between and within LEAs, NCIS, ACPO, government, and industry is 
suboptimal; and positive change is afoot in the regime—especially with the rollout of 
the Elmer database. The SARs regime should be a powerful tool in the deterrence, 
disruption, and enforcement of money laundering and predicate offences.
That SARs are broadly under-utilised is an important, though not surprising 
(not least given previous research on the subject extending back to 1994 with Gold 
and Levi), finding from a policy perspective. After all, while there is no agreement on 
the exact outlay, the reporting entities spend likely somewhere on the order of nearly 
100 million GBP annually (Reuter and Truman, 2004, citing KPMG)— or more. That 
is a considerable sum if it provides little return on investment for the undeterred 
(though clearly the very existence of a SARs regime should deter some criminality). 
O f course, law enforcement use o f the financial intelligence provide by the regulated 
sector is but one contributor to the efficacy of a SARs regime (see also the previous 
chapter, which discusses another)— but certainly seems to be one of sufficient 
importance. And that the regime may have a dynamic affect on deterrence seems 
legitimate: if offenders realise that there is no impact of having SARs filed on them, 
the regime’s deterrent value (whatever it is) should diminish.
Worth pondering is whether or not law enforcement under-performance in this 
regard (though as with any exploration of the use of intelligence, it’s hard to know 
exactly what solid performance should look like— certainly SARs should not be 
examined one-by-one) is part-and-parcel o f any SARs regime, or rather is something 
upon which LEAs could devote improvement efforts. The latter seems likely, but 
anecdotal evidence around the world seems to suggest that SARs may not be well- 
used (or well understood?) yet. Along these lines, it seems fair to question whether or 
not the FATF recommendations relating to the provision of feedback/statistics 
(notably Recommendations 25 and 32) are too pie-in-the-sky and virtually impossible 
to accord with in any meaningful way. Moreover, it seems fair to consider that what
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is called for in these recommendations is likely not of real use to information 
consumers, given the intricacies of SARs and their use (or lack thereof).
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Chapter 8. Conclusion
So is asset recovery (and, indeed, supportive anti-money laundering policy) an 
effective public policy? That is, does asset recovery, the process through which 
offenders are deprived o f the proceeds of crime, reduce crime? Despite strong 
support for asset recovery in the policy arena, virtually no theoretical or empirical 
work to date has confirmed that asset recovery reduces, or should reduce, crime. This 
thesis sought to begin to fill this gap in understanding through separate-but-related 
chapters o f asset recovery as a crime-reduction policy. This final chapter sums up the 
findings o f the research. It begins with a discussion of specific findings, suggests 
potential directions for future research, and closes with some general thoughts on 
asset recovery.
Perhaps most importantly (and thankfully, given the popularity of asset 
recovery in policy circles), there is indeed theoretical support for asset recovery in the 
fight against crime. Drawing on the economics of criminal behaviour literature begun 
by Becker (1968) and building on the asset-recovery-specific work of Bowles et al 
(2000), Chapter 4 (the first substantive chapter following a background section and a 
literature review) applied economists’ deterrence hypothesis (an application of the 
theory o f decision-making under uncertainty) to the study of asset recovery. In sum, 
ceteris paribus, asset recovery should reduce crime by lowering expected net returns 
per offence (this by increasing expected punishment costs and to some extent criminal 
operating costs, and by removing operating capital). But asset recovery’s impact 
should depend on 1) the capital requirements of and capital availability to offenders; 
2) the certainty o f asset recovery— which is affected, among other things, by 
offenders’ ability to simply hide the proceeds of crime through money laundering 
activity; and 3) offenders’ spending/saving habits. (This hiding ability and offenders’ 
spending/saving habits are examined in subsequent thesis chapters, discussed below.) 
Finally, the possibility exists, though unlikely, that asset recovery may increase crime 
through income effects.
O f course, asset recovery is not single power, but rather a policy package of 
various options. Chapter 4 ’s theoretical analysis also suggests, not surprisingly, that 
different powers should affect crime differently. The recovery of criminal proceeds 
should exhibit a stronger deterrent effect than that of profits (which itself should have
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little impact on crime in the absence of other forms of punishment), and the impact of 
the recovery of aggregate proceeds should be greater still. The deterrent effect of 
taxation recovery is driven in large part by the size of interest and penalties (and high 
interest/penalties can allow this largely profit-based power to emulate the stronger 
proceeds recovery approach). The recovery of instrumentalities is somewhat of a 
wild card, and its impact on crime depends largely on whether the forfeiture of items 
represents a tangible loss to the offender. And various provisions increase the 
likelihood that assets will be recovered and/or increase criminal operating costs, 
which reduce expected net returns per offence and thus reduce crime. Overall, then, 
the design of any asset recovery policy package will affect its crime-fighting efficacy.
The remaining chapters explored issues o f importance to asset recovery’s 
crime-fighting efficacy. Chapter 5 explored offenders’ spending/saving habits. After 
all, were offenders to spend all o f their criminal proceeds on unrecoverable goods and 
services (e.g., “wine, women, and song”), there would be nothing to recover, and asset 
recovery would have no teeth. Chapter 5 examined offenders’ benefit from crime, 
their net worth, and their judgment proof status, all using proxy variables found in 
JARD. Benefit and net worth differed considerably by primary offence, with the 
white collar crimes, particularly VAT fraud, leading the pack in both agreed benefit 
and order amount. JARD benefit ranged from one to more than 156 million GBP, 
with a mean o f 226,714 GBP and a median o f 12,388 GBP; JARD order amount (net 
worth) ranged from zero to more than 18 million GBP, with a mean of nearly 49,000 
GBP and a median o f some 1,938 GBP.
Most importantly, guided by the imperfect yet informative available data, 
offenders on average appear to save some 47 percent o f their benefit from crime 
(though this differed, o f course, by offence type). This tempers faith in asset 
recovery’s efficacy in deterring crime (offenders are not likely to be 
arrested/convicted with probability o f one (i.e. 100 percent of the time), and so truly 
deterrent sanctions would need to be some multiple o f the estimate of the criminal 
harm), though it is in no way suggestive o f a complete inability to deter. Certainly, 
the finding reinforces the importance of asset recovery as a complement to, as 
opposed to substitute for, imprisonment: the two together may represent a sufficient 
deterrent, whereas the two in isolation might not. And asset recovery (and other
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monetary sanctions) should deter at least a subset o f offenders (e.g. offenders whose 
crime type(s) carry a greater likelihood of arrest/conviction, thus requiring a smaller 
multiple of the criminal harm to deter; and/or offenders who carry out crime which 
meets the criteria for recovering the proceeds o f general criminal conduct). Certainly, 
given the differing savings rates for each crime type, depending on the goals/targets of 
asset recovery, it may be most efficient for law enforcement to target particular crime 
types in thinking of any asset recovery strategy.
Offenders can and will take steps to hide the fruits of their labours, and asset 
recovery will be largely toothless if offenders can successfully do so. Most asset 
recovery regimes include anti-money laundering components to prevent offenders 
from hiding— laundering—  their proceeds (though AML components are often 
viewed as distinct from asset recovery policy packages). The crime-reduction 
efficacy o f AML policies, and thus asset recovery, is a function of the ability of 
offenders to reduce their exposure to asset recovery; of regulated sector entities 
(banks, accountants, lawyers, etc.) to alert law enforcement when they know or 
suspect that an offender is laundering proceeds; and of law enforcement to make use 
o f the information provided by the regulated sector. Chapter 6 and 7 considered the 
latter two issues in turn.
Chapter 6 turned to the theme o f regulated sector entities’ (banks, accountants, 
lawyers, etc.) capacity to alert law enforcement when they know or suspect that an 
offender is laundering. Regulated sector entities must alert law enforcement (by filing 
SARs) if  they know or suspect that an offender is laundering proceeds. While the 
very existence o f this requirement likely deters some criminality, suspicious activity 
reporting does not deter all offenders from offending. As such, the targeting accuracy 
of the regulated sector is critical. In this regard, Chapter 6 explored the extent to 
which SARs targeting represents more signal (i.e. accuracy) than noise (i.e. false 
positives), using SARs’ hits on various law enforcement databases as proxies for 
success. Some 20.7 percent o f a sample of SARs provided by three police forces had 
hits on PNC, and 27.4 percent had hits on respective force intelligence systems. If 
hits on either PNC or force intelligence are considered indicative o f overall targeting 
success, then some 35.6 percent of the sample represents signal, not noise. Though 
there is no clear hit rate which defines success, this may be suggestive of moderate-to-
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solid performance in targeting on the part o f the regulated sector (or at least that some 
SAR filers appear to find and report signal—perhaps because they employ effective 
monitoring systems, and/or they see very obviously suspicious activity). After all, 
these checks represent nothing more than simple data-matching, not advanced 
analytics; it is reasonable to assume that more advanced work would reveal higher 
success rates, at least using these proxies for targeting accuracy (i.e. the “noise” may 
not be noise at all).
What this implies is that (assuming we’re seeing OK targeting performance on 
the part o f SAR filers) it may be the case that there is some potential for the SARs 
regime to affect the criminality of those offenders undeterred by its very existence.
O f course, this depends on the ability of law enforcement to turn the financial 
intelligence provided by SAR filers into appropriate action (explored in Chapter 7)— 
which does not appear to be the case. And we cannot escape from the fact that even if 
SAR filers are reporting signal, not noise, that signal may represent the activity o f the 
criminals who aren’t very talented (i.e. the amateur offenders), who, it seems 
reasonable to posit, may not represent those most harmful offenders of greatest 
interest to society.
Finally, as the criminality of the undeterred who have been identified by the 
regulated sector will only be reduced/prevented (and/or their assets will only be 
recovered) if  law enforcement agencies make use of the SARs sent to them, the final 
substantive chapter, Chapter 7, explored the actual use and management o f SARs by 
law enforcement. The chapter highlighted the often complex issues surrounding the 
LEA side o f the UK’s AML regime. It flagged up the fact that SARs appear to be 
under-utilised by most LEAs; systematic information maintained by LEAs on their 
use o f SARs is limited and often o f poor quality; the information which is, in fact, 
maintained is under-utilised by NCIS and subsequently by the larger policy 
community; communication and feedback between and within LEAs, NCIS, ACPO, 
government, and industry is suboptimal; and that positive change is afoot in the 
regime— especially with the rollout of the Elmer database. That SARs are broadly 
under-utilised is important, though not surprising. After all, while there is no 
agreement on the exact outlay, the reporting entities spend a considerable sum on 
SAR filing—disappointing if it provides little return on investment for the undeterred
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(though clearly the very existence o f a SARs regime should deter some criminality). 
And that the regime may have a dynamic affect on deterrence seems legitimate: if 
offenders realise that there is no impact o f having SARs filed on them, the regime’s 
deterrent value (whatever it is) should diminish.
The thesis has contributed to the corpus of knowledge on asset recovery, 
particularly through the theoretical and empirical analyses in the substantive chapters 
discussed above. But it is in no way the last word on the subject. Indeed, there is a 
need for future research.
To begin, it would be interesting to have a greater understanding of asset 
recovery’s costs and benefits. Asset recovery should be a valuable crime-fighting 
tool, but at what cost? Financial investigation is work—even though numerous steps 
can be taken to reduce investigative costs (e.g. through the use of better technology, 
such as that relating to SARs). And financial investigators do not grow on trees, but 
rather must be trained and accredited. While not an analysis of the benefits and costs 
o f asset recovery as a policy package, there are indicators that at least asset recovery 
is not living up to its promise in the UK: the critical review by the National Audit 
Office (2007) o f the UK’s Assets Recovery Agency implies on-the-ground benefits 
(of ARA, at least) falling short o f costs. Of course, it would be inappropriate to 
simply compare the costs o f asset recovery to the amounts recovered—deterrence is 
clearly a very important part of the mix, and no empirical research exists which 
estimates the amount of crime deterred— so any cost/benefit analysis would need to 
be properly carried out, mindful o f assumptions which would need to be made.
This begs the question: why not carry out an empirical analysis on asset 
recovery’s deterrence value? Unfortunately, poor data, coupled with a large array of 
concurrent policy changes (and changes in law enforcement practice), preclude an 
analysis of this kind being carried out at present. Simply put, there’s probably just too 
much going on, and too few data to capture the impact of asset recovery on crime.
This may change years in the future (or not: data shortcomings may never be fully 
addressed; see Levi and Maguire (2004) for related discussions on evaluating the 
impact o f anti-organised crime policies), but for now remains the stark reality. This 
implies that future research must chip away at the unknowns.
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The most obvious future research, and probably the research which should be 
tackled first, relates to the search for/use of better data. O f greatest importance, while 
the thesis has contributed to the body o f knowledge on offender spending and saving 
behaviour, questions remain. Offender financial behaviour presumably differs 
(perhaps through a causal relationship) in the presence of children and/or other 
dependents, with sufficient educational attainment, and/or with legitimate 
employment. But data on these characteristics don’t exist, and/or are not of sufficient 
quality to be of use. Future research should seek to capture these data-points, along 
with the other relevant personal/criminal/financial characteristics. Better data along 
these lines would allow for explorations of the factors which drive certain types of 
criminal activity— and might suggest appropriate policy interventions to combat 
crime. And better data would allow for analyses o f offence choice: if more money 
can be made with white collar crime, and drug dealing and other blue collar crime 
involves violence and its consequent risks, why are more offenders not forgoing such 
crime for the white collar frauds/etc.? What are the barriers to participation in white 
collar crime (or even simply are there barriers to participation in such crime?)?
Along these lines, the present data have not allowed for any serious analyses 
of flows, just stock variables (most notably with net worth). The data don’t even 
allow for analyses o f income (legitimate or otherwise, both flows) per unit time. 
Future analyses should look to capturing better data on flows, particularly on illicit 
and legitimate earnings per unit time—and subsequently comparing these data to 
findings related to legitimate income across the UK. Such analyses would help to 
illustrate whether or not offenders in general or those carrying out specific offences 
might be earning more or less than their non-criminal counterparts. This also might 
go some way to understanding whether or not criminal activity is a substitute for or 
complement to legitimate employment—and would help to suggest the merit of 
crime-control policies based on improving offenders’ employment opportunities.
This research has sought to explore the criminal benefit, net worth, judgment 
proof status, and specific asset-holding behaviour of acquisitive offenders. It has not 
sought to compare the financial characteristics of offenders to non-offenders. Future 
research (particularly that drawing from better data) should look to the statistical and
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economic literature on income and wealth across the population to examine 
differences between offenders and their legitimate counterparts.
Lastly, future research might seek to involve the UK’s Enforcement Task 
Force, which is responsible for enforcing outstanding confiscation orders, particularly 
those pre-POCA. What is it about these particular confiscation orders that makes 
them outstanding? Is it that offenders had insufficient funds to pay off the orders— 
were they judgment proof—or were the orders simply un-enforced and thus ignored 
(itself suggesting a dynamic component to the issue)? What have offenders done with 
their assets in the meantime?
The need for future research is not limited to spending/saving behaviour. 
Reporting entities’ ability to successfully target suspicious activity calls for deeper 
understanding. Another proxy for targeting accuracy might approach the issue from 
another angle. A random sample of convictions could be checked against the Elmer 
database to see whether or not SARs had been filed against the convicted offenders 
(and whether or not hit rates differed by crime type). These findings might then serve 
to bolster (or not) the findings of Chapter 6. As it happens, the Joint Assets Recovery 
Database, which records all confiscation orders and cash seizures/forfeitures in the 
UK, was modified in 2006 to capture similar information (namely whether one or 
more SARs had been filed on the offender in question). Assuming this field is used 
by FIs— which is not necessarily going to be the case, sadly, given how FIs have 
failed to fully embrace JARD—just such an analysis could be conducted quite easily.
Reporting entities filter their internal alerts (which are generated by staff and 
automated transaction monitoring systems), such that fewer SARs are sent than 
internal alerts generated. Future research should examine those alerts which never 
become SARs (compared to alerts which are indeed filed) to explore the extent to 
which the filtering process may represent a misguided disposal of signal, not noise— 
with implications for the impact o f the SARs regime on the undeterred.
But perhaps the most interesting question on targeting—though one which 
may go unanswered due to civil liberties constraints— is whether or not reporting 
entities would have a greater likelihood o f finding truly suspicious activity by simply 
filing SARs on a random sample of their customer base. It seems unlikely that this
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would be the case, but certainly some customers with links to criminality will be 
flagged up with random selection—so the question becomes what is the marginal 
benefit of looking for suspicious activity over simple random selection. Then it 
would be possible to begin to consider the marginal benefits and costs of a SARs 
regime over and above an undoubtedly lower cost random regime.
On law enforcement agencies’ use of SARs, change has been underway for 
some time now, not least with Sir Stephen Lander’s review of the SARs regime in
2006. This begs for follow-up research: are SARs now being used? What outcomes 
do we see?
Whither asset recovery? First and foremost, asset recovery should work to 
reduce crime. But it’s never going to be an acquisitive crime panacea (of course, 
there is no crime-fighting panacea, for acquisitive crime or crime in general). It must 
be part of a larger policy package, one which includes other forms of punishment. 
While not being a panacea, however, it should be of crime-fighting value: asset 
recovery should deter crime (by lowering expected net returns per offence), disrupt 
crime (by generating criminal intelligence), and prevent crime (by removing working 
capital). It won’t do all o f these things perfectly well, but all things considered, it 
represents a decent weapon in the crime-fighting armoury.
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Appendix 1: Estimated Benefit, Agreed Benefit, Order Application, Order Amount
E s t im a te d  b e n e f i t  
A g r e e d  b e n e f i t  
O r d e r  a p p l i c a t i o n  
Order amount
Source: JARD.
Table A1. Estimated Benefit, Agreed Benefit, Order Application, and Order Amount
Valid Missing Minimum Maximum Sum Mean__ __ Median__ Std. Deviation
3 , 1 7 0  5 1 0  £ 0  £ 1 1 2 , 1 1 3 ,4 0 0  £ 9 4 7 , 0 3 4 ,3 1 4  £ 2 9 8 ,7 4 9  " £ 1 4 ,4 4 8  £ 2 , 7 7 8 ,8 9 4
3 . 6 8 0  0  £1  £ 1 5 6 , 5 7 7 ,4 1 7  £ 8 3 4 ,3 0 6 ,6 0 1  £ 2 2 6 , 7 1 4  £ 1 2 , 3 8 8  £ 3 ,2 4 3 ,7 9 5
3 ,1 6 3  5 1 7  £ 0  £ 3 5 ,9 5 5 ,3 9 7  £ 2 7 3 , 9 7 1 ,2 8 5  £ 8 6 ,6 1 8  £ 2 ,9 8 5  £ 8 9 5 ,6 0 3
3.68 0_______________ 0_____________ £0 £18,648,679 £ 180,236,233_________ £48,977_________ £1,938_______ £422,419
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Table A2. Estimated Benefit and Agreed Benefit by Primary Offence
Estimated benefit _______________________________________Agreed benefit
M eati N Std. Deviation Median Mean N Std. Deviation Median
Burglary/Theft/Handling/Robbery £114.137 302 £315.249 £25.664 £91.069 372 £238.610 £21.417
Counterfeiting/Intellectual £274.540 55 £394.862 £46.761 £186.097 66 £341.525 £36.768
Property/Forgery 
Drag Trafficking £187.928 2.131 £1.969.837 £7.000 £95.410 2.431 £509.617 £6.000
Excise Duty Fraud £862,524 92 £2,836.740 £203.772 £320.557 107 £552.783 £100.000
Money Laundering-Drugs £183.289 48 £479.336 £44,168 £158.689 56 £319,525 £43.854
Money Laundering-Other £778.008 66 £1.814.773 £129.081 £644.765 80 £1,630,239 £100,426
Other F raud/Embezzlement/ £533.576 294 £2.855.179 £50.387 £328.499 345 £1.312.941 £41,003
Deception/Crimes o f dishonesty 
Pimps and Brothels/Prostitution; £424.054 24 £762.753 £161.295 £299.091 25 £449.714 £66,829
Pornography 
Tax and Benefit Fraud £137.570 22 £258.075 £35.417 £128.867 32 £274.116 £34,459
VAT Fraud £6.555.384 24 £22,586,919 £1,478.053 £10,557,368 29 £34.849.260 £619.040
Total £299,852 3,058 £2,827,261 £13,809 £226,917 3,543 £3,304,435 £11,691
Source: JARD.
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Table A3. Order Application and Order Amount by Primary Offence
Order application___________________________________________________ Order amount
Mean N Std. Deviation Median Mean N Std. Deviation Median
Burglary Thefi HandlingRobbcry £52.131 297 £199,414 £7,485 £30.174 372 £91,015 £3.070
Counterfeiting/Inicllcctual £123.439 55 £207.014 £26.155 £69.947 66 £153.551 £11.073
Property' Forgery
Drug Trafficking £35.412 2.130 £235,568 £1.598 £23.151 2.431 £190.099 £1,063
Excise Duty Fraud £341,726 89 £2.038.888 £59,180 £94,327 107 £190.154 £24.000
Money Laundering-Drugs £69.877 47 £122.068 £11.100 £60,149 56 £112.287 £13.899
Money Laundering-Other £117.067 67 £154,167 £50.000 £90.366 so £117.234 £47.872
Other Fraud/ Embezzlement/ £348,396 296 £2.558.130 £18.285 £165.248 345 £1.160.117 £13,000
Deception Crimes of dishonesty
Pintps and Brothels/Prostitution' £152.155 24 £257.110 £27,336 £123.280 25 £193.374 £20.000
Pornography
Tax and Benefit Fraud £90.357 23 £147,019 £24.897 £65.209 32 £108,678 £30,480
VAT Fraud £750,046 22 £1.614.076 £143.750 £661.843 29 £1.633.178 £39.586
Total £86,753 3,050 £910,823 £2,772 £49,163 3343 £429,965 £1,840
Source: JARD.
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Appendix II: SARs Case Examples Provided by LEAs
LEAs were asked, in the research for Chapter 7, to provide sanitised case 
examples of the use of SARs. Eighteen publicly usable examples were received from 
16 LEAs. It should be noted that while these case examples can illustrate the manner 
in which SARs do appear to contribute to crime reduction, there is little empirical 
merit in presenting individual case examples as sound evidence of the overall efficacy 
of the regime; one success-story from each LEA does not necessarily imply a well- 
functioning AML system. Case examples are, however, useful in indicating the range 
of LEA activity related to SARs, and also in suggesting to reporting entities that their 
efforts are not in vain (potentially motivating industry to continue to cooperate with 
the reporting requirements).
Despite guidance to the contrary, many LEAs provided only limited 
information. Time constraints prevented follow-up action to gather more detail 
(though there is a fine line between providing interesting detail and exposing sensitive 
information). Further, it is indeed disappointing that more than half o f the primary 
LEA users of SARs provided no publicly usable case examples (33 of the 49 
responding to the survey, 11 of whom provided no examples whatsoever). It is 
unclear if this is indicative of 1) historical lack of success with SARs; 2) limited 
promise of SARs; 3) limited law enforcement use of SARs; 4) no means of gathering 
such information; and/or 5) due to the very real possibility that the fact that one/many 
SARs contributed positively to a criminal justice outcome has not been disclosed in 
court (i.e. is not public knowledge). This last possibility is critical: industiy very 
reasonably supports the confidentiality of SARs; such confidentiality, however, often 
prevents case examples from making it to the public domain.
To be fair, case examples have been in high demand with documents such as 
the HMIC 2004 Payback Time report; perhaps there are not sufficient examples to go 
around. A number of LEAs noted that interesting examples were available but not for 
public use—as cases/investigations are ongoing. Thirty-nine such examples were 
received from 25 LEAs in the course of the research, many resulting from consent 
SARs. Such examples should be enlightening in the future (and the information 
available about them indicates some novel/exciting uses of SARs), but alas they add 
little to the present thesis (and Chapter 7 in particular). There were also examples of
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excellent uses made of SARs in cases which ultimately fell apart in court; they are not 
included here.
Publicly available case examples are presented below:
■ The receipt of a SAR by an LEA acted as a catalyst in the investigation of a 
complex financial scheme exceeding £100 million.
■ A SAR was received which suggested that a money service business in the UK 
was transferring substantial amounts of money overseas. An investigation 
commenced, revealing the existence of previous SARs, one of which suggested a 
connection to European drug-related crime and money laundering. The business 
was run by two individuals, one in the UK and one in the Middle East. The 
individual in the UK collected money through clandestine meetings throughout 
the country. The individual was arrested with more than £175,000 in cash, and a 
further £200,000+ was recovered in various premises. The individual admitted 
transferring £25 million out of the country in a period of 18 months, and was 
imprisoned. Nearly £600,000 were confiscated. The other individual was arrested 
in Europe several years later and extradited to the UK, ultimately pleading guilty 
to laundering £25 million.
■ A SAR received from a reporting entity noted that Mr A was regularly banking 
large amounts of cash in the form of one pound coins, these were in round 
amounts and there was no form of salary paid into the account. Enquiries were 
commenced, and it was established that the cash was being paid into the account 
by the son of the account holder. Financial enquires also revealed that the father 
was retired and was not using the account, while the son was unemployed and in 
receipt of benefit. The information contained within the SAR then tied in with 
information held by the LEA suggesting that the son was committing offences of 
theft from gaming machines. A total of four men were arrested in connection with 
the offences and were convicted of conspiracy. Guilty pleas were submitted, and 
all were given terms of imprisonment. It was shown that the accused had 
benefited some £200,000 from their crimes, and assets were traced to the value of 
£82,000.
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■ A reporting entity made a disclosure to NCIS after Mr B instructed the entity to 
purchase property. The subject was at the time under investigation for drug 
offences. Mr B was then further investigated for money laundering, and number 
of accounts were discovered (of use during the confiscation).
■ A SAR was filed on a drug trafficker paying cash into a third-party account under 
the guise of a limited company (but actually destined for a drug supplier 
elsewhere in the UK)—resulting in a confiscation order o f some £90,000.
■ Two SARs were received by an LEA indicating that a local postal official was 
suspected of criminality. An investigation commenced to gather evidence of 
criminality, which took about two years, before the arrest and charge of the 
official for the theft o f over £750,000 from a post office. The official was 
sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and a confiscation order was made in the sum 
of over £750,000.
■ The development of an intelligence package based on SARs resulted in the arrest 
and charge of individuals in connection with the distribution of pornographic 
videos.
■ A number of SARs were received by an LEA relating to a number of individuals 
involved in exchanging large amounts o f cash with travel agents. Enquiries were 
conducted, and all individuals were convicted of money laundering and subject to 
the confiscation process.
■ Over a period of time, a number of SARs were disclosed by a reporting entity. 
These were collated by an LEA, and an intelligence package was put together for 
action by an operational drugs team. Family members were charged with 
conspiracy to supply Class A drugs. One member of the family attempted to 
dissipate/launder lunds when released on bail. The LEA received a further SAR 
from a reporting entity which resulted in the family member being arrested and 
charged with money laundering. As a result of the SAR, the funds were secured. 
All family members received substantial prison sentences, and a £170,000 
confiscation order was made.
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■ In 2003, a reporting entity requested consent regarding a transaction involving 
more than €1.3 million. Consent was granted, and the money was seized. Despite 
contending the seizure on human rights grounds, the defendant did not supply a 
statement nor did he appear in court. In 2004, the court ruled in favour of the 
LEA, forfeiting the funds.
■ SARs led to the investigation of a large UK business (with turnover of billions of 
GBP). Through NCIS, an LEA was provided with a volume of information that 
detailed the ownership and nature of transactions going through offshore 
companies. The UK companies would buy materials from connected tax haven 
companies and the UK group was reporting large losses. The offshore 
arrangements were never static, however, and during the course of enquiries the 
LEA became aware of over 40 offshore companies. There were myriad issues 
including company residence, transfer pricing, branch/agency, trust legislation and 
employee remuneration arrangements. Ultimately the case settled for more than 
£6 million.
■ A two-year investigation of a major drug trafficking operation was conducted, and 
nine individuals were arrested. Financial investigations were undertaken 
alongside the criminal investigation, and substantial assets were identified both in 
the UK and SE Asia, held in the name of various family members of the 'top man'. 
Two SARs from two different reporting entities, received over 12 months apart, 
located additional accounts that would otherwise not have been identified, 
resulting in more than £100k being added to the assets available for confiscation.
A confiscation order of more than £3 million was ultimately made.
■ In 2004, a consent SAR was received by NCIS from a reporting entity seeking 
consent to move funds in divorce proceedings (there were questions surrounding 
the source of funds). Consent was refused to move £200,000 on behalf of the 
husband. After an investigation, the husband was arrested and convicted of a £2 
million fraud.
■ In 2003, an LEA received a SAR from a reporting entity relating to a large deposit 
of cash. An operation was mounted and the LEA arrested a European national at 
Waterloo Station on suspicion of money laundering. The individual was just
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about to board a Eurostar train to France and was carrying a large bag containing 
more than £150,000, which were seized. A detailed money laundering 
investigation was launched, involving enquiries in the United States, Europe, and 
an offshore jurisdiction, though no prosecution was ultimately taken forward. 
However, the evidence gathered during the course of the investigation showed 
clear links to unlawful conduct. No legitimate claim was ever made on the 
money, and the funds were successfully secured through a forfeiture order.
■ As a result of a SAR-based intelligence package developed by an LEA, enquiries 
were undertaken into the affairs of two individuals working for the UK subsidiary 
of a multinational manufacturing firm. Mr E ordered fictitious goods and services 
on behalf of the company and subsequently authorised that the goods had been 
received and passed on sales invoices from a fictitious supplier for payment. The 
firm paid all such invoices into the account o f this supplier, believing it to be a 
company account—whereas in fact it was the personal account of Mr E ’s ex-wife, 
Ms F. The majority of the funds were then forwarded on to Mr E. Both 
individuals were arrested for conspiracy to defraud.
■ A woman was dealing heroin from her home address and duly convicted. Whilst 
the confiscation investigation was in progress, a reporting entity read in the local 
paper about the conviction. A SAR was submitted, and assets were restrained.
■ Mr G, who had originally entered the UK in 1997 as an agricultural worker (and 
who had been denied asylum but remained in the UK illegally), set up an 
employment agency supplying workers to the agricultural industry with the help 
of a co-defendant. The agency traded from 2000-2003, employing up to 250 
workers, all of whom were illegal immigrants and all of whom were supplied with 
forged Home Office documentation by the agency. The agency supplied up to 35 
other companies with labourers. Income into the company was assessed as more 
than £4 million; £3 million was withdrawn in cash to pay to workers and owners. 
SARs from reporting entities who were alerted by the size of cash withdrawals led 
to the investigation of the agency. Six people were ultimately arrested, receiving 
custodial sentences ranging from three to seven years. A confiscation order was 
made against all six for £1.7 million.
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A reporting entity disclosed suspicious activity on an account. Enquiries revealed 
that the account was controlled by another person, Mr H. Mr H was arrested, and 
a search revealed him to have 100+ identities and to be systematically defrauding 
various banks (all with stolen identities). Mr H and an accomplice received 
custodial sentences. Mr H was also ordered to pay more than £250,000 following 
a compensation hearing.
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